When a country is losing a war, especially a war it was expected to win easily, explanations acceptable to the powers-that-be, and the general population, can be hard to come by. Often there is a primary protagonist, or antagonist, depending on who is seeking answers. In the American Revolution, one such person was Joseph Galloway, who proposed a Plan of Union at the First Continental Congress. This plan failed by a single vote and propelled Galloway into a loyalist stance which only hardened as time passed, to the point where he was almost unhinged in his conspiratorial thinking as to the cascading British downfall in the war.
Galloway, born in 1731, was a lawyer, politician, and member of the American Philosophical Society. He moved to Philadelphia to practice law in 1747, and entered politics in 1756 as a member of Pennsylvania’s Provincial Assembly and ally and mentee of Benjamin Franklin. He was a member of the First Continental Congress, but after his Plan of Union proposal failed, he declined an invitation to the Second Continental Congress. Now a committed Loyalist, he joined the British army, serving Gen. William Howe as superintendent-general for the maintenance of civic peace and civil governor of occupied Philadelphia during the winter of 1777-1778. When the British surrendered the city, Galloway evacuated to New York, abandoning his wife in Philadelphia, and moved to London early in 1779, never to return to America.
Galloway quickly became disillusioned by British military failures in the colonies. From his perch in London, he engaged in a furious pamphlet campaign from 1777 through 1782 analyzing the war missteps and largely heaping blame on Sir William Howe and his brother Admiral Lord Richard Howe. The word “pamphlets” diminishes their thoroughness, as most were small (and sometimes not so small) books. They included (using abbreviated titles):
Letters To A Nobleman, On The Conduct of the War In The Middle Colonies, 101 pages, (1779).
A Letter To The Right Honorable Lord Viscount H—e On His Naval Conduct In the American War, 50 pages, (1779).
Cool Thoughts On The Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence, 70 pages (1780).
A reply to the observations of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, 150 pages (1780).
Historical And Political Reflections On The Rise And Progress Of The American Rebellion, 135 pages, (1780).
Plain truth: or, A letter to the author of Dispassionate thoughts on the American war, 76 pages (1780)
Letters from Cicero to Cataline the Second (7 separate letters), 104 pages (1781)
A letter from Cicero to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount H–e: occasioned by his late speech in the H–e of c—ns, 43 pages (1781)
A letter from Cicero to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount H–e: occasioned by his late speech in the H–e of c—ns, 43 pages (1781)
Fabricius; or, Letters to the people of Great Britain; on the absurdity and mischiefs of defensive operations only in the American war, 111 pages (1782)
Galloway’s opponents in this war of words were the Howe brothers; Maj. Gen. Sir William Howe, who commanded the ground forces in America, and Lord Richard Howe, who commanded the naval contingent. They were appointed to the American theater in 1775 and 1776, respectively. Both had roles in the Seven Years’ War, and both had somewhat of a soft spot for America, partly because their brother George Howe, who died in that same war, was honored when the Massachusetts Assembly raised funds to remember him with a memorial in Westminster Abbey.
As tensions between Britain and her American colonies grew, both Howes urged the government to show restraint and avoid armed confrontation with their kinsmen across the pond.[1] After war broke out, William had his reintroduction to North America with the Battle of Bunker Hill, a very costly “success” for the British which demonstrated that, yes indeed, the rebels could fight. The Howes were involved with several unsuccessful early peace proposals. William Howe served in the war until May 1778, when the Crown accepted his resignation, with Richard following that September, both right around the same time France officially agreed to enter the war on the American side.
What got under Galloway’s skin so that he went on his furious writing campaign? It was largely the British campaigns of 1776 and 1777, spearheaded by the Howe brothers, and who became his betes noir. Galloway seemed to take the decision to abandon Philadelphia personally. He shied away, though, from any criticism of the British administration running the show from London, such as George Germain, Lord Sandwich, or Lord North, much less the King. It was those executing that strategy who, for him, were the problem, and that meant the Howes.
Galloway’s complaints became progressively more strident, eventually straying into the realm of hysteria and conspiracy theory. The Howe brothers, at least Sir William, did not simply take the abuse, and responded to Galloway’s charges in at least one pamphlet of his own: Some Observations Upon A Pamphlet Entitled Letters To A Nobleman. This pamphlet included a point-by-point attempt to refute Galloway’s most direct accusations issued in Letters to a Nobleman. Howe also defended himself in testimony before a committee of the House of Commons.
