Since writing several articles for this journal about the role of Pennsylvania’s militia in America’s War for Independence, I’ve received a lot of confused inquiries about the organization of the militia because, well, it’s a confusing subject. I’ve also seen a lot of people who are searching for revolutionary ancestors get a lot wrong about the militia. In part this is because of the insane way militia is portrayed in popular culture (I’m looking at you Mel Gibson); of course it also doesn’t help that the militia in Pennsylvania were decidedly different than in other Colonies. In this article I’m just going to break down and explain Pennsylvania’s Militia system from the start of the war to the end of the war and hope that I don’t lose my mind trying to explain it all, because it’s complicated.
Pennsylvania had two major shifts in government during the war, and also major changes in the types of militia forces that defended the home front. The shifts in government were actually instigated by the militia, and so they also dramatically impacted the militia system, besides profoundly upsetting the population. But don’t worry; I’ll explain this all in more detail because it is all interconnected. To better express this, here is set of charts:
The first shift was the establishment of the ‘old revolutionary (or provincial) government’. Between June and November of 1774, counties throughout Pennsylvania saw the rise of patriot Committees of Correspondence, made up of local activist community leaders. Depending upon where you lived, the means of forming this government could be violent and instant or slow and gradual. While meeting only briefly in 1774, they began to meet more frequently through the early months of 1775, and then steadily after the start of the war.
While extralegal, these Committees worked closely with the Continental Congress and occasionally the Provincial Assembly (basically a House of Representatives). The state government itself remained essentially the same throughout this transitional period; the Provincial Assembly, under the control of Quakers, Mennonites, and other pacifists, supported the Continental Congress despite remaining against any military action. The governor of Pennsylvania held authority until war broke out in 1775; he was quietly asked to remove himself from power. In place of the governor, the Provincial Assembly, at the behest of the Continental Congress, put in place a Committee of Safety as many feared that without some semblance of authority over military matters, they would be at risk. To be clear, this first shift was not limited to Pennsylvania, but rather was happening throughout Colonial America in one manner or another.
Pennsylvania did not have permanent Militia Laws in place like other surrounding Colonies. In times of crisis—like an invasion, or threat of invasion—they would enact temporary laws that would expire after a certain time, but one would have better luck herding cats in a pet store full of birds than finding any semblance of a proper defense force in Pennsylvania. For example, it took the deaths of 200 settlers, the burning of over 50 homesteads, the complete desertion of the frontier, and countless petitions from sundry melancholy inhabitants for the Provincial Assembly to pass a temporary Militia Law in 1755, during the height of the French and Indian invasion.
Primarily out of frustration over the Provincial Assembly’s stagnancy on the issue of defense, Benjamin Franklin founded the Philadelphia Military Association in 1747, modeled after London’s Military Association. These Associators were entirely volunteers; men could come and go as they pleased, and had to provide themselves with equipment. Over time, Military Associations sprang up in a handful of counties around Philadelphia. These Associators worked along with state-sanctioned militia following the enactment of the temporary Militia Laws.
That raises an issue too; what were the Associators if not militia? When they were initially formed, Associators did not necessarily owe allegiance to the Provincial Government or to the Colony of Pennsylvania (later the Commonwealth). Instead they all agreed to the Articles of the Association, and were obliged to sign a Form of Association (containing the list of Articles). The Provincial Assembly felt they had some minor control over them, but not really. The Associators could march when they pleased to wherever they pleased, and were not subjected to “any Pecuniary Mulcts, Fines, or Corporal Penalties, on any Account whatever; We being determined, in this whole Affair, to act only on Principles of Reason, Duty and Honour.” While the state commissioned the officers, all officers were elected by the Associators themselves, thus preventing any officer from being appointed who might otherwise act against the interest of the Association. The relationship, needless to say, was a strained one.
These Associations went dormant after the French and Indian War until 1775, when news of Lexington and Concord found its way into the hands of local Committees. On 6 May 1775, the Northampton County Committee of Correspondence ordered that every township in the county should Associate and form into companies, equip and arm themselves, and prepare accordingly. Sixteen days later, the Committee met again and resolved:
That the Association for our mutual preservation and Security now forming in this County be earnestly recommended to all the Freemen therein, and that they provide themselves immediately with all necessary Arms & Ammunition, and Muster as often as possible to make themselves expert in the Military Art.
