A British Major’s Quixotic American Mission and True Loyalties

In late 1775, Lord George Germain, the recently appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies, opened a letter from a newly retired British Army major, a large landholder in Ireland. The obsequious writer offered that a “Great Man, conscious of his own superiority,” heeded advice from those with valuable experience. The correspondent counselled that when it came to making decisions about America, familiarity was critical, as it was hard for Europeans to understand the colonists. Confidently, the retired officer offered the fifty-nine-year-old senior cabinet minister three alternatives for ending the burgeoning rebellion based on his military deployments in North America. None returned the British-American relationship to the antebellum state. Despite the downsides of the non-military alternatives, the writer urged Lord Germain to consider the long-term consequences of a protracted and bitter war when evaluating his options.

The first alternative was “holding out terms,” to prevent the perception of a “forced subjection,” which would avoid the Americans believing they were treated as “slaves” of Britain. In practice, this meant that the British would not be able to tax the Americans without their consent or veto colonial legislation. The retired officer believed that American leaders would be forced by the colonial populace to accept this generous offer or face the dissolution of their nascent union.

The second alternative was to let each colony decide its own course on independence. Britain would not be “troubled” with the defectors. The colonies would have to fend for themselves as they would not enjoy the protections afforded to members of the empire. This opened the Americans to European and Native Nations’ invasions, which the writer believed would be unappealing to the Americans. While this alternative is seemingly far-fetched, Britons with more influence than the major, such as the political economist Adam Smith, espoused this course of action.[1]

The retired major recognized that the “season for accommodation has passed,” as the ministry was amassing troops for transport to America. Despite the preparations underway, he warned against the third alternative: using military force to put down the rebellion. To make this option workable, the ministry must send a massive army capable of conquering a continent. The army would have to be large enough to garrison all the major seaports while fielding a “grand army to defeat the Rebels’ strongest army.” In particular, he warned against an invasion from Canada, which would allow the Americans to “give us a war of chicane for 300 miles,” require the building of a large fleet on Lake Champlain, and rely on the “false” friendship of the Indian Nations. Even if it was successful, cutting off New England from the southern colonies would not be easy, as Americans could easily attack shipping on the narrow Hudson River from the riverbanks.

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Additionally, the ministry should expect that the military option would take at least three campaigns to subdue the Americans. However, the British would lose a long war because it was very costly and would erode domestic political support. Further, a lengthy war “will familiarize their [Americans] new wants or shew them new channels of supplying their wants, will habituate them to their new governments and … that reconciliation will daily become more remote.” Another risk of the military option was that Europe would come to the Americans’ aid. European navies and privateers could interdict British trade and greatly hamper its colonial-based economy.

Even if a military victory were achieved, the author asserted that it could be as ruinous as defeat. The Trinity College-trained author posed the lesson of Samnite general Gaius Pontius, who trapped a Roman army at the Battle of Caudine Forks in 321 BCE. A period custom called for massacring the surrounded soldiers to remove the long-term threat. Herennius Pontius, Gaius’s father, endorsed leniency for the trapped army: “Let them go free.” The father argued that the extreme act of mercy would create a lasting peace with Rome. Gaius decided on a middle ground, saving the soldiers’ lives but enslaving them. Just a few years later, the dishonored and humiliated Romans rose up to defeat the Samnites. Lord Germain, also a Trinity College graduate, would understand the implications of this classical reference. Victory, in the officer’s view, would only be transitory.[2]

While making several good points, the major’s letter failed to dissuade the notably inflexible Lord Germain from using military force to control, in the former general’s view, the empire’s “misguided children.”[3] Although unconvinced, the American Secretary asked his clerk to retain the major’s letters for posterity with his most important personal papers. The unsolicited advisor’s letter to Lord Germain raises intriguing questions. Who was this able foretelling major? How did a lowly major have the temerity to offer recommendations at the highest levels of British government? Was he as prognostic as his recommendations seem? What were his loyalties?

