Philip Mazzei and the American Revolution—An Italian in Virginia

Beyond the most familiar Founding Fathers, the Revolutionary era included a wider circle of contributors whose ideas, actions, and relationships shaped the American cause. Among them was Filippo (Philip) Mazzei, an Italian-born writer, entrepreneur, and political thinker whose engagement with American leaders and Enlightenment ideals influenced the revolutionary generation.

Born in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany on December 25, 1730, Mazzei studied medicine and surgery in Prato and Florence before practicing in Livorno and Pisa. He later traveled to Smyrna—then part of the Ottoman Empire—where he continued in the medical profession. On March 3, 1756 he arrived in London, where he established an import-export business specializing in Mediterranean goods such as wine and olive oil, while also supplementing his income by teaching Italian.1

During the following decade, Mazzei expanded his commercial activities, traveled twice to Italy, and cultivated connections within London’s intellectual and social circles, including Thomas Adams and Benjamin Franklin.2 It was through these relationships, particularly with Adams, that his interest in the American colonies was first actively encouraged. During this period, Mazzei also successfully defended himself against charges brought by the Inquisition.3

By the time he resolved to cross the Atlantic for Virginia, Mazzei had traveled widely across Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, visiting major commercial and political centers from Paris and Vienna to Constantinople and Smyrna. These formative experiences—rooted in commerce and exposure to Enlightenment thought—shaped his worldview and prepared him for later engagement with American affairs.

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That engagement, however, did not emerge during the early imperial crisis of the 1760s. There is no evidence that Mazzei commented on colonial-Parliamentary disputes during the Stamp Act crisis or in its immediate aftermath. At the time, he was in Italy, preoccupied with proceedings brought against him by the Inquisition and largely cut off from his American contacts in London, who were themselves focused on articulating colonial grievances to British officials, most notably through Franklin’s testimony before the House of Commons in 1766.

When Mazzei turned his attention toward North America in 1771, his interests were primarily commercial rather than political. No surviving writings link him to contemporary events such as the Boston Massacre. While Mazzei likely remained informed about colonial developments through his American acquaintances in London, his correspondence suggests that he viewed British North America chiefly as a site for entrepreneurial opportunity.

Mazzei proposed introducing European crops suited to American climates, focusing on silk, wine, and olive oil on lands stretching from Virginia to the Mississippi River. Silkworm eggs would be imported from Italian silk regions, grapevines from major French and Italian vineyards, and about 4,000 olive trees from Mediterranean centers. He stressed recruiting fifty experienced farmers and estimated initial transport costs at about £3,000, with additional expenses for tools, surveys, and provisions.4

After making the necessary arrangements and securing permission from Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo to export Tuscan agricultural products, Mazzei embarked aboard the Triumph, with his arrival in Virginia reported on December 2, 1773.6

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Shortly thereafter, on December 7, he wrote to the American Philosophical Society, reporting that, at Franklin’s request, he had delivered the Society’s Transactions to the academies of Turin and Bologna and to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. He also brought with him books and pamphlets sent in exchange by those institutions and offered to act as an intermediary between American and Italian learned societies, thereby initiating a channel of philosophical and scientific exchange between Italy and what would become the United States.7

After establishing his estate—Colle, near Monticello—Mazzei launched a joint-stock agricultural enterprise in Virginia to cultivate “Wine, Oil, agruminous Plants, and Silk.” Leading Virginians, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and George Mason, subscribed as investors. The project, however, never advanced beyond its initial stages. A destructive frost damaged the first plantings, and the outbreak of war diverted both capital and labor. When Mazzei entered public service and departed for Europe, his estate was leased to Friedrich Riedesel—a Prussian general and prisoner of war—whose horses trampled much of the vineyard, effectively ending the venture.10

