According to some local sources, “Long island was the Thermopylae of the Revolution and the Pennsylvania Germans were its Spartans.” While laden with hyperbole and bias, this is the claim made about the Northampton County Flying Camp battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kichline. Kichline’s battalion, made up of four companies—two of which were severely understrength—had become attached to Lord Stirling’s forces just prior to the opening of the Battle of Long Island. These four companies played an integral part in the engagement and yet are often barely mentioned in histories of the battle (far too often no mention is found about them at all). This article hopes to remedy that.
What can’t be fixed—at least not apparently—is the limited information that exists about the Flying Camp as a whole. Due to the passage of time and poor record keeping, less than 12% of the names of the 4500 officers and men of the Pennsylvania Flying Camp are known. Beyond those who participated at Long Island, even less survives. Normally this would be an annoyance, but locating the extant documents has been part of the fun of writing this paper.
“What was the Flying Camp?” you might be asking. While this question deserves its own full treatment, I’ll give you the abbreviated version as it relates to Northampton County, Pennsylvania (partly due to space limitations and partly to give the editors a break from my normal, lengthy articles). At the onset of the summer of 1776, General Washington needed more troops. Congress, therefore, acted to supplement the army with volunteers. On 3 June 1776, Congress resolved:
“That a flying camp be immediately established in the middle colonies; and that it consist of 10000 men; to complete which number, Resolved, That the colony of Pennsylvania be requested to furnish of their militia… 6,000.
Congress then resolved a day later that these men all be outfitted appropriately by the respective committees, “to take particular care that the militia come provided with arms, accoutrements and camp kettles.”
At this point, Pennsylvania did not have a militia law on the books; instead, they had volunteers, known as Associators, usually supplied by their commanding officers; about 1500 Associators were under the pay of the province at the time of the request for the Flying Camp. Therefore, the Provincial Assembly resolved, in conjunction with these men already fielded, “That this conference do recommend to the committees and associators of this province to embody 4,500 of the militia, which with the 1,500 men now in the pay of this province, will be the quota of this colony required by congress.”
Local committees at the county level were simply too busy dealing with dissent from Tories and the disaffected within their communities to attempt recruitment, especially in Northampton County. The authorities in Pennsylvania would not press the issue of raising troops for almost a month after Congress resolved to raise them.
While the Flying Camp was recruited from volunteer militia companies, the Flying Camp itself was not considered a militia organization. Unlike the Associators, which served at the county level, the Flying Camp was called up by Congress and therefore under Continental pay and in Continental service, meaning that these were Continental troops (even though they weren’t considered Regulars).
When the Provincial Assembly published the resolves of Congress in The Pennsylvania Packet on 1 July 1776; the following was included:
“Resolved unanimously, That the 4500 Militia recommended to be raised, be formed into six battalions; each battalion to be commanded by one Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major; the staff to consist of a Chaplain, a Surgeon, an Adjutant, a Quarter-Master, and a Surgeon’s Mate; and to have one Serjeant Major, one Quarter-Master Serjeant, a Drum-Major, and a Fife-Major; and to be composed of nine companies, viz. Eight battalion companies, to consist of a Captain, two Lieutenants, and one Ensign, four Serjeants, four Corporals, a Drummer, a Fifer, and 66 Privates each; and one Rifle Company, to consist of a Captain, three Lieutenants, four Serjeants, four Corporals, one Drummer, one Fifer, and 80 Privates.”
These were extremely idealized numbers. Only a handful of battalions outside of Philadelphia were able to meet or come close to these figures. It seems that the Chairman of the Assembly, Thomas McKean, was well aware of the unrealistic expectations and so he included a provisional resolution and published it just below the latter one in the same paper:
“That it be recommended to the Committees of Inspection and Observation…for each County to order the Militia aforesaid to be raised out of the Battalions associated within their respective limits, in such proportions as they shall judge most equal.”
On 3 July 1776, Congress passed a further resolution to rush recruitment:
“Resolved, That a circular letter be written to the committees of inspection of the several counties in Pennsylvania, where troops are raised, or raising, to form the flying camp, requesting them to send the troops by battalions, or detachments of battalions, or companies, as fast as raised, to the city of Philadelphia, except those raised in the counties of Bucks, Berks, and Northampton, which are to be directed to repair, as aforesaid, to New Brunswick, in New Jersey.”
