The Mutiny of 1783: America’s Only Successful Insurrection

In June 1783, while a formal peace agreement was being negotiated in Paris, what British arms had not been able to accomplish was effectively achieved by the very soldiers who had sworn to protect and maintain the American government. A military insurrection unfolded on streets of the national capital of Philadelphia, the only successful insurrection against the government in American history as it forced Congress from its capital.

This “very trifling mutiny” began in the political and financial chaos that gripped the new country.[1] The financial cost of the war was staggering. In 1783, in an attempt to limit the rapidly growing debt, Congress ordered Gen. George Washington to begin furloughing troops. Washington insisted that his faithful soldiers leave the service of their country with at least three months’ pay even though the national treasury did not have the funds for this. Washington’s appeals to individual states for assistance produced few positive results. As a consequence, United States Superintendent of Finances, Robert Morris, decided to issue his own personal bank notes to the troops. These notes were widely circulated because they were receivable for taxes and because Morris could employ governmental revenues to redeem them. Morris was considered directly liable for their redemption should government revenue prove insufficient.[2]

Apprehension amongst Washington’s command grew that soldiers would not distinguish between a cession of hostilities and a definitive peace. Military leaders felt this could evolve into increased morale problems and discontent with Congress’s civilian authority.[3]

The Continental Army had rarely achieved stability in matters of supplies, discipline, and payment to the troops for their services. The army endured mutinies as early as 1775.[4] Although several of the military revolts were not direct threats to the American command structure and the military’s requirements for discipline were always evident, Washington predominantly erred on the side of being too magnanimous towards his men during the early revolts; his feelings would incrementally harden as episodes continued to occur. Unlike an earlier revolt amongst the Pennsylvania Continental troops, the January 1781 New Jersey Line Mutiny resulted in severe punishments with two participants executed by firing squads.[5] Washington’s firm handling of this incident prevented future uprisings within his own region of military control. The soldiers garrisoning the capital, however, were hundreds of miles away from him in June 1783.

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None of previous mutinies were close enough to Philadelphia to affect Congress. News of the various mutinies did cause the government concern, stimulating discussions about economic stability and ways to improve the troops’ general welfare. Congress felt safe from any physical repercussions from its military, but did appoint a committee to investigate the mutinies. Charged to chair the committee was Congressman John Sullivan of New Hampshire, a former Continental Army major general. Worried that the Pennsylvania Line Mutiny might alienate the French court, Sullivan told the French minister Chevalier de La Luzerne that it was merely a misunderstanding over the terms of enlistment and overdue pay. He attempted to minimize the troops’ violence by stating that they were predisposed not to injure civilians or their officers, “though some who were intoxicated with Liquor discharged their Musketts, killed one Officer and wounded three or four.” His prudently constructed reports may have motivated the French minister to recommend additional direct financial aid to keep the American cause from further disintegrating.[6]

American military commanders tried to placate one another with explanations that the mutinies were due to alcohol or British agents instead of legitimate grievances.[7] Washington was concerned about what could have happened if the January mutineers had reached Philadelphia—the soldiers could “wreck their vengeance upon the persons and properties of the Citizens.” He believed that “in a town the size of Philadelphia there are numbers who would join them in such a business.”[8] Sullivan delivered to Washington a more candid appraisal of the situation: “the almost total Dissolution of the Pennsylvania Line by Furlough or Discharge was absolutely necessary & a re-incorporation the only remedy that could be applied for as a body they would have been Troublesome if not Dangerous.” He continued, “too many of the Disorderly ones,” and “unprincipled Irish & English men ungovernable in their Nature” would reenlist and he strongly urged that the Pennsylvanians be “always Separated & Intermixed with other Troops.”[9] The Pennsylvania Line was ultimately reorganized.

By the spring of 1783, there was a clear feeling that a major political crisis had seized Congress and extended to the rest of the country.[10] In February, Congressman James Madison predicted that the next six months would decide if the American Revolution would finish in “prosperity and tranquility, or confusion and disunion.”[11] The government prepared to shift from the wartime conditions it had labored under, with dependence on the military, to a stronger, centralized civilian administration.