The author, Apollos Morris, descended from a rebellious but well-connected family. His great-grandfather, Capt. William Morris (c. 1620–1680) served in Oliver Cromwell’s army and later converted to Quakerism, transforming Benduff Castle near Rosscarbery, County Cork, into Castle Salem.[4] Following his ancestor’s path, not as a Quaker, but seeking wealth through soldiering, the Trinity College graduate Apollos embarked upon a military career in 1758 as a lieutenant. Three years later, as a newly-minted captain, Morris joined the 27th (Enniskillen) Regiment of Foot in time for service in the waning days of the Seven Years’ War in the Caribbean. After the June 1762 Siege of Havana, Morris gained North American experience when the army ordered the depleted regiment to New York City. Later, Captain Morris served in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence regions before the regiment returned to Ireland in 1767.[5]

Born to well-to-do Irish-Protestant parents widely recognized as generosus (noble birth) who owned over 1,500 acres, Morris had a history of writing to senior leaders well above his rank.[6] When a majority opened, Captain Morris wrote to Lord Townshend, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, asking for his support for the promotion and promising to “attribute any success” to the Lordship and his help “shall always be acknowledged with gratitude as well as the greatest respect.[7] Successful in his promotion quest, the new major performed routine peacetime duties, including presiding over court-martials and reconfirming soldiers’ eligibility for Chelsea Hospital out-pensions.[8]

On August 2, 1775, the Earl of Dartmouth ordered the 27th Regiment to be on standby for transport to Boston.^[9] Morris did not deploy with his command when the regiment sailed from Cork on September 26 as he left the army a month earlier.^[10] Many years later, an Irish colleague in his memoir opined that Morris “quitted the British service,” “not relishing a war against American liberty.”[11] A British military historian agrees, stating that Morris’s abrupt resignation was due to “the unjustifiable nature of the conflict,” expressing his frustrations in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.^[12] Alternatively, a fellow officer believed that Morris resigned to seek promotion and fame in America.[13] While American sympathies may have been a contributing element, Morris never expressed that he left British service to join the Americans. His letter to Lord Germain suggests the key factor was seeking a political solution, as Morris believed a military alternative would not succeed.

Acting upon his advocacy of a peaceful rapprochement, Morris made the momentous decision to travel to America. With more than a bit of hubris, he told both British and American officers that he came to America to enable “a Reconciliation … as most desirable and Independence only as preferable to dependence.”[14] Morris outfitted a privateer funded by his family fortune and sailed to the West Indies, demonstrating a fervent commitment to the mission. From there, he transshipped to Philadelphia, potentially on an American privateer, disembarking after the public announcement of the Declaration of Independence.[15]

As an experienced combat officer with administrative skills, Morris arrived at a propitious time. George Washington’s adjutant general, Col. Joseph Reed, had resigned to return to political life in Pennsylvania. There was a dearth of Continental Army officers capable of filling this crucial and demanding position. Upon meeting Washington in late January 1777, Morris indicated that he “left the British Service in disgust, upon not receiving a promotion to which he was justly intitled.” Enamored, the commander-in-chief observed that Morris was “a man of considerable military abilities, and from his behavior in two instances, he is a man of bravery and Conduct.”[16] This positive interaction led Washington to consider the retired major as a replacement for Colonel Reed.

Writing to Washington two days later, Morris broached the idea of finding a peaceful solution to the war. “I am certain you will employ for the good of a people which looks up to you, to bring about a reconciliation & to add to the honours you have already gaind that of restoring friendship to Countrys, whose quarrel is unnatural & interests will for a long time be mutual.”[17]

This first meeting and exchange of letters initiated a five-month period of Morris’s seemingly wavering loyalties. Morris sought Washington’s permission to send a letter to the British commander, General William Howe, posing several questions to explore potential aspects for a peaceful reconciliation. Washington refused to allow the Morris letter to be sent through official channels, telling Morris that his efforts were “certainly most laudable, but you must very well know that his is not to be effected by the interposition of any person in a private character, and the Lord and General Howe have refused to negotiate with the only great representative body of this continent.”[18]

Rebuffed in his peace attempt, Morris wrote Washington the next day that once he recovered from a cold, he would set off for Philadelphia, where he would remain “without meddling with politics.”[19] Still wishing to consider the former British major for his adjutant general, Washington asked his aide-de-camp, John Fitzgerald, to invite Morris to have dinner with him on February 1 “to clear up the matter by a personal interview.”[20] At the dinner, Morris indicated he would continue to pursue reconciliation, but, failing that, he would consider joining the American cause. Washington appeared willing to give Morris some time for his reconciliation attempt to play out. Colonel Reed, anxious to resign the adjutancy, pestered Washington about the status of Morris’s acceptance.[21]