As he attempted to develop the enterprise, Mazzei was drawn into the political crisis that preceded independence. His principal contribution to the revolutionary cause lay in shaping public opinion through written and oral advocacy in both America and Europe. He is best known for an essay published in the Virginia Gazette in 1774—one of a series of contributions that appeared between 1774 and 1776—under the pseudonym “Furioso” (Italian for “furious”). Written originally in Italian and translated into English by Thomas Jefferson, the essay declared that “all men are by nature equally free and independent.”11

Mazzei’s formulation is now widely regarded as an intellectual precursor to George Mason’s parallel assertion in the Virginia Declaration of Rights and to Jefferson’s claim in the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal.” Although neither Mason nor Jefferson acknowledged Mazzei directly, influence is plausible: his text predates both documents, Jefferson translated it, he maintained close personal and intellectual ties with each man, and the phrasing is strikingly similar.12 While the sentiment itself was common in Enlightenment political discourse, the convergence of chronology, relationships, and language suggests that Mazzei’s formulation may have helped shape the Virginians’ rhetoric in 1776.

In light of his social standing and intellectual commitments, Mazzei’s involvement in the imperial crisis was hardly surprising. In addition to his essay in the Virginia Gazette, he addressed the unfolding dispute in an account of Anglo-American affairs published in four installments in Florence’s Gazzetta Universale in June and July 1775.13 Written for a European audience, the report portrayed colonial resistance as lawful, constitutional, and commercially rational.

Mazzei contextualized the imperial crisis by revisiting the origins of English colonization, arguing that settlement had been the work of private individuals rather than a royal enterprise. Only later did England intervene, “in the hope of enjoying the fruit of the commerce of this continent, and for fear that other Powers might benefit from it.” Monarchs subsequently divided the continent into separate colonies, encouraging rivalry rather than unity; this system, Mazzei observed, endured until about 1764, when British policy became “arbitrary” and taught Americans that Parliamentary overreach affected them all. At that point, rivalry gave way to solidarity: the colonies “united and are now so tightly bound together that the whole world cannot disunite them, and if but one is touched, all of them will react.”

Mazzei located one of the principal grievances in British interference with colonial legislation, as royal vetoes increasingly served English commercial interests. “Some laws,” he wrote, “though more salutary for these countries, have not been approved by the King whenever it has been deemed they might somehow be prejudicial to English commerce.” Economic regulation compounded the injury; since colonial exports were forced through English ports, “the Americans do not make on most of their products two thirds of what they would if they could ship them directly to those nations that buy them from England.” Manufactured goods, likewise, were artificially expensive: “Americans pay twice as much . . . for they [goods] must be made in Great Britain, and if not, must first go to England in order to be shipped thence to America.”

These long-standing commercial burdens became intolerable when Parliament asserted the right to tax the colonies “as if they were dealing with a conquered country.” In colonial eyes, taxation combined with legislative interference reduced their assemblies—where they believed themselves represented—to subordinate bodies, thus transforming Americans into second-class subjects. Parliament justified its policy, Mazzei argued, by reasoning that colonial growth made Americans an attractive source of revenue: “as the colonies grow in population and wealth, the English could tax them at pleasure and remove taxes from themselves.” Shifting the burden to America promised relief at home after the Seven Years’ War, when debt and military costs mounted. Yet the strategy carried risks: referring to non-importation and non-consumption agreements, Mazzei warned that sales of English goods were already declining, noting that “people here no longer wish to import, as they do not wish either to export anything to England.”14

Colonial unity assumed a proto-institutional form through the Committees of Correspondence. From this structure, he maintained, emerged the Continental Congress, “representing a population of about 4 million inhabitants,” elected and approved “universally without a dissenting vote.”15 Delegates were chosen by provincial assemblies, whose members were themselves elected locally, thereby ensuring that authority flowed upward from the people, lending coherence and legitimacy to the process.