As a permanent peace loomed, one of the earliest controversies among the independent thirteen states arose over the location of the capital. Except for two periods when the British Army drove the Congress from Philadelphia, this city had continually served as the capital since 1775. For a variety of reasons, congressman had been unhappy about this. The demands of the commercial city of over 25,000 inhabitants, including occasional mob actions, frequently impeded the government’s independence. In addition, the Pennsylvania government, because of its physical proximity to Congress, exercised more pressure over matters of the union than the other twelve states. For these reasons, Congress agreed in early June 1783 to consider the selection of a post-war capital.[12]

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The imminence of peace made American troops and their officers uneasy. Their dominating belief was that Congress had not dealt with them fairly and honorably. It was now mostly officers who had grievances in matters of arrears in pay, unsettled food and clothing accounts, and the government’s failure to make sufficient provision for pensions. Some called the Newburgh Conspiracy a carefully planned military coup that had support within the government.[13] While Congress apparently feared the military, it was dangerously clear that many army officers grew to despise civilians. A rift had grown between the army and the people they were supposed to obey, serve and protect. The officers generally viewed politicians and civilians as having survived the war in relative comfort and safety. Some civilians profited from such things as war contracts, while the soldiers risked their lives and personal fortunes for their country.

Again Congress dodged any direct military confrontation when Washington dealt his powerful coup-de-grace to the conspiracy, reminding his officers that the military was subordinate to the civilian government. He forewarned his trusted former aide-de-camp, now Congressman, Alexander Hamilton, that “unhappy consequences would follow” if the government tried to disband the troops before reaching a proper settlement.[14] Despite these incidents and warnings, Congress decided to furlough and disperse the army. In its bankrupt and powerless state, there was actually nothing else it could do.

In June 1783, three companies of Pennsylvania Continental troops and another of artillery were stationed in the capital for its defense. Washington later identified the majority of them as “Recruits and Soldiers of a day, who have not born the heat and burden of War, and who can have in reality very few hardships to complain of.”[15] Most were in the service for only five months at most and had seen no more arduous assignments than guarding prisoners of war. But among them were a number of veterans from the Pennsylvania Line who participated in the 1781 mutiny. They shared mutual discontentment, as none had received any pay since December and they seemed to sense danger in the government’s proposals of furlough.[16] Also, on their way to the capital by ship was another detachment of Pennsylvania Line troops from the Southern army, probably including men who had been disciplined in 1781. Secretary of War Benjamin Lincoln recognized the potential danger if these troops joined the disgruntled members of the local garrison. An officer was dispatched to halt the vessel, but was unsuccessful.

The stage in Philadelphia was now set for a larger military revolt. Rumors of the furlough were confirmed by passing troops of the Maryland Line, fresh from Newburgh, on their way home. Washington’s amendment to the furlough was not received or relayed. The increased number of troops in the capital, fueled with news of the recent officer protests in Newburgh, certainly encouraged the garrison’s malcontented members to take bold and unprecedented measures.[17] They did on June 13 as Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair, commander of Continental troops in Pennsylvania, was about to issue orders conforming to Washington’s furlough instructions. The Philadelphia garrison’s sergeants gathered and conveyed their men’s grievances “in a very turbulent and indecent style” to Congress through the Secretary of War.[18] These noncommissioned officers refused to accept their discharge until they and their men received their overdue pay. Madison wrote that they “painted the hardships which they had suffered in the defense of their country & the duty of their Country to reward them, demanding a satisfactory answer the afternoon on which it was sent in, with a threat of otherwise taking such measures as would right themselves.”[19] The government took little notice of this “mutinous memorial from the Sergeants,” and the matter was referred back to Lincoln and St. Clair. The two men took “prudent & soothing measures” which Madison believed “obviated the embarrassment.”[20]

This was the calm before the storm. A short time later, the military protestors marshaled their forces on a much larger scale to seek satisfaction from within Philadelphia’s State House and its surrounding buildings. Congress displayed an aura of calm as its members were certain that Pennsylvania possessed sufficient local military forces to quell any hostilities.[21] Lincoln even believed that serious threats to the government had subsided with the gradual reduction of troops in the capital. He departed for a previously scheduled trip to Virginia and placed the Assistant Secretary of War, Maj. William Jackson, in charge.[22]

To the leaders of the national and state governments, local military discontent seemed to be abating with the quick reduction of Continental troops in the capital.[23] This was only wishful thinking. By June 15, anger among the soldiers escalated; a Spanish agent reported that the garrison gave “signs of being ready to strike a desperate blow, seizing the National Bank, overthrowing the Superintendent of Finance, to forcing the Assembly to appropriate money to pay them.”[24]

On June 19, word reached Philadelphia that mutiny erupted among the troops of the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment quartered in Lancaster. This revolt exploded on June 17 and approximately ninety fully armed soldiers, with sufficient ammunition and artillery pieces, were on the march to the capital. The soldiers said they wanted settlements for their time of service and not furloughs, and they desired to remain in active military service until an agreement was reached. To reduce their hostility and maintain control, their commander, Col. Richard Butler, made various promises to settle the men’s accounts.[25] His pledges contained the stipulation that they could not be upheld unless the men remained in Lancaster under command of their officers.[26] This somewhat reasonable request was rejected. As the soldiers marched, Butler tried to convince them that their appearance in Philadelphia would be construed as a threat to the government rather than a proper way of presenting their grievances. His views were very accurate.