That same day, John Hancock would write to Washington of these resolves and ask him to choose a commanding officer to lead the Flying camp.
Throughout midsummer, fears of an attack on New York prompted some panic; word spread to the communities in Northampton that refugees from the colony of New York were fleeing into Pennsylvania in order to escape what many viewed as the inevitable. But Washington also feared that the British would target New Jersey while New York was fortified and reinforced. On 10 July, Thomas McKean published the following additional resolves to the Pennsylvania Associators:
“Resolved, That it appears to the Conferees, that all the Associated Militia of Pennsylvania, excepting the Counties of Westmoreland, Bedford and Northumberland, who can be furnished with arms and accoutrements, should be forthwith requested to march with the utmost expedition to Trenton, (except the Militia for Northampton County, who are to march directly for New-Brunswick) in New-Jersey; and that the said militia continue in service until the flying camp of ten thousand men can be collected to relieve them, unless they shall be sooner discharged by Congress…. That the militia march by companies to the place of rendezvous.”
Despite the complexities of these concurrent resolves, there was a method to the madness. Congress was well aware that many Pennsylvania counties would be slow to comply given the circumstances within the state. Sending militia seemed to be the most expedient way to provide for a temporary defense of New Jersey while waiting for the Flying Camp to materialize. But sometimes strategies that look great on paper are terrible in their execution.
Understandably, the local county committees were perplexed with how to synchronously raise their Flying Camp battalions from the Associators while sending those same Associators (which were needed to, you know, fill the Flying Camp) to New Jersey. It was very nearly a spectacular disaster. It was so incredibly convoluted that Congress, as well as the command staff, had trouble deciding which unit was part of the flying camp and which units were Associators. To make matters more complicated, Congress then raised the quota from Pennsylvania by four additional flying camp battalions. The requested augmentation taxed the ability of local committees to recruit their companies of men.
Northampton County was no exception. Although some battalions of the Flying Camp and Associators made it into New Jersey shortly after the resolutions were issued to the committees, Northampton was slow to proceed. The minutes of the Committee of Observation in Northampton show that on 9 July, the county had only just begun discussing their quota and approved an added enlistment bounty of £3 per recruit for the flying camp. That same session, they were also dealing with charges of corruption from the local disaffected. Colonel Kichline himself was accused by another member of the committee of taking a bribe or reward to use his influence to keep up support for the local patriot government in the County.
As stated elsewhere, the county suffered from a shortage of firearms. A Moravian diarist notes that on 23 July, Colonel Kichline had come through Bethlehem and collected nearly all the guns in the village to supply the county troops; he left a few there for the Moravians to defend themselves should they have a need. While a magnanimous gesture, it was for naught; a few days later a former member of the local committee, George Taylor (at that time an elected member of Congress), gathered up the rest.
Finally, by 30 July, the flying camp was on the move. According to the diarist, “One hundred and twenty recruits from Allentown and vicinity, passed through on their way to the Flying Camp in the Jerseys, to which our County has been called on to contribute 346 men.” But the numbers never reached that requested total, despite the number of Associators.
Out of Northampton’s four companies, only one was at full strength (Captain Henry Hagenbuch’s company from the vicinities of Allen and Lehigh Townships at 108 privates) with one other company at nearly full strength (Captain John Arndt’s company—designated as the rifle company—of the area around Easton and Forks Township, made up of 87 privates), and two companies at less than half strength (Captain Nicholas Kern, consisting of 44 privates from Towamensing and Moore Township, and Captain Timothy Jaynes of Lower Smithfield Township, Plainfield Township, and the Delaware Water Gap, with 33 privates). All in all, the Northampton County battalion commanded by Kichline consisted of 268 privates and 55 officers, NCOs and additional staff, falling well short of the quota. Two casks of gun powder and “what Lead can be got” were distributed amongst them.
Not all the companies marched out at once either. While Captain Hagenbuch’s company had sent off for New Brunswick at the end of July, Captain Arndt’s company apparently began their march towards New Brunswick shortly before 5 August, and apparently at least one company had not yet departed by this date. According to recollections of soldiers, however, all of the Northampton County companies were at Amboy—to whence they marched after New Brunswick to form with the other half of the Battalion of Bucks—by the second week of August. From Amboy, according to the same accounts, they were marched to Fort Lee and were appearing on General Mercer’s returns by 20 August and had crossed to Long Island by 26August attached to the command under Lord Stirling.