By October, a count of all men in the county had yielded a large number of Associators: roughly 2,357 men from 26 townships had mustered. These results were typical for most Counties, with few exceptions, but represented a small percentage of the state’s population as these were primarily more radical opponents of the Crown.
The rise of Associations pressed the Continental Congress to place them under the Committee of Safety, who then organized a new set of Articles of Association. While broadly defined, these new Articles gave the Committee of Safety more control over the Associations, mainly through the commissioning of officers. In the Commission Form established by the Committee of Safety, they made clear that, through a common goal, they “do earnestly recommend to all Officers and Soldiers under your command to be obedient to your orders.” These broadly defined powers, in the form of “recommendations,” made it clear that these were not under the authority of the state, but more directly the Committee of Safety, under the arm of the Continental Congress. Perhaps the best analogy for this type of soldier would be the United States Volunteer regiments of the Civil War; they weren’t quite “regular” infantry, as the Continental Line, but they also weren’t militia.
By 1776, Congress called for more troops to be raised to form a Flying Camp. The Flying Camp was not militia either; as all Flying Camp recruits signed six-month enlistments (many served an additional six months), they were called by Congress to fight directly under Washington, and thus were Continental troops. However most of Pennsylvania’s contributions of soldiers were pulled from Associator battalions—those who had not yet enlisted in the Continental Line—while some Associators took it upon themselves and left Pennsylvania to join Washington in New York as independent units.
Meanwhile the Associators began to grow wary of their part in the war. As early as 1775, they had attempted to influence the Provincial Assembly to force every Pennsylvanian to share in the burden. After all, they had given not only their time, their sweat, and their blood to the cause, but most of them had lost their military equipment, their guns, and their uniforms over the course of two years. They had borne the weight of military service since the start of the war.
On November 25, 1775, the Assembly caved to their pressure, issuing a light fine (in the form of a tax) on all men between 16 and 50 who did not Associate, and offered a small bonus to those who chose to Associate. Most settlers on the frontier had the £2-10s needed to pay the tax, so recruitment efforts failed. The meager 2 shillings and 6 pence (it takes 20 shillings to equal £1) offered as an enlistment bonus was just not appetizing enough. After incessant complaining that this fine wasn’t doing the job, the best the Assembly could do was raise the fine to £3-10s and the bonus to an even 3 shillings, which had the same effect as repeatedly banging ones head against a wall to cure a headache.
In the fall of 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention—organized after the signing of the Declaration of Independence—voted upon and passed a stricter resolution, possibly at the behest of Benjamin Franklin who was on the Convention. They demanded that any non-Associating citizen between the ages of 16 and 50 would have to pay £20 every month that he refused to Associate, and those over the age of 21 were taxed an additional 4 shillings to the pound on the total value of their property—so if you’re estate was worth £300, you would need to pay 1200 shillings or £60! Yikes!
But the Pennsylvania Provincial Assembly challenged the Convention’s authority to levy taxes and write legislation—something like that was only meant to be done by the Provincial Assembly itself (I mean, when they bothered to do anything at all). The resolution was deemed illegal by the Assembly and nothing would come of it—but that was their last hurrah. With the Association backing them, the Convention ratified the new Constitution in September 1776, and the Provincial Assembly was dissolved (thus the Convention had the last sinister laugh); the Committee of Safety was ordered to hand over all its records and accounts for review, and designated as the new Council of Safety.
In place of the old Provincial one, a new General Assembly took its place. In addition, the new Supreme Executive Council (SEC) consisting of 12 elected men—including a president and vice-president—oversaw the Executive branch of the state. This new leadership passed the Test Act which required all members of the House and SEC to swear an oath to the new government and Constitution of Pennsylvania, effectively making the legislative body a single-party system.
When the shiny new House of Representatives met for the first time, Associators had hopes that they would finally issue a law that demanded compulsory service, perhaps on par with what the Constitutional Convention had resolved a few months previously. Instead they reinstituted the exact same £3-10s which had failed previously, for who knows what reason.