Mazzei also stressed the moral restraint of colonial resistance, depicting it as disciplined and humane rather than chaotic and revolutionary. Although Americans mobilized in response to the blockade of Boston, he observed that “they have the self-control and prudence not to be the first to start a war that may be called civil” (the Battle of Lexington and Concord had yet to occur when he wrote his report).16

Mazzei’s interpretation closely paralleled that of contemporary American revolutionaries, such as John Dickinson, who in Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania rejected parliamentary taxation not because it was onerous, but because it established a precedent and amounted to political subjugation: “Those who are taxed without their own consent, expressed by themselves or their representatives, are slaves.”17 Mazzei adopted the same logic for European readers, portraying British taxation as the policy of a victorious power over the inhabitants of a vanquished country, whose subjects possessed no voice in making their own laws.

Most of Mazzei’s analogies can be traced to Thomas Jefferson’s A Summary View of the Rights of British America.18 For instance, Jefferson similarly contended that America had been settled and defended at the expense of private individuals: “Their own blood was spilt in acquiring lands for their settlement, their own fortunes expended in making that settlement effectual.”19 Only after the colonies had become valuable for “her commercial purposes” did Britain intervene, at which point the settlers, having adopted “that system of laws, under which they had hitherto lived in the mother country,” chose to retain allegiance to the crown while preserving their internal autonomy. Jefferson likewise condemned economic restrictions and royal vetoes, exercised “for the most trifling reasons,” including the rejection of colonial efforts to halt the slave trade.20 Mazzei echoed these themes, distilling Jefferson’s detailed memorandum—structured as a direct address to King George III—for a European audience unfamiliar with American affairs.

From an economic standpoint, Mazzei agreed with Benjamin Franklin’s assessment, arguing that Britain risked its revenue from American trade—estimated by Mazzei to be at least “three million pounds sterling” annually—through its coercive policies. The logic resembled that advanced by Franklin, who told Parliament that non-repeal of the Stamp Act would bring “a total loss of the respect and affection the people of America bear to this country, and of all the commerce that depends on that respect and affection.”21

By reproducing arguments developed by Dickinson, Jefferson, Franklin, and others, Mazzei internationalized the American cause before independence was declared. His account translated colonial resistance into a European language of law, commerce, and honor that rendered the struggle intelligible—and defensible—in the Old World.

Beyond his writings, Mazzei also took part in direct political action. In May 1775 he marched as a private with the “Independent Company” of Albemarle County in response to the Gunpowder Incident at Williamsburg.22 On June 24 he helped remove arms from the royal governor’s palace to a public magazine following the withdrawal of John Murray, fourth Earl of Dunmore, aboard HMS Fowey on June 8.23 Later that year he again served as a private when British naval forces attacked Hampton in October.24

By 1776, he was fully integrated into Virginian society and firmly committed to the revolutionary cause. That year he drafted “The Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County to Their Delegates in Convention,”25 entering directly into debates over the creation of Virginia’s new government. As he later explained in a letter to John Adams, Mazzei feared the convention was moving to establish a constitution without a special mandate from the people.26 He warned that adopting a fundamental law under such circumstances risked leaving the new government on an “illegal foundation” and exposing future generations to the consequences of a hastily formed system. The “Instructions” therefore urged delegates to accept the proposed framework only as a temporary measure, intended to preserve unity during the revolutionary crisis, while reserving the creation of a permanent constitution for a more deliberate process rooted in explicit popular authority and proper constitutional legitimacy.

Popular sovereignty was the core principle of Mazzei’s political philosophy. For him, political authority originated in the people, and representatives could exercise power only with their explicit delegation. He maintained that the people “are the only fountain of Power,”27 and any system that allowed assemblies or conventions to act independently of those who empowered them risked replacing liberty with domination.

Mazzei defined the people as “all the Inhabitants of the Country . . . from the most opulent to the most poor, perfectly equal in their natural rights.”28 This definition suggests that his notion of equality was not economic but political. Specifically, his reasoning grounds political legitimacy in political equality: since “all men are by nature equally free and independent,” their political equality “is necessary to set up a free government.”29 Accordingly, a republic can endure only where no citizen enjoys exclusive political privileges or is denied political rights.