At around 1AM on the 27th, the fighting began along the Narrows Road just south-west from Lord Stirling’s position. According to Colonel Samuel Atlee’s (of the Pennsylvania Musketry Battalion) deposition of the events that morning:
“This morning, before day, the camp was alarmed by an attack made upon that part of our picket guard upon the lower road leading to the Narrows, commanded by Major Burd, of the Pennsylvania Flying-Camp. About daylight a part of General Lord Stirling’ s Brigade then in camp, viz: the Battalion of Maryland, Colonel Smallwood; the Delaware, Colonel Haslett; about one hundred and twenty of my battalion, Pennsylvania Musketry; and part of Lutz and Kiechlein’s [Kichline’s] Battalions, Pennsylvania Militia; containing in the whole about two thousand three hundred men, under the command of Major-General Sullivan, and the Brigadiers Stirling and Parsons, were ordered to march out and support the picket attacked by the enemy.”
Stirling’s account also indicates that around 3AM, he began to organize and form his men to meet Grant’s advance; he coordinated with Colonel Atlee and “desired Colonel Atlee to place his Regiment on the left of the Road and to wait their Comeing up, while I went to form the two Regiments I had brought with me, along a Ridge from the Road up to a peice of wood on the Top of the Hill, this was done Instantly on very Advantageous ground.” After exchanging a few volleys, Atlee pulled back to the top of the hill and reformed his line. Stirling goes on to write that after Atlee had found his new position on Battle Hill:
“Kichline’s Rifle Men arrived, part of them I placed along a hedge under the front of the Hill, and the rest in the front of the wood. The troops opposed to me were two Brigades of four Regiments Each under the Command of General Grant; who advanced their light Troops to within 150 yards of our Right front, and took possession of an Orchard there & some hedges which extended towards our left; this brought on an Exchange of fire between those troops and Our Rifle Men which Continued for about two hours and the[n] Ceased by those light troops retireing to their Main Body.”
This part is interesting. That Kichline’s men, green as can be, engaged with hundreds of British light infantry only 150 years away, is fairly impressive. According to letters written about the battle a few days later:
“The enemy then advanced towards us, upon which Lord Sterling, who commanded, immediately drew us up in a line, and offered them battle in the true English taste. The British army then advanced within about three hundred yards of us, and began a very heavy fire from their cannon and mortars, for both the balls and shells flew very fast, now and then taking off a head. Our men stood it amazingly well; not even one of them showed a disposition to shrink.”
Yeah, shells from canon were decapitating soldiers. Once you imagine it, you can’t unimagine it; yet as horrific as that might be to think about, it must have been a thousand times more terrifying to live it. After two hours of fighting in these conditions, however, Kichline’s battalion was sent to assist Colonel Atlee’s men for a short time. Atlee writes that after repulsing a few more attacks from Grant:
“I now sent my Adjutant, Mr. Mentgis, to his Lordship, with an account of the successive advantages I had gained, and to request a reinforcement, and such further orders as his Lordship should judge necessary. Two companies of Riflemen, from Keichlien’ s Flying-Camp, soon after joined me, but were very soon ordered to rejoin their regiment, the reason for which I could not imagine, as I stood in such need of them.”
Atlee didn’t know, nor could he at the time, that his Musketry Battalion was in danger of being completely overrun.
Lord Stirling and his command were under the false belief that they were holding back the full force of the British Army, unaware that they were about to be flanked by some 5,000 Hessians under General von Heister pushing back General Sullivan at the center of the army. Meanwhile, Colonel Miles was engaging a far superior force on the far left of the army; this force, commanded by Cornwallis, Howe, Percy, and Clinton—a combined total of 10,000 men— descended upon Miles’ 400-strong regiment. Atlee confirms this:
“I fully expected, as did most of my officers, that the strength of the British Army was advancing in this quarter to our lines. But how greatly were we deceived when intelligence was received by some scattering soldiers that the right wing and centre of the Army, amongst whom were the Hessians, were advancing to surround us. This we were soon convinced of by an exceeding heavy fire in our rear.”
Atlee discovered after the battle why Kichline’s men had been sent back to their regiment:
“No troops having been posted to oppose the march of this grand body of the enemy’s Army but Colonel Miles’s two battalions of Rifles, Colonel Willis’s battalion of Connecticut, and a part of Lutz and Keichlien’s battalions of the Pennsylvania Flying-Camp.”