Within the first few months of 1777, the Council of Safety also disappeared; all military activity was placed under the SEC from there on out. This is when the Associators finally had their edge. The SEC proposed a new resolution: the first-ever Militia Law in Pennsylvania that instituted mandatory enrollment. The law passed on 17 March 1777, and all white males between the ages of 18 and 53 were automatically enrolled in the militia. With the institution of this draft, the Associators disbanded. This marks the end of the second major shift in government, but it is also where everything gets hairy for the person interested in the Pennsylvania militia because all sense of normalcy and common sense goes out the window. Brace yourselves, more charts are coming.
The Committees at the county level were also disbanded, and in their place a County Lieutenant and a Sub-Lieutenant were put in charge of all military activity within their county. They held military ranks of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, but these men were actually civilian employees under the direction of civil government (so their ranks, while military-sounding, gave them no command in battle). The draft was instituted upon a class roll; that is, each county was to establish eight Battalion districts; these districts could encompass a handful of townships within the county, especially if there were several smaller townships with lower populations. A Battalion consisted of eight Companies of 80 to 100 men. Everyone who met the draft criteria was given a class number between one and eight. Depending on the need, one or more classes could be called up at any given time to serve.
More hairiness ensues. All field officers were elected by rank, within their district, and then drew lots for seniority. So the Colonel of the 1st Battalion would have seniority over the Colonel of the 2nd Battalion, and so on. This seniority extended beyond the county; seniority of militia officers originated in Philadelphia and extended beyond it, circling outward. So Colonels, Majors, Captains, and so on, from Philadelphia County outranked those from Chester County. Chester County officers outranked Northampton County officers, and Northampton outranked Cumberland County officers. But just to make everything more annoying, all officers were on a rotation through the classes.
The County Lieutenants kept full rosters of men on what are known as Permanent Billet Rolls. Most Battalion muster rolls in the Pennsylvania Archives dating to after 1777 are precisely these Permanent Billets. For example, the majority of the Companies listed in the 2nd Series, Volume 14 of the PA Archives (also those rolls from the 5th Series), post-1777 are actually these roll sheets.
When a class was called up, all members of that class were called up to serve throughout the county. For example, if the 1st Class was called, whether you fell under the 1st Battalion or the 7th Battalion, you were required to turn out. New rolls were taken by officers; these are known as Active Duty rolls. Many of these Active Duty rolls for 1777 do not survive.
So now we’ve discussed at least two different rolls (a Permanent Billet Roll and an Active Duty Roll); these existed for the organization of these Battalions, and therefore for each person (see above). By the ordinance of the Militia Law, the Class number became the Active Duty Battalion number. Additionally, when a class was called up, the men were assigned a different company number on the Active Duty rolls—the company number they were given corresponded to the battalion they were from on the Permanent Billet—than the company numbers on the inactive duty Permanent Billets. Anyone called up had to serve not more than two months at a time; anyone who deserted was subject to a hefty fine of two-months’ pay, even if they deserted at the end of their two month tour.
There were exemptions. Initially those exempt were only members of the new General Assembly, county officials (Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants), and members of the SEC. Men who held religious scruples against bearing arms were made exempt later (except Quakers who were not specifically mentioned), as well as certain tradesmen (like gunsmiths, coffin makers, and so on).
But some laws were weakened. While the age of service was between 18 and 53, substitutes under 18 and over 53 were allowed; for example, a 15 year old son could serve in place of his father. Or a 60 year old father could serve in the place of his of-age son.
For the militiaman, substitutes were the bee’s knees. From the start of the draft to the end of the war, those called up found ways to avoid service. Sometimes these were legitimate health reasons, but not always. So in December, the General Assembly passed two new supplements to the law: one that anyone unable to serve would be subject to a double-tax, and another that raised the fines for those seeking to avoid service by substitute. But it didn’t seem to hamper the problem. As a result of all the avoided service, the County Lieutenants had a lot of problems fulfilling their quotas of troops.
Substitutes made up about 42% of the total militia force between 1777 and 1780. In all those cases, only 7% of them were serving in place of a family member. The other 93% were essentially guns for hire, former Associators who wanted to serve, or friends of the family. Below is an example of an Active Duty roll showing the amount of substitutes versus those who did their own service. From 1781 through the end of the war, substitutes became more common as men were rotated into other duties or refused to serve for other reasons.