From this premise, Mazzei developed a critique of class-based political systems by arguing that wherever society is divided into ranks, “each class must have its share in the government, otherwise one class will tyrannize over the others”; such shares, however, can never be balanced and instead produce instability and, ultimately, despotism. Ancient republics failed because they were “a grotesque mixture of freedom and tyranny,” corrupted by inherited distinctions. Rome, often cited by English commentators to defend mixed government, illustrates the danger: once patricians and plebeians struggled for supremacy, “the two parties were kept in almost continuous dissension until a usurper, working his way between them attained the throne.”30

To address this problem, Mazzei advocated equal representation in a representative government—treating the latter as a practical necessity rather than a political ideal. Because population size and geography make universal assembly impossible, he argued, the people must appoint delegates to act in their name. Nevertheless, delegation never transfers sovereignty itself and representatives remain servants rather than rulers: “We want Agents, & not Masters.”31 Representation, therefore, exists to preserve liberty, not to replace it, and any claim to independent authority converts lawful delegation into usurpation:

It is an incontestable truth, that a Country is not free unless all its inhabitants partake equally of the power of Government. . . . As our freedom is reduced in proportion to the power we confer to others, it would be madness to give up any more than what is really necessary. The Power of approving or disapproving the laws resolved upon by our Representatives, is one of those rights, of which we cannot deprive, or divest our posterity.32

On this basis, Mazzei attacked the British parliamentary doctrine that elected legislators may act according to their own judgment rather than the will of their constituents. This principle, he reasoned, is the ideological foundation of disguised despotism: historically, representation has served “to blind the greater part of the People, to keep them in the most perfect ignorance of their rights, & to make them beleave that they were free, while the only miserable share of freedom they enjoyed was the choice of their masters.”33 Therefore, annual elections do not necessarily guarantee liberty, as long-term incumbency generates a sense of prestige and dependence; over time citizens grow “dazzled by the splendor of opulence & always prejudiced in favour of conspicuous families,” allowing office to concentrate in “few leading families” until government becomes “a tirannic Aristocracy, & perhaps Oligarchy insolently exercised under the shadow of Liberty.”34 Petitions and remonstrances are rendered meaningless when representatives claim discretion independent of popular instruction, for to ignore the voice of constituents is to deny the source of authority itself.

To prevent this degeneration, Mazzei emphasized the need for continuous popular control. He recommended that men in power be reduced “to a private station, for one year at least out of 3 . . . to maintain equality, to curb the ambitious views of aspiring men, to lessen envy & jealousy by opening the way to honours & power to greater number of individuals; & will be the means of having more men experienced in public affairs.”35 Long tenure was perceived as a source of inequality, creating a political class distinct from ordinary citizens; therefore, he advocated political structures that preclude the emergence of permanent governors and permanently governed.

Mazzei was equally outspoken against self-interest in office. He believed legislators should never be allowed to reward themselves. While the people may grant them the power to make laws, they “cannot allow them to make Laws for their own emolument, either pecuniary, or honorary.” Any compensation, he argued, must be “the free gift of the People” and should have the approval of the county’s residents. If lawmakers’ salaries were independent of the people, he warned, it would lead to independence in lawmaking as well.36

Religious liberty likewise occupied a central place in Mazzei’s thought. By citing Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights, he agreed that religion “can be directed only by reason & conviction, not by force or violence”; accordingly, laws compelling dissenters to support an established church imply that “you are allowed to think as you please, but you are to pay for other People’s thinking.”37 Such taxation violates natural equality and establishes a precedent for arbitrary power: if one sect may tax another, any majority may someday do the same. Certain rights, he concluded, “men cannot give up even to a great majority of their own Community. Supposing such a Majority to become so injust as to presume to take from the others their property the consequence would be a division of the State & a civil war, if the less number would not submit to a wretched slavery.”38 Thus, in Mazzei’s view, liberty is not merely the will of the majority but the preservation of rights that precede political authority itself. In this respect, although Mazzei did not directly influence James Madison, his Enlightenment thought mirrored concerns Madison would later address through structural safeguards in the Federalist Papers, and that ultimately became part of the Constitution itself.39