It seems that at some point after Kichline’s men had returned to their command, they were redeployed in the rear to discourage this large force, that was clearly on its way to destroy Stirling’s command, from pressing on as best as they could. Atlee waited about 45 minutes for orders from Stirling; no troops pressed his front and, at about 11AM, Atlee determined that withdrawing to where the rest of the command was located would be most prudent. When he arrived with his men at the location where Stirling had once been:
“How great was my surprise I leave any one to judge, when, upon coming to the ground occupied by our troops, to find it evacuated and the troops gone off, without my receiving the least intelligence of the movement, or order what to do, although I had so shortly before sent my Adjutant to the General for that purpose. The General must have known, that by my continuing in my post at the hill, I must, with all my party, inevitably fall a sacrifice to the enemy. An opportunity yet afforded, with risking the lives of some of us, of getting off.”
The large force attacking from the left and the Hessians moving up the center had forced Stirling’s and Sullivan’s forces to retreat. Kichline’s battalion had scattered by this point. Various personal accounts indicate that Kichline and Lutz had both been captured, along with most of their command staff, and their men—leaderless and having already suffered heavy casualties fighting in the rear of Stirling’s and Atlee’s positions—withdrew in a panic with the rest.
The aftermath for the whole army deployed that day is pretty terrible and Kichline’s battalion suffered just as poorly. Given the half-strength size of his battalion entering the battle, the amount of devastation it witnessed has been underreported. In his pension deposition years later, Henry Allhouse’s reported that “Colonel Kichline’s Battalion lost up-ward of 200 men & the Colonel & several other officers were taken prisoner—about 150 of our Battalion escaped, Captain Arndt and this declarant were among the number of those who escaped.” These numbers match what we learn from other depositions.
According to the one casualty list we have out of the four companies (the other three are missing or were just never taken), in Captain Arndt’s company 21 men were killed or captured at Long Island. Captain Arndt’s company largely managed to escape, but Captains Jayne and Hagenbuch were captured, along with Colonel Kichline.
On 4 September, Northampton County received some of the first news of the battle. According to the Moravian diarist, “Several deserters from the army passed through, and stated that in the battle of Long Island, one of the battalions from this county was badly cut up.” An entry from another individual, from around the same date (between 2 and 6 September), relates similar whispers:
“In these days, parties of militia on their return from New York, passed, bringing the intelligence that a battalion from the county has suffered severely at the engagement with the British, on Long Island, on the 27th of August last, having left most of its men either dead or wounded.”
The remnants of the Battalion were never again to have their own identity. Following the battle, General Washington ordered that:
“It is the Generals orders that the remainder of Lutz’s and Kachlein’s Battalions be joined to Hands Battalion; that Major Huys be also under the special command of Col. Hand; that then those Battalions, with Shee’s, Col. Magaw’s, Col. Huchinson’s, Col. Atlee’s, Col. Miles, Col. Wards Regiments be brigaded under General Mifflin, and those now here march, as soon as possible, to Kingsbridge.”
To make matters worse for the Northampton County men, several of their officers who had survived capture or death were under suspicion of cowardice.
“A Court Martial, consisting of a Commandant of a brigade, two Colonels, two Lt Cols.—two Majors & six Captains to sit to morrow at Mrs Montagnie’s to try Major Post of Col. Kacklien’s Regt ‘For Cowardice, in running away from Long-Island when an Alarm was given of the approach of the enemy.[‘] The same Court Martial also to try John Spanzenberg Adjutant of the same regiment, for the same offence, and likewise Lieut. Peter Kacklein [Junior].”
To their credit, they were exonerated by their peers on the charge of cowardice:
“Major Popst of Col. Kackleins Battalion having been tried by a Court Martial whereof Col. Silliman was President on a charge of ‘Cowardice and shamefully abandoning his post on Long-Island the 28th of August’; is acquitted of Cowardice but convicted of Misbehaviour in the other instance—he is therefore sentenced to be dismissed [from] the Army as totally unqualified to hold a Military Commission.
“Adjutant Spangenburg and Lieut: Kacklein tried for the same Offence were acquitted. The General approves the sentence as to Spangenburg and Kacklein, and orders them to join their regiment: But as there is reason to believe farther Evidence can soon be obtained with respect to the Major—he is to continue under Arrest ’till they can attend.”
Major Pobst had to have been exonerated, as he later served as a Lieutenant Colonel of militia in Northampton County in 1777.