On February 18, Morris sent Washington a letter intended for General Howe, “professing a friend to G. Britain as well as to the colonies & to a reconciliation.” The self-proclaimed negotiator asked General Howe several questions. Was independence out of the question? Could Howe treat with the colonies jointly (through Congress)? Would Parliament repeal the Coercive Acts? Was there a settlement to the tax issue? Would Howe cease hostilities until Parliament confirmed agreement on these questions?[22]

Four days after writing this message, Morris hinted to Washington that if he received less than satisfactory responses from his letter to Howe, his inclination was to “follow your orders and obey your orders … I believe that will be the best proof I can give of attachment to this Country.”[23] The next day, Colonel Fitzgerald urged Washington to give Morris more time as “he only wants a Pretence to be forced into our Service, by Sir William Howe’s not Answering his Letter or doing in a manner not Satisfactory to him.”[24]

With the passing weeks, Washington grew increasingly impatient with Morris’s unwillingness to commit to the American cause. He designated Col. George Weedon from Virginia as the acting adjutant general. On March 1, Washington returned Morris’s letter to General Howe, pointing out that “the die was cast” and that the Americans did not wish to reconcile but to be internationally recognized as an independent nation. Washington left the door open for Morris, as he still wished that a man of Morris’s abilities would declare for the American cause.[25] Not hearing any response from Morris, Washington moved on, characterizing Morris’s intentions and character in a letter to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates as “too dubious a nature to intrust with an Office of such high importance.”[26]

Undaunted, Morris continued to send messages to General Howe through a series of loyalist contacts. First, he sent the Howe letter through New Jersey Loyalist John Allen, a former member of the Provincial Congress who left the rebel assembly over his opposition to the war. Allen reported back that Howe rebuffed Morris’s reconciliation attempts as coming from a gentleman without “influence” and “political connections.” Allen included in his response that the appearance of Morris’s old command, the 27 Regiment, “does you the greatest credit.” ^[27]

For another month, Morris continued to communicate with Loyalists to influence General Howe. Finally, on May 8, Allen wrote to Morris that all attempts at reconciliation were moot given the “claim of independency insisted on by the American Delegates” at the Staten Island peace conference on September 11, 1776. ^[28] Washington, although aware of these contacts with the Loyalists, ignored them.

In late May, the former British Army major finally resolved to be neutral in the conflict between Britain and America. Writing to Washington, “I know I should be happy in serving under you, could I by the most remote degree of reasoning construe the object of my endeavours into the good of both Countries,” Morris firmly stated his loyalties:

It is impossible for me consistently to take any employment, especially whilst I am under a Conviction that almost anything short of Independence will be granted on one side; & that no question tending to Reconciliation will be authoris’d on the other, nor even an equitable offer made for a confirmation of Independence.^[29]

Three days later, he again wrote to Washington to express “gratitude for the Confidence shewn as well as for the honorable offer made to me.”^[30]

A piqued Washington found Morris’s behavior odd and felt misled. He informed Morris in a strongly worded letter that

a neutral Character is looked upon as a suspicious one; and I would therefore advise you to leave a Country with the majority of whom you cannot agree in Sentiment, and who are determined to assert their liberties by the ways & means which necessity and not the love of War have obliged them to adopt.^[31]

Washington sent Congress a duplicate, noting that permitting the former British major to remain in the country posed a threat to the American cause. “He has made himself Master of too many Secrets.” To prevent the British from gaining valuable intelligence, Congress should not allow the suspected sympathizer to travel to occupied New York City; instead, it should send Morris directly to Europe or, if necessary, through the West Indies. Further, Washington characterized the erstwhile negotiator as a “dangerous person,” for he would “take every opportunity of gathering information that may operate to our disadvantage.”[32]

Some historians claim that Morris served as a volunteer aide-de-camp in the Continental Army, but this is unlikely given Washington’s reluctance to rely on foreign volunteers without a formal pledge of allegiance to the American cause and the tone of their interactions and correspondence in early 1777.[33] As evidence, historians cite a study of the battles of Trenton and Princeton, attributed to Morris. The battle accounts are detailed, describing command decisions, tactics, and troop movements. More likely, Morris gathered important intelligence through his interactions with Washington’s staff and other officers he met in camp and in Philadelphia. Seemingly, the accounts were written for a British audience. For example, the author provided a description of a creek, which would not be required for an American reader.[34] Additionally, Morris blamed the Trenton debacle on the Hessian commander, Col. Johann Rall. The former British Army major asserted that Rall ignored warnings from a British officer in Princeton about the impending attack, refused reinforcements, and failed to build defensive fortifications.[35]