Butler sent an officer ahead to advise Philadelphia of the approaching mutinous troops. The warning was received first by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council, whose duty it was to maintain local law and order including preserving the safety of Congress; they accordingly informed Congress of the approaching military threat. Congressman Madison recorded that matters could get worse if these troops were joined by other discharged soldiers. Congress appointed a committee of three “for the purpose of conferring with the Executive of Pennsylvania and taking such measures as they should find necessary.”[27] The committee members—Pennsylvania’s Richard Peters, Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth, and New York’s Alexander Hamilton—were prominent political allies of Robert Morris. Hamilton and Peters were considered military authorities and ardent nationalists. Also in Hamilton, Congressional President Elias Boudinot had a personal friend could completely trust and rely on.[28] With Hamilton as the obvious choice for committee chairman, detailed instructions were sent to Secretary of War Jackson to intercept the rebellious soldiers attempt to pacify them if they halted their advance. But Boudinot later related to Washington, “All endeavors to oblige the men to return to Lancaster proved ineffectual.”[29] Boudinot ordered to Jackson to “immediately send an Express to Major General St. Clair, directing him to repair to the City without delay.”[30]

Hamilton and John Dickinson, president of Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council, began a long exchange of letters, declarations, requests, and demands between their respective chambers, on the first and second floors of the State House. Hamilton reported that the Council had “shown reluctance to call out any part of the Militia expressing an opinion that they would not be willing to act till some outrage should have been committed by the troops.”[31]

Jackson, his oratory skills of persuasion not up to his assigned task, returned to Philadelphia. Approximately one hundred mutinous soldiers marched into the city with “fixed Bayonets and Musick” as if on parade or preparing for battle. They had a dramatic impact on the members of the national government.[32] Cheered by many sympathetic civilians, the soldiers calmly proceeded to the city barracks, where they were received by garrison’s troops with open arms as brothers in a common cause.[33] The garrison’s defection swelled the number of mutineers to over five hundred. For the moment, they maintained discipline and created no public disturbances. Pennsylvania authorities saw that the soldiers received sufficient rations in the hope that they would remain mollified.[34] Nonetheless, the very air of the city was charged with wild and alarming rumors; Morris’s Bank of North America or the United States Treasury would be robbed, shops and homes would be looted, congressman and state officials would be seized, ransomed or even slaughtered. Everyone knew why the soldiers had come, but no one could be sure what they proposed to do.[35]

To ignite this combustible situation required experienced and clever leaders, an essential factor as the majority of the troops were young and undisciplined recruits. Retired Capt. Henry Carberry of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment and Lt. John Sullivan, on leave from the 4th Light Dragoons, nominated themselves.[36] Both men always claimed that they were the “sole originators and prime movers of this mutiny.”[37] Previously they had secretly worked for several weeks to condition the Philadelphia troops to resist the furlough when a settlement for it was not announced.[38] Sullivan also anonymously sent letters to Sgt. Christian Nagle, a seven-year veteran of the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment stationed at Lancaster, communicating the ill-feelings of the capital’s garrison and insinuating that the government’s delaying tactics were intended to repudiate payment to the troops. Nagle revealed this information to the Lancaster soldiers, insisting that their concerns would never be properly settled unless they took matters into their own hands. Therefore, when their officers announced the furlough without a settlement plan (omitting Washington’s moderation), the men were prepared to react negatively. They had marched to Philadelphia in four days under Nagle’s leadership.[39]

With mutinous troops completely in control of the city, a steady correspondence began amongst the levels of government. Each letter intensified the blame on the other as the conflict escalated. Boudinot summoned a special meeting of Congress on the Saturday afternoon of June 21. At the same time, the Council gathered for its discussions. As the various governmental officials assembled in the State House, between 12:30 and 1:00 PM, the rebellious troops, numbering approximately 300 to 500 men, surrounded the government buildings, posting sentinels at all the doors and windows. The soldiers, though refraining from physical violence, threatened congressmen and councilmen alike. In one instance, a soldier pressed a bayonet to a congressman’s chest. These menacing gestures apparently made a deep psychological impression on the members of the national government. Though the mutineers never attempted to enter the building, Madison reported them shouting “occasionally offensive words and wantonly pointing their muskets to the Windows of the Hall of Congress.” It was also “observed that spirituous drink from the tipling houses adjoining began to be liberally served out to the soldiers, & might lead to hasty excesses.”[40]