Mazzei maintained that a republican government established by Congress would command obedience precisely because it rested on consent: “as all legal Authority is in the People, & none can exist but what is derived from them, we will submit to, & obey such a Government, as the Genl. Congress in their wisdom may think fit to establish.”40 He did not fear authority itself but authority without accountability. For him, a government that assumes unlimited power, even if elected, becomes arbitrary if it draws no line between delegated and reserved authority; where no such line exists, citizens are reduced to subjects.

Furthermore, he anticipated later arguments for constitutional unity by warning that independence without institutional coherence would produce weakness and rivalry: “The duration of our union greatly depends upon our having the same Constitution.” Maintaining that unity, he argued, would make it more difficult for “both foreign & domestic” enemies to generate suspicion and jealousy among Americans.41

The republic envisioned by Mazzei is one grounded in the full political equality of its citizens and structured to prevent power from hardening into hierarchy. Liberty would be sustained through constant participation and vigilant oversight by citizens capable of judgment and responsibility, while political institutions ensured that rulers remained temporary, dependent, and subordinate. In such a constitutional republic, the authority of elected officials would remain perpetually subject to recall, revision, and resistance in cases of abuse.

As the conflict progressed, Mazzei grew increasingly confident that France and Spain would enter the contest.42 His conviction hinged on the fact that both kingdoms had seen their presence in North America vastly reduced after the Seven Years’ War and had been excluded from formal commercial relations with the colonies due to British mercantilist policies. Although colonial merchants managed to trade contraband goods with French and Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, the prospect of securing a legitimate commercial foothold in a region of immense economic potential—while simultaneously undermining Britain’s exclusive access and revenues—proved deeply enticing. Coupled with a desire for national retribution, these factors, in Mazzei’s view, made French and Spanish intervention increasingly likely:

For even the acquisitions which Spain and Italy, and any other nations, will make in this case are to be considered as her own [France’s], and her own as doubly so, because so much will be taken from her rival [Britain]; from that rival, who will never be able to make head against her after losing three millions sterling at least of her neat annual profit, which she reaped from the monopoly of trade with this continent, and the support of about 40,000 sailors.43

It was not long before Mazzei’s transatlantic mindset, combined with the Americans’ need for funds to sustain the war effort, prompted leading figures to recommend—and ultimately secure—his appointment as Virginia’s agent to Europe. Thomas Jefferson was among the first to advance the idea of employing Mazzei on the European continent, writing to John Adams that he believed “as much might be borrowed as would amount to a million of pounds lawful money” from the Grand Duke’s treasury, adding, “I think we have a gentleman [Mazzei] here who would do it with dexterity and fidelity.”44

Jefferson displayed a particular interest in the Mediterranean, not only as a source of potential trade partners and allies in the struggle against Britain, but also for its people. He favored immigrants from Southern Europe, believing they possessed “a skill in agriculture and other arts better adapted to our climate.” In his correspondence with Richard Henry Lee, Jefferson therefore endorsed Mazzei’s appointment, emphasizing that his connections in Tuscany “are good, his acquaintance with capital men there, in Rome, and Naples great,” and that his prior experience in Constantinople—where he had acquired “a knolege of the customs of the country, the mode of doing business there and of some respectable characters”—might render him “more able to be useful to as [sic] than many others.” Jefferson further stressed that, should Mazzei’s integrity alone prove insufficient to guarantee his zeal, “his real and pure principles of republicanism would do it.”45 Lee concurred, replying that he held “a very high opinion of the republican principles of Mr. Mazzei,” and expressing confidence that there was “a good chance to succeed in borrowing there [Italy] one of the millions, five of which are absolutely necessary to sustain, and restore our falling currency.”46