Captain Arndt, having returned following the engagement at Fort Washington, where he lost even more of his company (only 33 men rallied at Elizabethtown after the battle on 16 November, including Arndt), faced accusations as well. Frederick Reager, who served under Arndt at Long Island and Fort Washington (who was himself wounded there), levied the accusation that Arndt hid behind a barn during the battle and had run away from his company at Fort Washington. Additional testimony from other members of Arndt’s command suggest he served admirably; according to Corporal Elijah Crawford, Arndt “by his good conduct saved about twenty of his Comp’y, who would have either been killed or taken prisoner.” The charges against Arndt were dropped by the Committee of Inspection and Reager was forced to sign a letter of apology for defaming him.
The ripple effects of the Battle of Long Island on Northampton County are telling. While the second quota of the Flying Camp met with similar success (four companies of 278 men) in the fall and winter of 1776, the loss of so many active patriots was most assuredly a devastating blow to the committee at Easton and to the county as a whole. Northampton County soldiers saw additional service in 1776 and early 1777, but those who survived were constantly defending themselves against unbecoming charges of cowardice and desertion.
What is imperative to realize is that none of these accusations hold water. The depositions of the officers in command of the Battalion, Atlee and Stirling, are positive; the reports about the conduct of Kichline’s men—from their two-hour standoff with British Light Infantry, to the rear-guard defense of Atlee and Stirling from the flanking attacks in the late morning of the battle—are endearing, not dismissive or negative. In fact, Kichline and his Flying Camp battalion played a pivotal role in the fighting at different times during the day; the full effects of their actions may perhaps never be known (e.g., did they help prevent an all out attack on the hill?).
Their absence from accounts about the battle is bizarre, if not unsettling. For the American army, this was the first instance they would face the British on an open field of battle; they formed up in European style lines of battle and exchanged volleys with them, using an odd assortment of weapons—from muskets that were several decades old to modern rifles made in Northampton County by German gunsmiths—and they produced, during this engagement, one of the few successful actions of the day. The Northampton County Flying Camp battalion served quite admirably given their lack of experience and short time in the army. While suggesting they are akin to the Spartans at Thermopylae might be an overstatement, their deeds and sacrifice deserve a place in the light—as much as the Maryland and Delaware men also under Lord Stirling—rather than the obscurity they’ve been dealt.
/// Featured image at top: Lord Stirling at the Battle of Long Island, Virtue & Co. Publishers, 1859. Source: George Washington’s Mount Vernon
 F.C. Johnson, ed., The Historical Record: A Quarterly Publication Devoted Principally to the Early History of Wyoming Valley (Wilkes-Barre: Press of the Wilkes-Barre Record, 1897), 7:130.  Along with the Northampton County Flying Camp battalion at Long Island was the Berks County battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Lutz, a few companies from Lancaster County, and some from Chester County; this article primarily focuses on Northampton County’s contribution because of limited details of the role these other units played during the battle (also space requirements), though the sacrifices of all these men deserve to be remembered. It is my hope that another author or contributor will further outline the contributions of these additional Flying Camp forces at Long Island since it is clear they also saw heavy action.  According to the Northampton County standing committee minutes, “Peter Kachline Esq. Lieut. Colonel of the first Battalion of Militia to be Lieut. Colonel of the said Flying Camp…to be composed partly from the County of Bucks and partly from this County;” Pennsylvania Archives (Harrisburg: The State Printer, 1907), Ser. 2, 14:609. Colonel Joseph Hart, from Bucks County, was given overall command of the Northampton and Bucks County battalions, however during the Battle of Long Island Colonel Hart was at Amboy with most of the companies from Bucks County. This is attested in pension files, like Michael Fackenthal’s of Bucks County, who was stationed with Colonel Hart; his file states: “In the year 1776 he enlisted, in Captain Valentine Opp’s company, in the said township of Springfield, was appointed Sergent of said company. It was one of the four companies from Bucks County that formed a regiment with four companies from Northampton County of the Flying Camp. Joseph Hart from said county of Bucks was appointed first Colonel, and Peter Kichline, from Northampton County, second Colonel. Colonel Kichline with four companies from Northampton county were in the engagement on Long Island, August 27, 1776, and was made prisoner with a number of his men. Colonel Hart was stationed at Amboy and the company I was with.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 33 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1909), 255.  