Dickinson descended from his second-floor meeting room to share with the Congressmen the soldiers’ written demands. These remonstrative protests were delivered to the Council by St. Clair as the troops stated that they were “deserted by their former Officers.” Boudinot was “greatly mortified” as he reported this “highly disagreeable and perplexing” event to Washington. Boudinot noted that, up until now, most of the protests were directed against Pennsylvania’s officials; “the Mutineers sent in a paper, demanding of the President and Council to authorize them to choose their own Officers” to “represent their grievances. That they would wait twenty minutes, and if nothing was there done, they would turn in an enraged Soldiery on the Council, who would do themselves Justice, and the Council must abide the consequences.”[41] Not to be intimidated by such threats, Pennsylvania’s government unanimously rejected these proposals. Nevertheless, each Congressman’s thoughts must have been that if the troops stormed the building, would they bother to distinguish between the members of the two levels of government as acts of violence were committed? Many congressmen believed that in a short period of time, no one within this governmental body would be alive.[42] Finally, in a rare show of solidarity, the assembled representatives of the state and national governments removed themselves from their respective chambers. They walked through the cordon of hostile troops who continued to bombard them with verbal insults. Eventually, St. Clair was able to “draw them off to their barracks” with a personal pledge that they could designate individuals from their own numbers to represent them in dealing with the state officials.[43] Boudinot wrote to his brother Elisha that Congress was kept a virtual “prisoner in a manner for 3 hours.” What really distressed him was that “not a single citizen came to our assistance” and he wished it was possible for his brother’s “Troop of Horse to offer their aid” for protection of the government.[44]

One piece of official business Boudinot managed to conduct consisted of a decision to hold the next Congressional meeting in the relative safety of nearby Carpenter’s Hall. He dispatched an express messenger to Washington, who was in the Newburgh area, with a detailed account of the mutinous events and instructions to “direct a movement of some of your best troops, on whom you can depend; under these circumstances, towards this City.” Boudinot still hoped that Dickinson and his Council would react positively and summon the “Militia of the City” as he felt “the worst is yet to come.”[45]

With a quorum meeting, the nearly panic-stricken Congressmen again formally called upon Pennsylvania for protection.[46] Congress demanded that the state militia be summoned to quell the revolt and disarm the rebellious troops. The Council still ignored this request due to its worry that if summoned, none of the militia would respond, giving it a helpless appearance. The lesser of the evils was to wait and do nothing. When pressed by the Council, the state’s senior militia commander agreed “that it would be imprudent to call upon the militia now as we are convinced it would be ineffectual.”[47]

Congressional patience with Pennsylvania’s inability, or its “scandalous neglect,” to protect and sustain the national government now reached its breaking point.[48] Congress adopted a firm resolution and proclamation that “the authority of the United States” was “grossly insulted by the disorderly and menacing appearance of a body of armed soldiers about this place which Congress was assembled.” Boudinot’s Proclamation continued, “that effectual measures should be taken for supporting public authority” and that Congress “have not received satisfactory assurances for expecting adequate and prompt exertions of this State for supporting the dignity of the Federal Government.” If Congress continued to meet in Philadelphia, while an “open mutiny and revolt” remained unchallenged by Pennsylvania, “the dignity and authority of the United States would be constantly exposed to a repetition of insult.”[49] Boudinot, Hamilton, and the Congressmen announced their intentions to remove the government to Princeton as a last resort.

Congress instructed Hamilton to firmly communicate to the Council the exact meaning of Boudinot’s Proclamation’s “effectual measures.” During the entire mutiny affair, Hamilton and Dickinson conducted their own literary dual as scores of letters and messages passed officially between them.

At a special Sunday morning meeting at Dickinson’s home, the Council deliberated the demands presented by Hamilton’s Congressional committee. The night before, Robert Morris called privately on Dickinson and gave his support for the Congressional requests to summon the state militia. The Council’s Minutes recorded that “by effectual measures, the Congress mean that the militia of the State be called forth in sufficient force to reduce the soldiers to obedience” or the national government would move the capital to New Jersey. Nevertheless, “the Council should not think it practicable to draw forth an adequate force immediately,” but “the field officers of the militia be immediately consulted.”[50] The Council continued to hold that requesting the services of the militia, without confidence of having an adequate force, would only antagonize the mutineers to violence. If the appeasement measures were working, why change these actions? The Council’s views not to summon the militia were not entirely incorrect. Dr. Benjamin Rush recorded that, “The experiment of calling out the militia was at last tried but without effect. Only 13 men assembled at the parade of Colonel Reed’s battalion. The universal cry was the men have been neglected and injured, and it is wrong to shed their blood only for the sake of preserving the dignity of the government.”[51] For now, the Council decided to watch and wait, believing Congress was only bluffing in its threat to relocate. The Council also continued to stall in a vain hope the mutinous troops would either acquiesce or Washington’s loyal regiments would arrive to restore order.