Mazzei, for his part, proved willing to place his skills at the service of his adopted nation and discussed the matter openly within his revolutionary circle. Writing to Lee, he laid out the economic difficulties confronting the country—above all the depreciation and inflation of paper currency—and suggested the potential utility of his own appointment: “I can’t help thinking, that I could probably contribute not a little to remedy these evils, or lessen their effects, was I sent to Europe in company with some clever fellow.”47 Ultimately, Mazzei received his commission from Patrick Henry, then governor of Virginia, as both European agent and commercial agent for the state. In practice, these roles overlapped considerably; formally, however, the distinction separated his broader political and financial responsibilities as general agent from his more specific duties in promoting trade, establishing commercial ties, and procuring goods as commercial agent.49

Mazzei’s instructions as an agent provided that he travel to Europe to secure a loan for Virginia, first proceeding to Paris to consult with Benjamin Franklin, and then continuing on to Tuscany to seek financial support. His influence there was expected to impress “the grand Duke and his Subjects with the justice of the American cause,” the certainty of its success, and the benefits that would flow from friendship and commerce with the new states. He was further instructed to guard against the “intrigues of the British Envoy and his partisans” while prioritizing the procurement of a loan from the Duke himself. Since the ruler might hesitate to lend openly, “whilst the inconveniency of affronting Great Britain is so obvious,” Mazzei was authorized to negotiate through “secret and circuitous methods . . . if he [the Duke] should be willing to oblige us, or to reap the profit of our offers.” Should these efforts fail, Mazzei was to turn to private individuals and companies. He was bound by strict limits—no more than £900,000 at an interest rate not exceeding 5 percent—required to formalize agreements in proper legal terms, and to guarantee repayment on behalf of Virginia. If unsuccessful in Tuscany, he was instructed to “renew . . . attempts in the other States of Europe, (Except Switzerland), where the greatest chance of success appears,” with Genoa and Spain considered especially promising. More broadly, he was to persevere wherever opportunities arose, promoting Virginia’s economic potential—particularly its tobacco exports—to reassure prospective lenders, while maintaining regular correspondence with Thomas Smith, who likewise served as an agent on the continent.50

As commercial agent, his mission was to procure supplies in Italy for Virginia’s army, with authority to “contract for goods and merchandise” on behalf of the state and with the “Faith of this Commonwealth” pledged to fulfill those agreements. He was instructed to purchase only items specified in an approved invoice and to ensure that all goods were shipped “at the sole risk” of the sellers and delivered safely to Virginia.51 Payment could be made in tobacco at fixed rates tied to shipping speed—“nine pounds” if dispatched “before the first day of October,” and eight and seven pounds respectively for goods shipped before the first days of November and December—thereby incentivizing rapid delivery. He was also encouraged to promote trade by engaging European “Speculators and opulent merchants” to supply profitable commodities that would benefit both Virginia’s army and its wider economy.52

Prior to his departure, Mazzei wrote to George Washington requesting his “commands for France & Italy” and updating him on the progress of his agricultural experiments in Virginia. He observed that the state “is better calculated than any other I am acquainted with for the produce of wines, but I cannot say the same in regard to oil and lemons.”53 Washington concurred, replying that he had “nothing to give you the trouble of” regarding the commissions, and instead offered his wishes for an “agreeable & prosperous voyage & a safe return to your adopted Country, in which & rural life I should be happy to meet you.”54

After roughly six years in Virginia—where he pioneered professional European-style viticulture through early commercial ventures, laid the groundwork for America’s wine industry, promoted republican and Enlightenment principles, and backed the Revolutionary cause—Mazzei left for Europe to serve as Virginia’s agent. The journey, however, proved exceedingly arduous.