For example, Barnet Schecter’s The Battle for New York: The City at the Heart of the American Revolution (Penguin Books, 2003) makes no mention of the Flying Camp under Stirling, despite the fact that every other unit deployed with Stirling gets a mention.  As noted in the Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 5, 7:17.  This article was the result of several months’ work; it required examining actual manuscripts (which was just awesome, by the way), looking through a handful of pension files, scattered after-action reports and letters, in addition to the few notes found in the published Pennsylvania Archives. Special thanks to the research librarians at the Easton Public Library, Marx Room, for helping me find these manuscripts in the library archives. Also thanks to archivist Aaron McWilliams with the PHMC, Pennsylvania Archives for his diligence in locating additional, obscure Flying Camp manuscripts.  Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2, Vol. 3:572.  Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2, Vol. 3:572.  See my article ‘Explaining Pennsylvania’s Militia’ for details about Pennsylvania’s complex militia system: http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/06/explaining-pennsylvanias-militia/  Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2, Vol. 3:574.  See primary source evidence of these local issues in my article ‘Disarming the Disaffected’: http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/08/disarming-the-disaffected/.  This however didn’t sit entirely well with the Associator companies in Pennsylvania, many of whom knew this would deprive them of their numbers and would force them to march out of their own state; McKean had to address them directly. He noted that the council “presume only to recommend the plan we have formed [with the raising of men from the Associators] to you. Trusting that in case of so much consequence your love of virtue, and zeal for liberty will supply the want of authority delegated to use expressly for that purpose.” The Pennsylvania Packet,1 July 1776.  Worthington Chauncey Ford, et al., eds. Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington, D.C., 1904–37), 5:508.  To George Washington from John Hancock, 4 July 1776, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0136accessed 21 October 2014.  As early as 13 June 1776, the diarist of the Moravians had recounted: “Intelligence came from Philadelphia that New York was expected to be attacked daily, and that the troops from the former city were moving thither.” John W. Jordan, Abraham Berlin, et al., ’Bethlehem During the Revolution: Extracts from the Diaries in the Moravian Archives at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania,’ The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Jan., 1889), 389.  These were published in The Pennsylvania Gazette, 10 July 1776.  On 20 July, they resolved, “That the convention of Pennsylvania be requested to augment their quota for the flying camp, with four battalions of militia,…in addition to those formerly desires by Congress, and send the same, with all possible despatch, to the said flying camp.” Journals of the Continental Congress, 5:598.  John Hancock wrote to the various committees, “I am directed by Congress most earnestly to request, you will supply the Flying Camp and Militia in the Jerseys, with as many Muskett Cartridges, with Balls therein, as you can possibly spare and send them forward with the greatest Dispatch. The State of our Affairs will not admit the least Delay, nor need I use Arguments to induce you to an immediate Compliance with this requisition.” The fact that he was already referring to militia and Flying Camp battalions located in New Jersey indicates pretty definitively that some gad already arrived. John Hancock to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety, 14 July 1776, http://web.archive.org/web/20110112181711/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=DelVol04.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=369&division=div1accessed October 2014.  Pennsylvania Archives Ser. 2, 14:607. On 17 July, the tax on Non-Associators and disaffected in the community was raised to “defray the expences of a Bounty of £3 to be given to those Men who are now raising to compose the Flying Camp…at 9d. pr. Pound, and that Single men pay at a rate of 6s. pr. Pound.” Pennsylvania Archives Ser. 2, 14:609.  While these accusations were summarily ignored by the committee and the individual who raised them was brought before them and shamed into submission, the reader of the minutes (and of this article) is left to judge for themselves if such accusations hold any merit.  Jordan, ‘Bethlehem During the Revolution’, 389.  Jordan, ‘Bethlehem During the Revolution’, 390.  Roughly 2,357 men from 26 townships had Associated; a fraction of the township, but far more than the few hundred men who joined the Flying Camp.  These numbers are based upon a manuscript return, copied on 28 September 1776 on request from the Council of Safety, for means of paying the bounty money promised to the Flying Camp. The manuscript, made by the adjutant of Northampton County at the time, is located at the Easton Public Library. Jaynes’ company’s small size probably had a lot to do with the claims of Toryism in the region.  