Broadly speaking, most of the officers and County Lieutenants followed the Militia Law pretty closely from 1777 to 1779. But by 1780, County Lieutenants were given more power over their county districts; rather than being called up to serve in Washington’s army, the militia were called to serve the needs of the county specifically. County Lieutenants could essentially ignore specific ordinances of the Militia Law; Company officers were labeling their command whatever they wanted. It was the militia, à la carte. Two or more Classes could be called up, and they would be designated as whatever Battalion was more useful to the Colonel. The further west one went in Pennsylvania, the more likely to find militia detachments serving longer tours (upwards of nine months at a time) in preparation for Indian attacks.
The important information to take away from this article is that the Pennsylvania Militia system was just a messy pile of, well, you know. Let’s agree it was a disaster; it only polarized people, the high fines meant that poorer settlers with small families were automatically at a disadvantage, wealthier people could avoid the draft by simply paying whatever was owed, politicians were exempt (I mean, come on), substitutes were primarily mercenaries who took advantage of the system to rake in more coin, and the exemptions specifically singled out religious groups (like the Moravians, making them targets) or ignored them completely (like the Quakers).
But what are perhaps the most interesting bits are the social implications. Throughout the first two years of the war, outside of the minority elements of the population, the majority of Pennsylvanians did not want to fight. And in 1777, the Militia Law forced a difficult choice on all Pennsylvanians. Each one had to weigh the cost-benefit of showing up for an exercise drill, a muster, and service, or pay a steep fine. There was the concern that a County Lieutenant would force someone’s family member to serve in their stead, and the danger was very real on the wilderness. For some, serving tours and showing up for exercises was not worth risking the death of the crops. Regardless of what they decided, there were serious consequences. If everything else about the militia still confuses you, at least remember that.[FEATURED IMAGE AT TOP: America Septentrionalis a Domino d’Anville in Galliis edita nunc in Anglia Coloniis in Interiorem Virginiam….1777. Source: Raremaps.com]
 For a full account of the social factors and legislation that this article draws from, see Arthur J. Alexander, “Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Militia,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 69:1 (January 1945 ), 15-25.  The only time Pennsylvania seems to have had any sort of basic militia prior to the draft is during the winter months of 1776 into 1777. But these may have just been Associator units confused for militia. The details on these units are extremely limited and don’t tell us about their makeup; given that one of these units, originally raised by John Rosbrugh—the minister-turned-Colonel—was asked to resign his original commission in favor of a unit Chaplaincy and command was given over to an Associator officer, John Hays, leads me to believe these were similar to the Flying Camp, in that the rank and file were predominantly Associators.  For example, see the Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd Ser., Vol. 14 for the Minutes of the Committee of Observation in Northampton County. Also see J. I. Mombert, An Authentic History of Lancaster County (J.E. Barr & Company: Lancaster, 1869), 199-200 for discussions and reproduced contemporary circulars dating back to June 12, 1774.  In Northampton County, at the behest of George Taylor, a mob of some 100 or more people dissolved the current British provincial government nonviolently and replaced it with their own. However in New York and Maryland, Tories and former provincial assemblies did not get off so easily. For a brief overview of the persecution of Loyalists and Tories, see http://www.canadiangenealogy.net/chronicles/persecutions_loyalists.htm  See the pleas of Governor Robert Hunter Morris, who had “in vain endeavoured to prevail upon my Quaker Assembly to pass” a militia law to aid the inhabitants of the backcountry of Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania Archives, Col. Rec., Vol., 6, 512, 738). For sources of these ‘sundry inhabitants’ and ‘melancholy events’, see the footnotes throughout my article “A Want of Arms in Pennsylvania”: http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/a-want-of-arms-in-pennsylvania/  Thomas Verenna, “A Want of Arms in Pennsylvania”: http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/04/a-want-of-arms-in-pennsylvania/  Though it wouldn’t be right to avoid the fact that some contemporary accounts refer to the Associators as ‘militia’; for example, between the 28th and 29th of July, 1775, York County held a meeting of the ‘Committee of Officers of Militia’ (Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd Ser., Vol. 14, 536-537); however by 1776, it seems as though this language would go away. York County would refer to them as Associators in future correspondence.  