He sailed from the York River in late June 1779 aboard the Johnston Smith, a brig owned by the French merchant Pierre Penet and commanded by Andrew Paton, a man he distrusted. “The Capn.’s behaviour to me and family,” he later recounted to Jefferson, “was intollerable; his insults were constant, and certainly unprovoked,” and only “regard for the public service” led Mazzei to endure the treatment. Shortly after setting sail, the vessel was captured by British privateers off the Virginia Capes and the Italian was brought to New York City as a prisoner on suspicion of traveling on behalf of Congress or the state.

He denied the charges, claiming instead that he was bound for Tuscany to settle private family and business affairs. The British could not substantiate their suspicions, as he had thrown his official credentials and instructions overboard upon capture (though he preserved several of Jefferson’s legislative proposals on criminal law reform and religious liberty, which he deemed harmless in the enemies’ hands). After pressing his case with British authorities in New York—including Gen. Henry Clinton—he secured passage on a vessel bound for Ireland. Departing Long Island in late August 1779, he endured severe illness during the voyage before arriving in Cork—Britain’s main port for supplying its troops in America.

As part of his cover story, he had indicated to the British in New York an intention to proceed to London—a plausible next destination given his many years as a merchant there from 1755 to 1773—but instead managed to arrange passage aboard a neutral Portuguese merchant vessel bound for France. The ship put him ashore on an island off La Rochelle; from there he made his way to Nantes, where he at last began his work as Virginia’s agent in late November 1779.55

1 Accounts of Mazzei’s arrival in England differ between 1755 and 1756. Margherita Marchione places it on March 3, 1756. See Philip Mazzei, Philip Mazzei: Selected Writings and Correspondence, vol. 1, 1765–1788: Virginia’s Agent during the American Revolution, ed. Margherita Marchione, associate eds. Stanley J. Idzerda and S. Eugene Scalia (Prato, Italy: Cassa di Risparmi e Depositi di Prato, 1983), XXXVII–XL (hereafter cited as Mazzei: Selected Writings).

2 Thomas Adams, a Virginia merchant and politician then in London, met Mazzei and urged him to bring his expertise in Mediterranean viticulture and olive cultivation to the colony. Adams, a friend and London agent of Thomas Jefferson, played a key role in introducing Mazzei to Jefferson and other leading Virginians upon their arrival in the colony.

3 In 1765 Mazzei was denounced by the Tuscan Inquisition for alleged efforts to smuggle prohibited books into Italy. After taking temporary refuge in Lucca, an independent Tuscan enclave, he was conveyed to Naples, where he managed to clear himself with the help of influential Neapolitan figures–mainly Bernardo Tanucci. Fully vindicated, he returned to Tuscany, later leaving for England in the spring of 1767.

4 Philip Mazzei, “Outlines of a Plan for Introducing the Different Products of Europe,” 1771, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:31–34.

6 Pietro Leopoldo to Filippo Mazzei, May 3, 1773, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:44. “Arrival of the Triumph in Virginia as Reported by the Virginia Gazette,” Virginia Gazette, December 2, 1773, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:49: “The Lucy, Driver, from Salem, and the Triumph, Frigate, Rogers, from Leghorn, are arrived in James river; in the latter, we hear, many gentlemen came passengers, in order to settle and cultivate VINES in this colony.”

7 Philip Mazzei to the American Philosophical Society, December 7, 1773, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:49–50.

10 Philip Mazzei, “Proposals for an Agricultural Company,” November 1774, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:65–67. Friedrich Adolf Riedesel to George Washington, February 16, 1779, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-19-02-0219. Friedrich Adolf Riedesel, testimonial concerning Philip Mazzei, April 4, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:142–43.

11 Philip Mazzei, “Fragments Published on the Principles of the American Revolution by a Citizen of Virginia,” 1774–1775, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:68. Marchione dates the series to 1774–1775; most historical accounts assign the specific essay on equality to 1774.

12 Thomas Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration of Independence read “all men are created equal & independant”; George Mason’s draft for the Virginia Declaration of Rights stated “all men are created equally free & independent,” while the revised and final version adopted language identical to Mazzei’s formulation.

