Smoke, Coffee, and Piracy: Adams and the 1786 Barbary Negotiations

On a brisk day in February of 1786, John Adams stepped into the home of Sidi Haji Abdrahaman, the envoy from the Barbary State of Tripoli. Adams spent much of his political and diplomatic career being taken as a nobody, described by his former friend turned political enemy Jonathan Sewall as having, “none of the essential arts or ornaments which constitute a courtier.”[1] Public opinion notwithstanding, Adams understood the importance of his role as minister to the Court at St. James’s. As he crossed the threshold of the envoy’s door, he surely felt this weight, but what he did not know was that he was beginning a diplomatic negotiation that would end in war nearly two decades later.

Adams was surprised at being welcomed into the envoy’s home, assuming he would only be leaving a card instead. Servants invited him in and seated him next to Abdrahaman in a large chair, bringing in two large lit pipes full of harsh tobacco. The servants next brought in steaming cups of coffee and Adams began to puff and sip so precisely that the servants exclaimed that he must be a native, which should have put an end to the idea that the stiff New Englander was an inept diplomat. The envoy informed Adams that a state war was currently underway between the two nations, shocking Adams as he felt there had been no injury to justify a war. Abdrahaman explained that the Barbary States of North Africa (Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli, and Morocco) would demand tribute, essentially a bribe, to sign a treaty and allow commerce to travel in or around the Mediterranean Sea.

In the years preceding the War of Independence, America fell under the umbrella of protection provided by the British, but with the signing of the Declaration of Independence, America was on her own to ensure peace on a global scale. The French, likewise, were unwilling to assist the United States in ensuring a flourishing Mediterranean trade. The Barbary states knew America’s economy was on rocky footing and leveraged this as they were certain America would have to pay for safe passage or deflate their own economy. Adams penned a letter to Thomas Jefferson in France explaining the humor of the situation, but also the dire nature of consequences.[2]

Two days later, following diplomatic protocol, Abdrahaman called at Adams’ home on Grosvenor Square. He informed Adams that the time to make the treaty was now, because if it were delayed, it would only cost more in tribute. Acting slightly appalled at the process himself, Abdrahaman informed Adams that he was not happy with the circumstances, but there was no possible way to avoid it. The requirement for tribute or war was based upon their religious beliefs that they should make war, take slaves, or exert dominance through the payment of tribute. They viewed the world as full of sinners, and it was their duty to have dominion over them in accordance with God’s plan. In a letter to John Jay, the foreign secretary under the Articles of Confederation government, Adams explains the horror of a war between Christian and Muslim nations. There would be no civility, no fair treatment of prisoners and no end to the evils that would come. Adams also knew the economic consequences of sitting idle would be ruinous to the fragile economy of the United States.[3] John Adams received word frequently from prisoners stating their need to be freed from their captors. The grueling labor was only part of the problem, the sailors would be stripped of their clothes, chained up and paraded as tokens of war—a humiliating and dangerous existence.[4]

Advertisement

Adams quickly understood the circumstance was dire, and he needed another diplomat to assist in negotiations. He sent a frantic letter, along with Col. William Smith, to Paris to bring Thomas Jefferson to London. Telling him his official reason for his visit would be to pay his respects at court, but the true reason was the negotiation with Tripoli. Adams felt the walls closing in around him: he was overworked, stretched thin and under immense pressure. He needed men in America to convince Congress that the eighty thousand dollars allotted for tribute would be insufficient, a minister would need to go to Holland to obtain a loan, and others were needed in London to negotiate. Adams was also not sure that another Dutch loan would be possible, as America had been relying heavily on credit for its operations.[5]

Jefferson arrived in London on March 11, 1786, on a cold and snowy day.[6] Soon the two ministers jumped headlong into negotiations with Abdrahaman where he informed the ministers it would cost thirty thousand guineas to his government, along with three thousand pounds sterling to him as a gift. The payment would need to be made in cash upon the signing of the treaty.[7] Both Adams and Jefferson knew the American coffers were depleted, and there were not enough funds to cover treaties with all the Barbary nations. But what choice did they have? The situation was dire as American sailors languished in slavery in North Africa, American trade foundered in the Mediterranean and the price of insuring ships was skyrocketing.