Pennsylvania Archives,Ser. 2, 14:609.  Pennsylvania Archives,Ser. 2, 14:612.  Henry Allshouse, a fifer in Captain Arndt’s company, states the following course the Battalion took in his pension file (pages 1-2): “As soon as Captain Arndts company was organized it marched from Northampton County, Pennsylvania, where it was raised, first to Brunswick in New Jersey, from there to Amboy…in New Jersey, where it was joined by the rest of the Battalion—the whole Battalion then marched to New York, and encamped in sight of the North River about two miles above the city. We were ordered from there to Long Island, and encamped near East River.”  As discussed in Francis E. Devine, ‘The Pennsylvania Flying Camp, July–November 1776’, Pennsylvania History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January, 1979), 63-64. This is supported by Cornelius Brooks’ pension file, which notes: “That he enlisted in the year seventeen hundred and seventy six at the town of Lower Smithfield, County of Northampton, and state of Pennsylvania, as a fifer for six months into Captain Timothy Jaynes Company called the Flying Camp, that he marched immediately with the Company to Eastown [Easton], and joined the battalion, which was commanded by Colonel Kickline, that he then marched to Amboy in the state of New Jersey, and that while at Amboy the battalion to which he belonged at the request of General Washington, as he then was informed by his Captain, volunteered to go to New York. That he went with the Company and battalion to which he belonged to New York about the middle of August, that on the twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth of August he with the Company and battalion went over to Long Island…”  Incidentally, it was the Pennsylvania Flying Camp, early in the morning at about 1AM on 27 August, which kicked off the fighting at Long Island. A detachment of riflemen from Colonel Lutz’s Berks County detachment, under Major Burd, on Long Island, deployed as pickets and advanced guards ahead of Stirling’s main body, encountered British troops under General Grant along the Narrows Road; being outnumbered 3-to-1, they worked to stall the advance of Grant’s men as long as they could while Stirling’s main force sought to organize itself along Gowanus Road and what became known as Battle Hill. Discussed at length in Devine, ‘The Pennsylvania Flying Camp’, 66; also mentioned in Atlee’s journal, above.  Atlee’s account of the day’s events is found in Peter Force, American Archives (Washington, D.C., 1837–53), Ser. 5, V1:1251; but it is also available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.21526, accessed 21 October 2014.  To George Washington from Lord Stirling, 29 August 1776, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0135, accessed 21 October 2014.  An unsigned letter dated 1 September 1776, http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.22414, accessed 21 October 2014.  It was believed for a short time that Stirling’s men had actually killed General James Grant after an officer was slain and a hat was found with the name ‘Grant’ inside. It was later determined that the hat belonged to Lieutenant Colonel James Grant of the 40th Regiment; Atlee wrote in his journal: “The sentinels gave the alarm. Officers and men immediately flew to arms, and with remarkable coolness and resolution sustained and returned their fire for about fifteen minutes, when the enemy were obliged once more to a precipitate flight, leaving behind them killed Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, (a person, as I afterwards understood, much valued in the British Army,) besides a number of privates, and some wounded.” A letter dated 28 August, from the headquarters (unsigned) at Long Island, indicated, “This morning General Parsons came in with a few men; he brings an account that the enemy have lost five hundred men, and a hat, with two bullet holes, marked Colonel Grant, and his watch. I wish it was General Grant, but their great officers don’t like venturing.” American Archives, Ser. 5, 1:1195.  American Archives, Ser. 5, 1:1195-1196; a letter (unsigned) from the battle indicates “Their retreat [Smallwood’s, Haslet’s, and Atlee’s battalions] was covered by the Second Battalion which had got into our lines. Colonel Lutz’s and the New-England regiments made some resistance in the woods, but were obliged by superior numbers to retire.” While it isn’t clear, Kichline’s men were most likely mixed in with Lutz’s men (given their proximity to one another behind the lines, given above in Atlee’s disposition).  Jordan, ‘Bethlehem During the Revolution’, 391.  The letter is reproduced in Henry Melchior Muhlenberg Richards, The Pennsylvania-German in the Revolutionary War, 1775-1783 (The Pennsylvania-German Society, 1908), 17:249.  General Orders, 31 August 1776, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0143, accessed 21 October 2014.  It seems like Captain Arndt’s company of the original Northampton County battalion was the only one to be deployed to Fort Washington; according to pension files of men from other companies, they were stationed at Amboy or other locales in New Jersey until their enlistments expired—quite likely due to the heavy casualties these companies suffered.  Pennsylvania Archives,Ser. 2, 14:620.