As a new week began, meetings of the two levels of government returned to the State House. Their same previous requests, and the subsequent responses, were respectively sent up and down the building’s staircase. Each side continued to blame the other for the matter throughout the day; however, it appeared that the Council’s policy of conciliation might be having some positive results as there was no large-scale destruction, violence or public demonstrations.

The city’s peace was shattered on June 24, as the mutineers again surrounded the State House as the two governments were meeting. They sent six representatives into the building. Congress watched as helpless spectators while the selected soldiers negotiated with St. Claire and the Council. The commanding sergeants’ tone became much more ominous as they threatened everyone in the building with death if the soldiers did not receive justice. Militia officers continued to resist calling their commands until the mutineers “should commit any outrage.”[52] Hamilton urged Congress to withdraw to Princeton. Boudinot welcomed the opportunity of having the capital in his home state as he wished “Jersey to shew her readiness on this occasion, as it may fix Congress as to their permanent residence.”[53] New Jersey’s governor emphasized this same sentiment as he felt this “august Body shall think proper to honor this State with their presence. I make not the least doubt that the Citizens of New Jersey will cheerfully turn out to rebel any violence that may be attempted against them.”[54] Boudinot officially ratified the transfer and issued his proclamation, which, until now, had been kept secret from the populace due to an apparent worry of their negative reaction.

Some Congressmen and other leaders had wished to leave Philadelphia prior to the mutiny; this event served as a catalyst to accelerate their permanent departure. Many felt that the city and its state government exerted too much influence on Congress. Others believed that Philadelphia must offer “some assurances of protection” if it wanted to be the capital.[55] Virginia Congressman Arthur Lee considered it important that the government escape from Philadelphia where the city’s influence could chart the course of the country. Even before the mutiny, Lee had argued that the government “must move to a Spot where they will have a better chance to act independently.”[56]

On June 24, as Congress was shifting across the Delaware River, Washington received Boudinot’s urgent message. He betrayed his feelings when he replied in a dispatch, “It was not until 3 o’clock this afternoon, that I had the first intimation of the infamous and outrageous Mutiny of a part of the Pennsylvania Troops.” He “instantly ordered Three compleat Regiments of Infantry and a Detachment of Artillery to be put into motion as soon as possible.” This “gallant little Army” comprised “a large portion of our force,” 1,500 effectives, who would “perform their duty as brave and faithful Soldiers.”[57] Selected for command was an officer with vast experience in suppressing mutinies by whatever means necessary, Maj. Gen. Robert Howe. Howe kept his corps light and unburdened by heavy equipment and, despite the summer heat, quickly covered the distance across New Jersey. HE was devoted to the supremacy of civil authority and wrote ahead to Dickinson that “to pay implied submission to the Laws of the State, to hold the rights of citizens inviolate, and to treat with the utmost respect, deference, and attention the Legislative and Executive authorities, shall be the rule of my own conduct and that of those under my command.”[58] Washington defended the integrity of the majority of the army as he was concerned that Congress would harden in opposition to the legitimate requests of loyal veteran regiments. He wrote to Boudinot that the mutineers “had not born the heat and burdens of War” nor “suffered and bled without a murmur.” These rebellious soldiers had “very few hardships to complain of” and had not “patiently endured hunger, nakedness and cold” like his loyal troops.[59] Pennsylvania Congressman John Montgomery echoed Washington’s low opinion of the mutineers, writing that “these fellows had never been in action” and were “the off-scourings and filth of the Earth.”[60]

Once Congress was safely in Princeton, the charges and counter-charges continued to be hurled. Madison observed, “The removal of Cong’s under the circumstances which gave birth to it, is a subject of much conversation and criticism. Many of those who condemn it are partially acquainted with facts. Many of those who justify it, seem to have their eye remotely in the disgrace of the Executive Council of the State.”[61] At first, the decentralist element in both Pennsylvania and Congress were very pleased that the government had departed. They hoped this would diminish the power of conservatives like Robert Morris and the wealthy class who were attaining more influence. Nevertheless, to both radicals and conservatives, it was a matter of pride to have the capital in Philadelphia; to lose it to a relative backwater village diminished the city’s prestige. The national governmental leaders never again trusted Philadelphia and its promises to ensure Congress’s safety. Many Congressmen acquired the view that Philadelphia was “a very improper place for the permanent residence of the federal Government.”[62]