While offering battle details cited by contemporary historians, the veracity of other aspects of these purported primary-source documents is suspect. The chain of custody is uncertain because the document is not in Morris’s handwriting. The copied study claims that Morris acted as a “major general in the American service” and sent a duplicate of his after-action report to Washington on April 27, 1778. Both assertions are false: Morris never received an officer’s commission from Congress, he was not in North America in 1778, and there is no record of the commander-in-chief receiving the letter.[36] Despite the evidentiary issues with the accounts of the Trenton and Princeton battles, Washington’s concerns over Morris’s intelligence gathering spurred Congress into action.

After receiving Washington’s warning, on June 9, 1777, Congress directed Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold to place Morris under arrest “until further orders of this Congress.”[37] Two Continental guards were placed at Morris’ door, restricting him to the house and yard and preventing visitors.[38] The next day, Congress required Morris to sign a parole agreement that he would not give directly or indirectly any intelligence to the enemies of the United States nor make any statements “prejudicial to the Interest and Welfare of these states.”[39]

Still unsure that he would be free to leave the United States, Morris penned an impassioned plea to John Hancock, President of Congress, for his freedom. Writing in the third person, he “came to this country, not for its riches, but to share its distress & even take up Arms for its peace, Liberty & safety, which he thought consisted in restoring it to the situation of 1763.” The failed negotiator expressed his good intentions and friendship toward both Britain and America. He noted, less than truthfully, the “forfeiture of his Fortune in Europe.”[40] When guards reappeared two days later, he wrote to John Adams to further plead his case for freedom from arrest.[41] On June 20, Congress commanded Morris to remain in Philadelphia until the Marine Committee permitted him to take passage to the West Indies or Europe, subject to the continuing provisions of his parole.[42]

Eight weeks later, Robert Morris, on behalf of the Marine Committee, granted Apollos permission to leave America. He was ordered to proceed, “peacefully & orderly” via the “proper route” to Sinepuxen Inlet on the coast of Maryland. There, Morris was to depart on an American ship, the Brig Friendship, bound for Nantes, France.[43] Although Morris escaped captivity in America, new, serious questions about his loyalty soon arose.

As the brig approached the French coast after a shorter-than-usual voyage, a French pilot boarded to guide the ship into the harbor. Unfortunately, a hostile vessel overtook the Friendship before it reached the safety of the anchorage. The Revenge privateer, operating under British letters of marque, claimed the American ship as a lawful prize and sailed her to the Isle of Jersey. While several other passengers were released, the island’s lieutenant governor detained the former British major and his personal papers on suspicion of treasonous behavior.[44] The Admiralty had Morris transferred to the recently recommissioned, ninety-gun warship Blenheim, docked at the Hamoaze anchorage on the River Tamar in Portsmouth.

There, Morris pleaded that, in America, he acted as an unwaveringly loyal British subject. First, he wrote to Lord Robert Bertie, who commanded the 7th Regiment of Foot in which Morris initially served, to vouch for his character. Bertie did “not chuse to interpose.”[45] Next, he wrote to the lord commissioners of the Admiralty with a more fulsome account of his activities in America. He claimed that his conduct always demonstrated his “attachment to King and Country.” He never took employment nor entered into any obligation, withheld every service, and did everything in his power to “incline them to a Reconciliation.”[46] Finally, he argued that his being under parole from Congress demonstrated his loyalty to the British Crown. Morris’s capture and incarceration made news in England and Pennsylvania.[47]

Eventually, British authorities freed Morris to return to his Irish home in Clonkeen, County Cork. There, he “was esteemed one of the best officers in the British army.”[48] One might have thought that Morris would have enjoyed his military reputation, living as a country gentleman supported by his estate’s income. Unwilling to remain on the sidelines, Morris continued writing to influential political leaders, offering his unsolicited opinions and recommendations.