At the outset at least, Galloway appeared to have several legitimate complaints about the way the war effort was run, including the failure of Sir William Howe to take George Washington’s army at a time when they were most vulnerable, the winter of 1777-1778 at Valley Forge. Galloway continually hammered on this as a missed golden opportunity to take Washington’s army, and perhaps Washington himself, out of commission.
Galloway observed in Letters to A Nobleman that “Washington’s army continued in this weak and dangerous state from December till May, while the British troops, who had the best appointments, and were in high health and spirits.”[2] Washington’s diminished force even scoured the countryside to obtain provisions that would have helped the British contingent in Philadelphia; at times there were skirmishes. “We should not be at a loss to account for the conduct of the British General, in suffering a weak, distressed, and yet mischievous enemy, to remain near six months so near him, unmolested,” complained Galloway.[3]
Howe’s response in The Narrative of Lieut. General Willam Howe Relative to his Conduct . . . was simply that “The entrenched situation of the enemy at Valley Forge, twenty-two miles from Philadelphia, did not occasion any difficulties so pressing as to justify an attack upon that strong post during the severe weather . . . I judged it imprudent, until the season should afford a prospect of reaping the advantages, that ought to have resulted from success in that measure.” He continued, saying, “having good information in the spring that the enemy had strengthened the camp by additional works , and being certain of moving him from thence when the campaign should open, I dropped all thoughts of an attack.”[4] Galloway’s rejoinder was that, at the very least, “in the months of March, April, and May, when the inclemency of the winter had ceased,” an attack could have easily been launched, because “the assault was then practicable with ease and little risque.”[5]
The way Galloway saw it, Washington was hemmed in, making him ripe for the taking: “The Schuylkill on his left, was not passable but over the bridge. In his rear lay the Valley Creek, with the high precipice and narrow passage before described. In his front, and on his right, he was assailable on equal terms.” For Galloway, it was only a question of which tactics: assault or siege:
Had the General taken post with 2000 men and fortified a commanding ground on the North side of Schuylkill, near the bridge, it would have been impossible for the rebel army to have escaped on the left. Had he taken post with a like number on a similar piece of ground, opposite to the narrow passage in his rear, it would have had a like effect in that quarter. And had he detached, at the same time, 5 or 6000 men to the front and right of the camp, they would have prevented a flight on those fides, and facilitated an assault in four different places at the same moment.[6]
He ridiculed Washington’s defenses, saying that “his ditches were not three feet in depth; nor was there a drummer in the British Army, who could not, with the utmost ease, leap over them.”
In a later pamphlet, A Reply to the Observations of Lieutenant General Sir William Howe, Galloway did not let up on his attack, stating that Howe had “betrayed a public trust” and that he “finds himself under the necessity of misrepresenting notorious facts . . . for his own vindication.”[7] Specific to Valley Forge, Galloway disregarded the frankly weak defense that Howe initially offered as his reason not to attack Washington. He noted that Howe “suffered his whole army to be besieged in Philadelphia, from the month of November to the month of June, by a feeble, sickly, naked, and half-starved army, of less than four thousand effective men [italics in original].”[8]
Galloway capped his onslaught by criticizing Howe for something he had previously ignored, stating that “we had seen the same General with a vanity and presumption unparalleled in history, after his indolence, after all these wretched blunders, except, from a few of his officers, a triumph more magnificent than would have become the Conqueror of America.”[9] Here Galloway made an oblique reference to the Mischianza, an elaborate celebration in honor of Howe’s departure, staged on May 18, 1778. This grand event began with a regatta, followed by various entertainments that included fireworks, gun salutes, and a luxurious dinner.[10] It can only be considered as decadent and illustrative of a lack of self-awareness by the leaders in Philadelphia to stage such an event in wartime with the amount of suffering going on. This inappropriate, poorly timed, and expensive (reportedly three thousand guineas) celebration marked the end of Howe’s tenure in America as well as the British army’s withdrawal from Philadelphia after having accomplished relatively little, plus, not coincidentally, the entry of France into the war.