The shock of the government’s departure, and information that the mutinous soldiers planned an immediate attack on Morris’ Bank of North America, convinced the Council to finally adopt the strong, forceful measures Hamilton had urged from the beginning. They ordered “that the militia officers be directed to call for as many of their respective commands as possible” and “take posts as best calculated” for the bank’s defense. In addition, adequate “arms and ammunition” were delivered to the militia by the Commissary of Military Stores. The Council “resolved unanimously that they will not even take the proposals now made by the soldiers into consideration unless they first put themselves under the command of their officers, and make a full and satisfactory submission to Congress.” It was further ordered “to call forth a guard of five hundred privates, with such number of officers” that the lieutenant of the city militia “may think proper, as a measure indispensably and immediately necessary to secure Government from insult, the State from disturbance, and the city from injury.”[63] The Philadelphia Light Horse was brought in to stabilize the situation; a local citizen “found the light-horse gentlemen in my yard and about my house, to be ready to protect Governor Dickinson from being insulted by the riotous soldiers from Lancaster.”[64]

Slowly the mutiny crumbled as over five hundred militiamen answered turned out when news arrived that Howe’s army was on its way. The sergeants and other insurrection leaders deserted their followers. Philadelphia’s sheriff was directed “to take all possible means to apprehend and secure the persons” of Captain Carberry and Lieutenant Sullivan.[65] Resistance collapsed when Howe’s detachment neared the city. Dickinson even persuaded the mutineers to follow their officers back to Lancaster. With the assistance of the judge advocate, Howe instituted an official inquiry and kept his command in Philadelphia for the rest of the summer. Two sergeants of the Lancaster Garrison were sentenced execution by firing squad while four other non-commissioned officers were to receive corporal punishment. Congress reviewed the harsh sentences and extended mercy; pardoning those convicted for their role in the military revolt. For his loyalty and heroism in this affair, Congress passed an official resolution publicly praising and thanking Howe.[66]

Reality struck Philadelphia when Congress did not immediately return; it was evident that the city wanted them back. Rush wrote Montgomery, “You have no time to lose. If you remain one week longer at Princeton feeding one another with ideas of insulted and wounded dignity (all stuff in a republic), you will lose Pennsylvania forever from your wise plans of Continental revenue.” He further retorted to Boudinot that,

Three wrongs will not make one right. The Soldiers did wrong in revolting, the council did wrong in not calling out the militia, and the Congress are doing wrong in remaining at Princeton. The two former have come right. Congress alone preserve in the wrong. If you fled for safety, come back-the mutiny is quieted.[67]

Philadelphia authorities realized that they miscalculated about the government’s attitudes. To try and rectify the situation, they employed Thomas Paine to write a conciliatory petition to Congress, as he had politic connections with both aggrieved parties. He devised “a softening healing measure to all sides.” Paine’s work had opposition, principally from Pennsylvania politician Joseph Reed who was using the crisis to expand his power base. To keep anyone from disapproving the document simply because of its author, Paine left his draft unsigned. The stratagem worked—the majority of Philadelphia’s leaders, no matter their allegiance, signed their names to the appeal.[68]

The wound to Congressional dignity ran deeper than initially imagined. Even the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation realized that the mutiny would not easily be forgotten by Congress. They understood that the government would never again want to be placed in such a precarious position. Montgomery wrote to Rush, “You wish Congress to return. Will you proud Philadelphians desend to invite them to return or will you rather say that they went without our Knowlage and they may return without an invitation.”[69] Oliver Ellsworth felt that until “a full assurance given to Congress that they may depend on protection, I am of opinion they will not return to Philadelphia. Some interest making and caballing has been among the members: but a great majority feel the indignity which has been offered them, and shew a great disinclination to return.”[70]

Princeton was unsuitable for a permanent capital due to logistical limitations. Before the mutiny, Congress considered proposals for a permanent national capital. The hasty move to Princeton gave this issue a renewed importance. By the fall of 1783, at least five states were actively competing to have the national capital within their borders.[71] Following some intricate political maneuvers, a majority of congressional votes favored alternating capitals at Trenton (which offered to “give Congress an exclusive jurisdiction over 20 square miles”) and Annapolis.[72] Some Congressmen felt that “a perambulatory Congress favors republicanism—a permanent one tends to concentrate power, Aristocracy and Monarch.”[73] The decision, nevertheless, did not maintain popularity or get fully resolved; it still placed the capital within the boundaries, jurisdiction, and protection of individual states. The plan was scraped by December 23, 1784. Congress moved from Annapolis to New York City where it remained for the duration of the Articles of Confederation.[74] For many years Philadelphia never failed to remember its loss of prestige. In 1786 Benjamin Franklin, now president of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council, was reminded by Congressman John Bayard: “It is with regret we find occasion to mention that the discontents which arose between Congress and the Executive Council of Pennsylvania in the year 1783, are not wholly forgotten.” Pennsylvania’s Congressional Delegation felt that there was “Reluctance in the Executive of Pennsylvania to call to account & punish the persons concerned in the Mutiny of the Soldiers in 1783.”[75]