13 Philip Mazzei, “Letter from a Citizen of Virginia,” Gazzetta Universale (Florence), nos. 46–49 (June 10, 17, 24; July 1, 1775), in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:77–83.

14 Mazzei, “Letter from a Citizen of Virginia,” 1:77–79.

15 Mazzei, “Letter from a Citizen of Virginia,” 1:80–81.

16 Mazzei, “Letter from a Citizen of Virginia,” 1:81–82.

17 John Dickinson, “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, Letter VII,” in Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania; Letters from the Federal Farmer, 2nd ed., ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 44.

18 Thomas Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden (Modern Library, 2004), 273–89.

19 Jefferson, “A Summary View,” 274–75.

20 Jefferson, “A Summary View,” 283.

21 Examination of Benjamin Franklin Before the Committee of the Whole of the House of Commons, February 13, 1766, Founders Online, National Archives, founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-13-02-0035.

22 William W. Reynolds, “Reaction to the 1775 Gunpowder Episode by the Independent Company of Albemarle County,” Journal of the American Revolution, February 24, 2015, allthingsliberty.com/2015/02/reaction-to-the-1775-gunpowder-episode-by-the-independent-company-of-albemarle-county/.

23 “Removal of Arms from the Governor’s Palace,” June 24, 1775, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:83–84.

24 Philip Mazzei, My Life and Wanderings, trans. S. Eugene Scalia, ed. Margherita Marchione (American Institute of Italian Studies, 1980), 216.

25 Philip Mazzei, “The Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County to Their Delegates in Convention,” May–September 1776, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:90–103.

26 Philip Mazzei to John Adams, September 27, 1785, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:492–95.

27 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:92.

28 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” 1:90.

29 Philip Mazzei, “Fragments Published on the Principles of the American Revolution by a Citizen of Virginia,” 1774–1775, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:68.

30 Mazzei, “Fragments Published on the Principles of the American Revolution by a Citizen of Virginia,” 1:68–69.

31 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:93.

32 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” 1:94.

33 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” 1:92.

34 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” 1:94.

35 Philip Mazzei, “Political Memorandum on the Forms of a New Government in Virginia,” May 11, 1776, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:105.

36 Mazzei, “Political Memorandum on the Forms of a New Government in Virginia,” 1:106.

37 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:101.

38 Mazzei, “Instructions of the Freeholders of Albemarle County,” in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:101– 2.

39 James Madison, “Federalist No. 10,” in The Federalist Papers (Signet Classics, 2003), 71–79.

40 Mazzei, “Political Memorandum on the Forms of a New Government in Virginia,” in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:104.

41 Mazzei, “Political Memorandum on the Forms of a New Government in Virginia,” 1:104.

42 Philip Mazzei, “Observations of a Citizen of the World in answer to an American,” August 24, 1776, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:119–24.

43 Mazzei, “Observations of a Citizen of the World in answer to an American,” 1:122.

44 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 21, 1777, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:128–29.

45 Thomas Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee, August 30, 1778, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:135–36.

46 Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, October 5, 1778, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:136–37.

47 Philip Mazzei to Richard Henry Lee, August 25, 1777, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:129–31.

49 Patrick Henry, “Commission as European Agent for Virginia,” April 22, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:143–44. Patrick Henry, “Commission as Commercial Agent,” April 24, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1: 148.

50 Patrick Henry, “Instructions as Agent for Virginia,” April 22, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:144–47.

51 The annexed invoice Patrick Henry mentioned has not survived in the historical record.

52 Patrick Henry, “Instructions as Commercial Agent,” April 24, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:148–49.

53 Philip Mazzei to George Washington, January 27, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:141–42.

54 George Washington to Philip Mazzei, July 1, 1779, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:155.

55 Philip Mazzei, “Narrative of Capture & Captivity,” March 19, 1780, in Mazzei: Selected Writings, 1:182–201.