With negotiations at a standstill, and no other pressing business to handle, Adams and Jefferson took a trip through the countryside together, visiting Shakespeare’s home along with gardens throughout England.[8] At the end of their sojourn, Jefferson returned to Paris to continue his work as minister. But their vacation did not ease their minds as to the state of negotiations. No sooner had Jefferson returned to France than frantic letters began crossing the channel between the two ministers describing the conditions of the enslaved men, debating their thoughts to remedy the situation and how they would ever be able to pay the money. Jefferson was strongly in favor of building a navy and going to war with the Barbary States, feeling that tribute would only extort the country for more money over time.[9] John Adams agreed a navy was necessary, would be an asset to the government in the future and that fighting the pirates would boost the morale of Americans. But he understood there currently was no navy, and it would cost significantly more to build, provision and fight the Barbary States than it would to pay the tribute for now. According to Adams, it would cost two to three times as much to outfit a fleet than it would to pay tribute outright. He also assumed Congress would be hesitant to propose legislation creating a navy—even if they could pay for it. Finally, it would take a significant amount of time to have enough vessels completed to wage war on the Barbary States. The Algerians alone had upwards of fifty gunboats, a number that would swamp any attempt at an attack by America, and it would also bring the weight of all the Barbary Nations with it.[10]

Negotiations stalled and there was little to show for their effort, except the Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship, negotiated by Thomas Barclay. Morocco being the friendliest to the United States, was willing to negotiate the terms more than the other Barbary nations were. Writing to John Jay on January 27, 1787, the commissioners informed him that the treaty was signed, and Barclay was able to obtain peace at a significantly lower price than initially proposed, and in gifts instead of cash.[11] This was but a small victory as there remained no agreement with the other Barbary Nations, but it proved on a large scale that diplomacy could be successful.

Advertisement

John Adams felt strongly that the only way to put the United States on a more solid footing and to end the reliance on foreign credit to pay American expenses, was to expand the size and scope of the federal government to allow for the levying taxes and obtaining other sources of revenue.[12] The Articles of Confederation were too weak to support this larger government, and leaders in America knew it. This crisis, along with others from Shays’s Rebellion, armed state conflicts and financial woes showed men like James Madison, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton that a new system was needed for the country to survive. These men would make their way to Philadelphia to meet at the Constitutional Convention initially to reform the current Articles of Confederation, but what emerged from the hall was a document that would allow Adams and Jefferson to secure what was needed to put an end to the piratical depredations at sea in the very near future. Eventually, with the signing of the Naval Act of 1794, a provision Adams fought vehemently for, a navy would be constructed that would become a tool Thomas Jefferson would use in 1801 to wage war against the Barbary States. A smoke filled, coffee-fueled negotiation in London in 1786 by an “inept” diplomat, was the catalyst for a war that would begin fifteen years later and finally allow the United States to not pay ransom to trade upon the global stage.

[1] John Adams, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, edited by Charles Francis Adams. Vol. 1 (Little, Brown and Company, 1856).

[2] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, February 17, 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-18-02-0083.

[3] Adams to John Jay, February 20, 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-18-02-0087.

[4] “Early American Interactions with the Barbary States,” William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, clements.umich.edu/exhibit/barbary-wars/early-barbary-interactions/.

[5] Adams to Jefferson, February 21, 1786, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-18-02-0088.

[6] David McCullough, John Adams (Simon & Schuster, 2001), 354.

[7] The American Commissioners to John Jay, March 28, 1786, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-18-02-0115.

[8] McCullough, John Adams, 356.

[9] Jefferson to Adams, July 11, 1786, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0058.

[10] Adams to Jefferson, July 31, 1786, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-10-02-0106.

[11] The American Commissioners to John Jay, January 27, 1787, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-18-02-0303.

[12] Adams to Jefferson, June 6, 1786, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-09-02-0513.