From the Form of Association, which can be found at http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp?vol=3&page=205a  Pennsylvania Archives, 2nd Series, Vol. 14, 592.  Chester County had a high population of Quakers and remained pacifistic throughout much of the war. Contrary to this, Bucks County had a large population of Tories who sided with the British and refused to cooperate with Washington when the time came.  According to Census records, Northampton County had an estimated 24,238 people in 1790; if these numbers remained consistent, the total number of Associators made up 9.7% of Northampton County’s population at the time. If we allow for a 25% increase from 1775 to 1790—a staggeringly high increase in population found only in later periods in Northampton’s history which would imply that about 6,060 people settled in the county between those dates—then the number of Associators would only make up 12% of the population. This number is still extremely low compared to population figures.  Pennsylvania Archives 5th Ser., Vol. 5, 295; see also 8-12 for the new Articles of Association, resolved August 19, 1775.  In January of 1777, prior to the passing of the Militia Law, the Council of Safety ordered Berks County Associators out to aid General Washington, but many refused to go. Under a show of power, the Council issued a decree that all affected men of arms who wanted to march should disarm all disaffected Associators and pay them for their wares and taken accoutrements and march to Washington’s camp (Pennsylvania Archives, Col. Rec., Vol. 11, 94-95).  Incidentally, most Associator companies were led by an officer or group of officers wealthy enough to supply and outfit an entire unit. This is why Associator companies were so well equipped; many had their own flags, like the Hanover Associators, and their own unique style of uniform—dyed hunting frocks or shirts, for example, would indicate what county you might be from based upon the color of the dye used. This is very similar to how Volunteers were raised during the Civil War, with a wealthy supplier who would outfit a company or regiment with unique uniforms, muskets, and accoutrements.  In some instances, full battalions of Associators joined with the Flying Camp, but did not enlist with them. This seems to be the case with Peter Kichline’s battalion of Pennsylvania Associators. Two of his four companies were understrength (one of 33 men and one of 44 men), which seems to suggest that these were not recruited specifically for the Flying Camp. Full rosters of the four companies under Kichline are found in the Pennsylvania Archives, Ser. 2, Vol. 14, 557-570. Out of the four, one company, under Captain Arndt, originally mustered with over 100 officers and men, met up at Elizabethtown after the taking of Fort Washington; only 33 had escaped death or capture. Kichline himself was wounded at Long Island.  They, like everyone else, would be required to compulsory service and would be called up in the manner described further on in the article.  For example, the County Lieutenant elected for Northampton was John Weitzel on May 16th, 1777. The last entry in the Northampton County minutes of the Committee of Safety is dated on 14 August 1777. As indicated in the minutes, all accounts were to be settled.  It was the responsibility of every County Lieutenant to keep records of all men between the stated ages on file; they cooperated with local constables to acquire this list.  Chart inspired by Hannah Benner Roach’s chart in, “The Pennsylvania Militia in 1777,” The Pennsylvania Genealogical Magazine Vol. XXIII, No. 3, (1964), 164. This article gives details on a lot—what Classes were called up when, and where they were camped for example—more than what can be covered here.  A lot of people presume that these Billets indicate Active Duty service, when in fact they do not. While the lower Pennsylvania counties called up all eight of their classes in 1777, the frontier and northern counties did not. In addition, “Active Duty” doesn’t mean “saw action” or “fought in a battle.” To the contrary, Active Duty militia from Pennsylvania were relegated to tasks like building breastworks and redoubts, handling picket duty, and escorting prisoners and supplies. Some Pennsylvania Militia did take part in the battles of Brandywine, Germantown, and Whitemarsh, but only a handful of the lot saw actual combat. Most of the men were far removed from the fight as Washington did not trust them. While no Pennsylvania militia was present at Valley Forge, Washington did use them to secure supply routes for the army throughout his time camped there.  So someone belonging on the 2nd Class, 7th Company, in the 6th Battalion district on the Permanent Billet, would have a new active duty muster roll arrangement of the 6th Company (because he belonged to the 6th Battalion) of the 2nd Battalion (because all men of the 2nd Class were called up, they were folded into the 2nd Class Battalion, or just the 2nd Battalion).  Quakers were still required to attend drills and show up when called to serve, but many found substitutes as a way to keep their conscious clear, though still required to pay the standard fine.  