The insurrection gave credence that the capital should be placed in a special federally controlled district where it would never again be at the mercy of any state government and their militia for protection.[76] In his blame of Pennsylvania, Hamilton contended, “The conduct of the executive of this State was to the last degree weak and disgusting. In short, they pretended it was out of their power to bring out the militia, without making the experiment.”[77]

Following Madison’s opinions, Hamilton made the case for an independent capital that has “every requisite control” in Federalist No. 84.[78] In Federalist No. 29, He further displayed his mutiny experience in his defense of the Federal Constitution’s Article 1, Section 8. In matters related to state militias, the federal government should have the authority, “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections” and “To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”[79]

Throughout its tenure in Philadelphia, the government had been too susceptible to the whims and volatility of Pennsylvania politics. Many thought the temporary removal of Congress from America’s largest city might not be such a bad thing and that a lesson of respect for the government could even be taught to Philadelphians who took it for granted. Other influential figures and Congressmen believed the exodus from Philadelphia, stimulated by the acts of the mutiny, was essential for the future of the young republic.

Many prominent individuals involved with the mutiny realized the folly of having the capital fully dependent on or heavily influenced by any individual state. The words “without some assurances of protection,” or some variation, reverberated in letters of government leaders when Philadelphia or another state’s city was considered for a permanent national capital.[80] The “very respectful and affectionate address” from Philadelphia was not enough for the Congressmen to entertain returning to the city.[81]

[1] Thomas Jefferson to the Marquis de Chastelux, January 16, 1784, Julian Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 30 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), 6:466.

[2] Richard L. Blanco, ed., The American Revolution 1775-1783: An Encyclopedia, 2 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1993), 2:1118.

[3] Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), 179.

[4] See John A. Nagy, Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution (Yardley, PA: Westholme, 2007).

[5] Gregory T. Knouff, The Soldiers’ Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American Identity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 103.

[6] John Sullivan to Chevalier de La Luzerne, January 13, 1781, Mary A. Y. Gallagher, “Reinterpreting the ‘Very Trifling Mutiny’ at Philadelphia in June 1783,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 119 (1995):9.

[7] Ibid., 10.

[8] Washington to Anthony Wayne, January 3, 1781, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799, 39 vols. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 21:57.

[9] Sullivan to Washington, January 29, 1781, Peter H. Smith, et al., eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, 25 vols. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-98), 16:641-42.

[10] Kenneth R. Bowling, “New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the War for Independence,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 101 (1977):421-422.

[11] Madison to Edmund Randolph, February 25, 1783, William T. Hutchinson, et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison, 15 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962-), 6:286.

[12] Bowling, “New Light,” 439.

[13] Hatch, Administration, 159.

[14] Washington to Alexander Hamilton, April 16, 1783, The Writings of George Washington, 26:285-296, 342.

[15] Washington to Elias Boudinot, June 24, 1783, ibid., 27:33.

[16] Varnum Lansing Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton (Lancaster, PA: New Era Printing Company, 1908), 9.

[17] Ibid., 10.

[18] Boudinot to the Ministers Plenipotentiary of the United States in Paris, July15, 1783, Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 6 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), 6:546-47.

[19] Madison to Randolph, June 17, 1783, The Papers of James Madison, 7:158-59.

[20] Madison’s Notes on the Debates, June 13, 1783, ibid., 7:141.

[21] In addition to numerous militia units available in the capital, there was the 1st City Troop of Cavalry. In 1779, these skilled mounted troops had been effectively employed to end a large-scale urban riot at the home of Judge James Wilson.

[22] Hatch, Administration, 181.

[23] By June 12, the Maryland Continental troops had departed for home after collecting three months back pay notes. No doubt these troops, who had been quartered with the city garrison, informed the Pennsylvania soldiers that they had received their pay from January in the form of cash or goods. The Maryland troops had also been permitted to select whether they wanted to accept the furlough.

[24] Francisco Rendón to José de Gálvez, June 15, 1783, in Gallagher, “Reinterpreting the ‘Very Trifling Mutiny’,” 20-21.

[25] The promises included funds for clothing reimbursement, the previous January’s payroll in cash and the subsequent month’s payroll in Morris Notes, and Butler’s full assurance that continued provisions and quarters would be provided until the men were satisfied.

[26] Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton, 14.

[27] Madison’s Notes, June 19, 1783, Letters of Delegates, 20:345.

[28] Bowling, “New Light,” 426.

[29] Boudinot to Washington, June 21, 1783, ibid., 20:249.

[30] Boudinot to Jackson, June 19, 1781, Letters of Delegates, 20:344.

[31] Continental Congress Report, June 20, 1783 in Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 1782-1786, 22 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962-), 3:399.