Two years after returning to Ireland, Morris wrote a series of letters to Thomas Conolly, one of the most powerful and wealthy men in Ireland, criticizing “short-sighted legislatures,” the “selfish passions” of the gentry, a corrupt legal system, and an inadequate local defense force. In one letter, he provided a thirteen-page summary of complaints about English restrictions on Irish freedoms and suggested a better governing relationship. His dissatisfaction with British rule over Ireland mirrored his discontent with British dominion over America, and his recommendations reflected similar proposals to those in America. His efforts at Irish-English reconciliation fell on deaf ears, just as they did in America.[49]

Though unsuccessful as an unsolicited negotiator for the second time, Morris’s days of participating in revolutions had one final episode. He organized tenant farmers into a corps of Irish Volunteers in County Cork, part of an island-wide extra-governmental military movement. The Irish Volunteers sought to pressure the British government to make political concessions, such as granting more power to the Irish legislature.

As part of his Irish Volunteer duties, Morris mentored Arthur O’Connor, the teenage son of a close family friend and an emerging Irish revolutionary. Later, O’Connor would become prominent in the fight against the British occupation of Ireland during the Napoleonic era. The retired army major regaled the impressionable O’Connor with stories of his military exploits. Morris recounted that his contributions in America were little known because he served under a false name to avoid forfeiting his property in Ireland. The retired soldier puffed up (or fabricated) his revolutionary contributions to the American cause for his protégé. On the other hand, O’Connor credited Morris for teaching him the military arts in preparation for a revolutionary life.[50] The extralegal militia pressure on Britain for additional Irish Parliamentary powers bore fruit in 1782. Shortly after this brief Irish political victory, Morris died at fifty-four from unknown causes. Like many revolutionaries, he left an estate mostly encumbered by debt, with his heirs eventually losing Morris’s 1,350-acre estate and house in a debtor’s suit.[51]

Morris’s American experiences pose an interpretive puzzle for understanding the Irish landowner’s perspectives, judgments, and loyalties. How could he so wisely predict British military defeat while not realizing that his own goal of peaceful reconciliation was doomed? One view is that he was mainly chasing fame and career advancement whenever the opportunity arose. A more generous and probably accurate view is that Morris went to America, spending his inherited wealth, to find ways to make colonial relationships fairer, including those between Ireland and Britain. Still, he learned the hard way that he, too, didn’t fully understand the Americans, just as he had warned Lord Germain at first. Morris eventually realized that creating equal relationships within the British Empire would be very tough to do peacefully. Ultimately, that’s why he joined the movement for greater Irish independence. Morris’s main loyalties were to his Irish heritage and land.

[1] Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannon, with Max Lerner (William Strahan and Thomas Cadell, 1776; repr., The Modern Library, 1937), 899–900.

[2] Apollos Morris to Lord George Germain, December 29, 1775, Lord George Germain Papers, vol. 4, William Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

[3] Alan Valentine, Lord George Germain (Clarendon Press, 1962), 100.

[4] Rosemary ffolliott, The Pooles of Mayfield and Other Irish Families (Hodges Figgis & Co. LTD, 1958), 59.

[5] Jeffrey Campbell, “Draught Soldiers to the 27th Regiment,” Seventy-Eighth, December 17, 2018, frasers78th.blogspot.com/2018/12/draught-soldiers-to-27th-regiment.html.

[6] “Trinity College Dublin Alumni Register,” n.d., 435, www.scribd.com/document/94119104/Register-of-students-graduates-professors-provosts-of-Trinity-College-Univ-of-Dublin-1593-1846.

[7] Morris to Lord Townshend, September 1771, MS 41, Box 1, Folder XI, Special Collections, Kenneth Spencer Research Library, University of Kansas.

[8] H. C. Wylly, History of the Manchester Regiment (Late the 63rd and 96th Foot) (F. Groom, 1923), 32. Dublin Gazette, April 6-8, 1775.

[9] K. G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783: Colonial Office Series (Irish University Press, 1972), 11:63.

[10] A List of the General and Field-Officers, as They Rank in the Army: Of the Officers in the Several Regiments of Horse, Dragoons, and Foot, on the British and Irish Establishments (J. Millan, 1776).

[11] Clifford D. Conner, Arthur O’Connor: The Most Important Irish Revolutionary You May Never Have Heard Of (iUniverse, 2009), 19.