However, according to the new regulations under the Militia Law, tradesmen were not permitted to hold back any apprentice from serving, though their service was not obligatory. Additionally, Judges of the Supreme Court, delegates in congress, professors and teachers, ministers of every denomination, postmasters and riders, sheriffs, gaolers, the state attorney general, state treasurer and servants purchased were all exempted at some point through to the duration of the war.  Most argued that crop season, replanting crops that died, or returning from service was why they would not turn out. But in many instances, men would remove themselves entirely from their original Battalion district to another to avoid being called up for service, as noted in The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682 to 1801, Vol. 9 (Philadelphia: Clarence M. Busch, 1903), 188: “And whereas many militia men by removing from one battalion or company to another, find means to escape their tour of duty….”  The first supplement was passed on 26 December 1777, wherein those not able to serve were charged an additional tax equal to the tax they paid annually. The second supplement was passed on 30 December 1777 that instituted a £5 fine for anyone who left the company assigned to them and displayed on their Permanent Billet Roll. In addition, the law also stated, “Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any militia-man shall neglect or refuse to march in person on the day appointed as aforesaid, such delinquent shall forfeit and pay within five days the sum of forty pounds to the lieutenant or nearest sub lieutenant, unless he produce a sufficient substitute of or belonging to his own family.” (The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania, 186).  County Lieutenants complained about falling short of their quotas throughout the Philadelphia campaign. Thus on 5 April 1779 the fine was increased to £100 for those who refused to serve, and those who did not heed other services required (like showing up for regular drills) were forced to pay six times as much as they would normally pay, except for Philadelphians who would be required to pay eight times as much (because the law hates Philadelphia, I guess).  See the slightly dated, yet still excellent study of substitutes written by Arthur J. Alexander, “Service by Substitute in the Militia of Northampton and Lancaster Counties (Pennsylvania) During the War of the Revolution,” Military Affairs, 9:3 (Autumn, 1945), 278-282.  Around this period of time, the SEC authorized the forming of five companies of Rangers, to be outfitted and equipped by the state. These were not militia, nor were they Continental troops, nor Associators, but Independent companies meant to serve a longer tour of duty, made up of volunteers, to patrol the frontier under threat of Indian attacks.  In the western frontier counties, this was already happening. County Lieutenants worked closely with the Continental officer in charge at Fort Pitt, and so militia could be called to serve tours of six months in addition to their standard two-month tour of duty as specified in the ordinances of the Militia Law. See my discussion here: http://historyandancestry.wordpress.com/2014/06/02/the-pennsylvania-militiaman-fighting-for-virginia-how-land-disputes-confuse-everyone/  For an example, see the roll found in the Pennsylvania Archives, 5th Series, Vol. 8, 165. The roster contains a list of 28 names called to serve, of which 24 had substitutes in their place. In addition, the transcription suggests that the unit designations were no longer following the Active Duty roll patterns.  Part of the problem with establishing militia companies after 1780 is that Captains were not consistent in how they marked their rolls. Some used checkmarks for positive attendance, other used checkmarks for negative attendance. Sometimes they used a variety of symbols and supplied a key. They also called their Companies whatever they wanted to call them, using their original designation or giving them a new designation—occasionally they would refer to their militia battalions as ‘of Foot’, like the ‘3rd of Foot’ (i.e., the 3rd Class of militia from such and such county). These designations are mostly found in the Fine Lists found in the Pennsylvania Archives 3rd Ser., Vol. 5-7.  On 11 September 1780, in Sugarloaf Township, a company of men from the Northampton County militia, primarily from the Battalion district encompassing Allen, Moore, and Lehigh townships, were ambushed and massacred by Indians. They attempted to flee and were cut down next to a stream which flows through the region. They were found days later by local residents and a detachment of Northampton militiamen were sent out to Sugarloaf to bury them. This event came a few years after the massacre at Wyoming in which Pennsylvania and Connecticut militia were slaughtered; but previous to that were a series of violent campaigns against the frontier by the same Indians that left militia on high alert—fortifications were the primary target and were burned prior to the Battle at Wyoming. See what I’ve written about it here: http://allthingsliberty.com/2014/02/connecticut-yankees-in-a-pennamites-fort/