[32]This military parade was very different for the Congressmen than previous such affairs in the city. In 1777, the Congress applauded American troops marching through Philadelphia to defend the capital from advancing British forces.

[33] Collins, Congress, 17; Affidavit of Benjamin Spyker, Jr., June 28, 1783, Samuel Hazard, ed., Pennsylvania Archives: Selected and Arranged from Original Documents in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, 13 vols. (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Company, 1854), 10:577.

[34] Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia 1609-1884, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: L.H. Everts & Company, 1884), 1:429.

[35] Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton, 17.

[36] Francis Bernard Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army During the War of the Revolution, April 177, to December 1783 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1982), 143, 527.

[37] Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton, 13.

[38] Gallagher, “Reinterpreting the ‘Very Trifling Mutiny’,” 19.

[39] Collins, The Continental Congress at Princeton, 14.

[40] Madison’s Notes, June 21, 1783 in Hutchinson, The Papers of James Madison, 7:177.

[41] Boudinot to Washington, June 21, 1781, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress January 1, 1783 to December 31, 1784, 8 vols. (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1934), 7:193.

[42] Scharf and Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 429.

[43] Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council, June 21, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives,13:605.

[44] Boudinot to Elisha Boudinot, June 23, 1783 in Burnett, Letters of Members, 7:195.

[45] Boudinot to Washington, June 21, 1783 in Smith, Letters of Delegates, 20:349-50.

[46] Scharf and Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 429.

[47] Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council, June 24, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives, 13:610.

[48] Eleazer McComb to Nicholas Van Syke, June 27, 1783, Letters of Members, 7:202.

[49] Boudinot Proclamation, June 24, 1783, Letters of Delegates, 20:360-61.

[50] Minutes, June 22, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives, 13:606-07.

[51] Benjamin Rush to John Montgomery, June 27, 1783 in L.H. Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush, 3 vols (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951),1:302.

[52] Minutes, June 24, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives, 13:610.

[53] Boudinot to Elisha Boudinot, June 23, 1783, Letters of Delegates, 20:356.

[54] William Livingston to Boudinot, June 34, 1783 in Carl E. Prince et al., eds., The Papers of William Livingston April 1783 August 1790, 5 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 5:28.

[55] Olliver Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull, July 10, 1783, Letters of Members, 7:220.

[56]Arthur Lee to Francis Dana, May 1783, ibid., 7:156.

[57] Washington to the President of Congress, June 24, 1783, The Writings of George Washington, 27:32.

[58] Robert Howe to Executive Council of Pennsylvania, July 2, 1783, Charles E. Bennett and David R. Lennon, A Quest for Glory: Major General Robert Howe and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 146-47.

[59] Washington to Boudinot, June 24, 1783, The Writings of George Washington, 27:33.

[60] Montgomery to Rush, July 8, 1783 in Burnett, Letters of Members, 7:216.

[61] Madison to Randolph, June 30, 1783, ibid., 7:208.

[62] Nathan Dane to Moses Brown, June 7, 1788 in Smith, Letters of Delegates, 25:149.

[63] Minutes, June 24 & 25, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives, 13:611-12.

[64] Jacob Cox Parson, ed., Extracts from the Diary of Jacob Hiltzheimer of Philadelphia 1765-1798 (Philadelphia: Press of Wm. F. Fell & Company, 1893), 56.

[65] Minutes, June 26, 1783, Pennsylvania Archives, 13:613.

[66] Bennett and Lemon, A Quest for Glory, 147.

[67] Rush to Montgomery, July 4, 1783; Rush to Boudinot, August 2, 1783, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:300, 308.

[68] David Freeman Hawke, Paine (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 139.

[69] Montgomery to Rush, July 8, 1783 in Burnett, Letters of Members, 7:216.

[70] Ellsworth to Joseph Reed, July 1, 1783, ibid., 7:209.

[71] Theodorick Bland to St. George Tucker, October 6, 1783, Letters of Delegates, 21:21.

[72] McComb to Van Dyke, June 27, 1783 in Burnett, Letters of Members, 7:203.

[73] David Howell to William Greene, December 24, 1783, ibid., 7:397.

[74] Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1979), 336.

[75] John Bayard to Benjamin Franklin, June 30, 1786, Letters of Delegates, 23:376.

[76] Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 182.

[77] Hamilton to George Clinton, June 29, 1783 in Burnett, Letters of Members, 7:203.

[78] Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 84, May 28, 1788, ibid., 581-82.

[79] U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.

[80]John Rutledge to Jacob Read, June 26, 1783; Ellsworth to Reed, July 1, 1783; Ellsworth to Trumbull, July 9, 1783 in Letters of Members, Burnett, 7:200, 209, 219.

[81] Boudinot to Thomas Willing, July 30, 1783, ibid., 7:241.