Later, Galloway would make a specific reference to the party:
Yet these 19,000 men were blockd up in Philadelphia, from Dec’r to June; while the General did not choose to march out, and attack 5,000, and at last 4,000 rebels, who were almost naked at Valley Forge, and instead of fighting and triumphing over the Rebellion he and his officers chose to triumph over the Ministry in his most absurd Mischianza, upon hearing the News of the French Declaration, which they tho’t must overturn the Ministry.[11]
To further support his case as to Washington’s vulnerability during this period, Galloway included as an appendix to “A reply to the observations of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe” a copy of a long letter from Francis Dana to the president of the Continental Congress, Henry Laurens, detailing all the supply and disease difficulties at Valley Forge. Dana was part of a five-person committee sent to Valley Forge to assess and reorganize the Continental Army, and perhaps even to “rap a demi-god [Washington] over the knuckles,”[12] as one supporter put it. The letter may have been obtained by Galloway when Laurens was captured by the British in August 1780 on his way to a diplomatic mission in Holland.
One of the questions this testimony and earlier defenses by Howe raises is exactly how many troops each side had during that winter of 1777-1778. Was there really the massive advantage Galloway was claiming? The process of troop counts was inherently imprecise, and the numbers changed, over time, due to the difference between total troops and healthy troops. Galloway, although he erred slightly in reporting too few troops under Washington early in 1778, overestimated the number of troops under the American commander at Valley Forge.[13]
His reports concerning the difficulties confronting the Americans during the winters of 1776-1777 and 1777-1778 were generally correct. Washington’s troop counts dropped precipitously from 14,122 and December 1777 to 7,316 in March 1778.[14] During the winter of Valley Forge, Washington reported that 4,000 of his soldiers were “unfit for duty because they were bare foot and otherwise naked.” Realizing he was in trouble, he wrote “unless some great and capital change suddenly takes place . . . this Army must inevitably be reduced to one or another of three things: Starve, dissolve or disperse.”[15]
That was the condition of Washington’s side. What about the British in Philadelphia? Well, things weren’t quite as rosy there as Galloway intimated. Every public building was used to house two-thousand sick and wounded British and Hessian soldiers. The army was on half rations, and there was a shortage of medical and hospital supplies that caused tension between the British and the Hessians. Unable to obtain supplies, the city became a prison for as many as 50,000 inhabitants and troops.[16] Galloway, being involved as he was in Philadelphia politics, would have been aware of these miseries. In fact, at this point conflicts developed between Galloway and Howe as the former attempted to assemble a quasi-civilian government.
Still, Galloway reported the following troop counts in a table included in Letters to a Nobleman:
| Galloway’s estimate of Troop Counts, from Letters to a Nobleman, p. 100 | |||
| Dates | British Troops | Rebel Troops | Superiority of British Troops |
| March 1777 | 27,000 | 4,500 | 22,500 |
| June/July 1777 | 30,000 | 8,000 | 22,000 |
| September 1777 | 30,000 | 16,000 | 14,000 |
| December 1777 | 30,000 | 10,500 | 19,500 |
| Feb/Mar/Apr 1778 | 29,500 | 4,500 | 25,000 |
| June 1778 | 29.500 | 6,000 Pennsylvania
2,500 under Gates in CT 8,500 |
21,000 |
It may be convenient, Galloway added,
to magnify the State of the Rebels, in order to palliate the shameful conduct on our part. Washington has slumbered and slept in quiet, at the distance of twenty miles from Philadelphia, this whole winter, with no more than about 5000 men: Sir W. Howe had upwards of 16,000, as brave fellows, and as eager to engage, as ever took the field; yet he gave the former no interruption.[17]
In support of his estimates, Galloway, in his position as civilian governor of Philadelphia, deployed an extensive number of spies to Washington’s camp, as well as obtaining intelligence from deserters—perhaps as many as eighty spies over the course of the winter of 1777-1778 to keep him informed of the movements and plans of the American army and Pennsylvania government. From their input, he developed and presented to Howe three different plans for attacking Valley Forge.[18] “During all the winter while the Rebels lay in this condition at Valley Forge,” he wrote in the third person, “Mr. Galloway was continually sending spies into their camp, who bro’t an account of everything that passed, all of which he told to Sir Wm. Howe. Galloway also shewd him three plans of the Rebel Camp and marked where and how easily it might be attacked.”[19] Howe brushed them off.