[12] Stephen Conway, “British Army Officers and the American War for Independence,” The William and Mary Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1984): 266.

[13] Sheldon S. Cohen, “The Connecticut Captivity of Major Christopher French,” The Connecticut Historical Society Bulletin (Hartford, CT) 55, nos. 3–4 (1990): 221.

[14] Morris to William Howe, February 17, 1777, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence, p. 2, Library of Congress, www.loc.gov/item/mgw446590/.

[15] Morris to Howe, January 20, 1777, Conolly Papers, MS 3974-84, 448, Trinity College Dublin.

[16] George Washington to John Hancock, January 26, 1777, The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series (University Press of Virginia, 1998), 8:160–63.

[17] Morris to Washington, January 28, 1777, ibid., 8:173–74.

[18] Washington to Morris, January 29, 1777,” ibid., 8:181–82.

[19] Morris to Washington, January 30, 1777, ibid., 8:191-92.

[20] Ibid., 191–92.

[21] Joseph Reed to Washington, February 13, 1777, ibid., 8:327–29.

[22] Morris to Howe, February 17, 1777.

[23] Morris to Washington, February 18, 1777,” The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, 8:358–59.

[24] John Fitzgerald to Washington, February 19, 1777, ibid., 8:369.

[25] Washington March 1, 1777, ibid., 8:475.

[26] Washington to Horatio Gates, March 10, 1777, ibid., 8:548–49.

[27] Morris to John Allen, April 2, 1777, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence, www.loc.gov/item/mgw446886/.

[28] Allen to Morris, May 8, 1777, George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence, www.loc.gov/item/mgw447201/.

[29] Morris to Washington, May 26, 1777, The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, 9:535–36.

[30] Washington to Morris, June 6, 1777, ibid., 9:626–27.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., 627–28.

[33] John Milner Associates, Inc., “Report of Military Terrain Analysis and Battle Narrative, Princeton, New Jersey,” paper presented at The National Park Service – American Battlefield Protection Program, September 2010, 50, pbs1777.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/2010-09_MilnerReport.pdf.

[34] Britains would recognize a creek as a prominence on a coast or small cove. Samuel Johnson, “Creek,” Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, 4th ed., 1773, johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/views/search.php?term=creek.

[35] Apollos Morris, “Major Morris’s Account of the Affair at Trenton, 1776,” n.d., MS Sparks 53 (Miscellaneous papers relating to the Revolution, 1752-1779. item 4, pp. 11-19, Harvard University Library, iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:436034650$92i.

[36] Ibid., 9.

[37] Worthington Chauncey Ford et al., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1907), 8:428.

[38] Benedict Arnold to Morris, June 9, 1777, Conolly Papers, MS 3974-84, 477, Trinity College Dublin.

[39] Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 8:450.

[40] Morris to John Hancock, June 12, 1777, Conolly Papers, MS 3974-84/479, Trinity College Dublin.

[41] Morris to John Adams, June 14, 1777, Adams Papers, Digital Edition, www.masshist.org/publications/adams-papers/index.php/view/ADMS-06-05-02-0136#sn=0.

[42] Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 8:489.

[43] Robert Morris, “In Marine Committee of Congress, at Philadelphia,” Marine Committee of the Continental Congress, August 15, 1777, Conolly Papers, MS 3974-84, 484, Trinity College Dublin.

[44] M. Corbet to the Admiralty, September 13, 1777, 127, fos. 214-219d, Colonial Office 5, The National Archives, Kew, UK.

[45] Morris, to Phillip Stephens, November 1, 1777, 127, pp. 231–33, Colonial Office 5.

[46] Morris to Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, November 6, 1777, 234–35, 127, fos. p230-235d, CO 5 259, p202.

[47] Kentish Gazette, November 1, 1777. “New York, January 5, 1778,” Pennsylvania Ledger, or the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New-Jersey Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia, PA), January 17, 1778.

[48] Conner, Arthur O’Connor, 19.

[49] Morris, to Thomas Conolly, January 20, 1777, Conolly Papers, MS 3974-84, 595, 596, 1801, Trinity College Dublin.

[50] Conner, Arthur O’Connor, 19.

[51] Fintan Lane, “William Thompson, Bankruptcy and the West Cork Estate, 1808-34,” Irish Historical Studies 39, no. 153 (2014): 27.