Howe did not venture to supply specific troop counts in either his replies to Galloway or his testimony to the House of Commons in 1779. The 1779 House of Commons inquiries included Howe, Burgoyne, Cornwallis and several of their subordinates. In them, Cornwallis, under questioning from Howe, stated that he thought Washington had “about ten thousand men; at that season of the year, they generally allow them to go home for a time.”[20]
In echoes of his earlier defense, Howe observed that “the author’s plan of besieging the enemy at Valley-Forge is in the highest degree absurd. Had I made a division of the troops in the manner he proposes, I should have exposed them to be beaten in detail.”[21] Howe did not explain why that was the case and deferred to Maj. Gen. Charles Grey for further clarification. Grey testified that “As affairs were then situated in America, I think an attack on the enemy at Valley-Forge, so strongly posted as they were, both by nature and art, would have been very unjustifiable.” He was further asked about Howe’s aggressiveness (or lack thereof):
Q: Do you recollect any instance of Sir William Howe’s omitting any opportunity of attacking the enemy, when it could have been done with a reasonable prospect of advantage, considering all respective situations and circumstances at the time?
A: All circumstances considered, the choice of difficulties in carrying on a war in the strongest country in the world, with almost a unanimous people to defend it, and the number of troops the Commander in Chief had to overcome those difficulties, I know of no instance wherein Sir William Howe ever omitted attacking the enemy, or of his not doing everything that was possible to be done, to promote his Majesty’s service, and the honour of the British arms.[22]
On the other hand, there is the following from Major General James Robertson, under questioning from George Germain, British Secretary of State responsible for the war strategy, in the House of Commons hearings of 1779:
Q: Do you know what force we had in 1777?
A: We had 52,815 men.
Q: What part of that force was under the command of Sir William Howe?
A: 40,874 [Note: This exceeds any number on the Galloway table shown above].
Q: Do you think there was a force fully equal to the object of the war at that time?
A: It was a force that could beat any that the rebels could produce against it.
Q: Have you always been of that opinion?
A: Surely yes. [23]
As far as the aftermath of the failure to attack, the British faced a newly emboldened and more effective Continental Army emerging from Valley Forge. Soon the French would enter the war. Galloway’s criticisms didn’t make much difference in the end, other than providing material for future historians to argue over.
[1] American Battlefield Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/howe-brothers-north-america.
[2] Joseph Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman on the Conduct of the War in the Middle Colonies, (London, J. Wilkie, 1780), 87.
[3] Ibid., 88.
[4] Sir William Howe, The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe in a Committee of the House of Commons … To Which Are Added Some Observations Upon a Pamphlet Entitled Letters to a Nobleman (London, H. Baldwin, 1780), 30.
[5] Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 88.
[6] Ibid., 88-89
[7] Joseph Galloway, A Reply to the Observations of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, on a pamphlet, entitled Letters to a Nobleman (London, G. Wilkie, 1780), 1.
[8] Ibid., 5-6.
[9] Ibid., 6.
[10] Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America (New Haven, Yale Press, 2013),119.
[11] “Parliament and the Howes,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Third Series, Vol. 44 (October, 1910 – June, 1911), 165.
[12] Washington’s Mount Vernon, www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/the-revolutionary-war/valley-forge
[13] John Ferling, “Joseph Galloway’s Military Advice: A Loyalist’s View of the Revolution,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 98, No. 2 (April 1974), 185.
[14] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America,118
[15] Ferling, “Joseph Galloway’s Military Advice,” 185
[15] O’Shaughnessy, The Men Who Lost America, 185-186.
[16] Ibid.,111.
[17] “Parliament and the Howes,” 112.
[18] “Parliament and the Howes,” 165.
[19] Ibid., 165n.
[20] The Parliamentary Register; or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the House of Commons (London, John Stockdale, 1802), 23.
[21] Sir William Howe, The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe in a Committee of the House of Commons (London, 1781),106.
[22] Ibid., 107.
[23] The Parliamentary Register, 282-283.
One thought on “Joseph Galloway and His War of the Howe Brothers”
Mr. Werther, Excellent article about the struggles in the Revolution. I would like to add, Mr. Galloway, being in Philadelphia, did not mention the continued service of the militia. A major, 4 captains and 87 privates from York County were called into active duty for two months to protect the men at Valley Forge. John Lacey was promoted on January 9, 1778 to brigadier general and ordered to assume command of these men. These men, in small parties, were posted on roads leading to the enemy’s lines. Much of their time was spent looking for provisions as they were too far from the commissary. The militia was not relieved of this strenuous duty until the British evacuated in June. This is probably why the British were reluctant to move against Washington. See PA Archives 5th Series, V Volume, P45.