Top 10 Battles of the Revolutionary War

yorktown

The outcome of a war depends on far more than individual battles, but the battles are compelling to study; everyone has a favorite. The impacts of each one are numerous, and we can pontificate endless “what if” scenarios regarding the outcomes. There were, nonetheless, several battles that changed the momentum of the American Revolution – battles that stopped campaigns and caused changes in strategy. Although the outcome of every battle influenced subsequent events, only a few completely changed the momentum of a campaign or of the war itself. For a top ten list of game-changing battles, I first limited the scope to land battles fought on the North American continent. Then I considered whether the outcome of that battle changed the momentum of what was going on at the time. For example, the Battle of Brandywine was a momentous fight, but if the battle hadn’t occurred at all the overall result of the Philadelphia campaign would probably have been more or less the same; and, because the British won, they sustained momentum that they already had. An American victory at Brandywine would’ve been a game-changer – but that didn’t happen. In some cases it’s difficult to isolate battles from campaigns – Yorktown being a fine example – so I’ve mingled the two a bit. Here’s my list: some famous, some not so famous, but each one an event that shifted momentum from one side to the other and shaped the overall conduct of the war. Which battles would make your list? lexingtonconcord

1. Lexington and Concord, April 1775

Although more a series of skirmishes than a pitched battle, this clash of arms was the result of tensions that had built over a long period and changed the conflict from politics and social unrest to open warfare. “Ever since the 19th, we have been kept in constant alarm; all Officers order’d to lay at their barracks.”[1]
bunkerhill

2. Bunker Hill, June 1775

This costly British victory helped shape the early course of the war by proving that intimidating force alone would not bring about victory. It also proved that there was no going back: the war would be a long one with no immediate diplomatic solution. “I believe the regulars will hardly venture out, for they must lose a vast many men if they should, and they cannot afford to purchase every inch of ground as they did at Charlestown.”[2]
quebec

3. Quebec, December 1775

A series of American victories along the waterways from Lake Champlain into Canada ended at Quebec. Had Americans seized the city, the entire northern theater of the war would have been different. “A heterogeneal concatenation of the most peculiar and unparalleled rebuffs and sufferings that are perhaps to be found in the annals of any nation…”[3]
charleston

4. Charleston, June 1776

Often disregarded as a minor action, the British failure to take this major seaport forced the war’s focus to be primarily in the north for the next several years. “Nothing, therefore, was now left for us to do but to lament that the blood of brave and gallant men had been so fruitlessly spilt.”[4]
trenton

5. Trenton, December 1776

The British army’s dramatic success in New York and New Jersey in 1776 was, arguably, predictable given its overwhelming size and skill. The sudden defeat at Trenton and the ten days of chaos that followed was not expected, and preserved American military will. “It is now announced in our general orders, to our inexpressible joy and satisfaction, that the scene is in some degree changed, the fortune of war is reversed, and Providence has been pleased to crown the efforts of our commander-in-chief with a splendid victory.”[5]
saratoga

6. Saratoga, October 1777

It wasn’t so much any single battle but the failure of the British campaign from the north that made this the war’s most significant military turning point. The surrender of a British army encouraged France to openly join the conflict. “Thus ended all our hopes of victory, honour, glory &c &c &c”[6]
rhodeisland

7. Rhode Island, August 1778

This failed American campaign, often overlooked as insignificant, not only stopped American military momentum gained from Saratoga and the recovery of Philadelphia, it showed that alliance with France would not bring a speedy end to the war. The northern theater remained in a stalemate for the rest of the war. “There never was a greater spirit seen in America for the expedition, and greater disappointment when Mr. Frenchman left us.”[7]
kingsmountain

8. Kings Mountain, October 1780

The annihilation of loyalist militia on the South Carolina frontier forced the British to revise their southern strategy and demonstrated that their overextended forces could be defeated in detail. “The destruction of Ferguson and his corps marked the period and the extent of the first expedition into North Carolina… the total ruin of his militia presented a gloomy prospect at the commencement of the campaign.”[8]
cowpens

9. Cowpens, January 1781

This sudden defeat of a substantial British force stopped British offensive momentum in the south and renewed the spirits of American forces, initiating the campaign that brought the war to an end. “I was desirous to have a stroke at Tarleton… & I have given him a devil of a whipping.”[9]
yorktown

10. Yorktown, October 1781

Not a pitched battle but a protracted siege that ended in the surrender of a substantial British army, this operation was the zenith of French-American cooperation and the end of major British military operations in America. “The annals of history do not exhibit a more important period than the present.”[10]


[1] John Barker, The British in Boston, being the Diary of Lieutenant John Barker of the King’s Own Regiment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924), 38.
[2] “Another Account of the late Action at Bunker’s Hill”, Virginia Gazette (Dixon & Hunter), 26 August 1775, in Todd Andrlik, Reporting the Revolution: Before it was History it was News (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2012), 150.
[3] Isaac Senter, in Kenneth Roberts, March to Quebec (Camden, ME: Down East Books, nd), 241.
[4] Sir Henry Clinton, The American Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1854), 35.
[5] James Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution (Hartford, CT: Hurlbut, Williams & Co., 1862), 69.
[6] William Digby, The British Invasion from the North. The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, 1776-1777, with the Journal of Lieut. William Digby of the 53d, or Shropshire Regiment of Foot. Munsell’s Historical Series No. 16 (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1887), 322.
[7] G. Williams to Timothy Pickering, 12 September 1778, in Christian M. McBurney, The Rhode Island Campaign (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2012), 207.
[8] Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North Carolina (London: T. Cadell, 1787), 166.
[9] Daniel Morgan to William Snickers, 26 January 1781, quoted in Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 1.
[10] Glasgow Mercury, 22 November 1781, in Todd Andrlik, Reporting the Revolution: Before it was History it was News (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2012), 337.

34 Comments

  • steven paul mark says:

    I’d like to know your reason for omitting the Battle of Long Island/Brooklyn. After the successful Siege of Boston Washington saw ‘NYC’ as the next major conflict. Of course, he was correct, lost the battle and had to retreat, retreat and retreat. But for that loss and the eventual trek through NJ into PA, there would have been no Trenton. If ‘turning point’ is the thesis you need Long Island’s loss stuck in between Boston and Trenton.

    • Todd Andrlik says:

      I’d also put my vote behind NYC’s addition to the list; however, I’d be inclined to include it more for the Continental Army’s lessons learned than for serving as a prelude to Trenton.

    • Per my longer comment below, I view the British campaign as having opened when they arrived in New York harbor with overwhelming force. While battles like Brooklyn and others were necessary for them to achieve victory, they had the initiative from the moment they arrived in the area and no battle took it away from them. This doesn’t mean the battle wasn’t important, only that it didn’t change initiative from one side to the other.

  • John Furfari says:

    I would add the Battle of Fort Mercer. Although a footnote to the Philadelphia Campaign, the American victory over a superior Hessian force in defense of the fort stemmed the tide of American defeats at Brandywine, Paoli, and Germantown. The overwhelming victory garnished public confidence which was deteriorating throughout the region after the fall of Philadelphia and provided an additional morale boost to an American army embarking on a winter at Valley Forge.

  • J. L. Bell says:

    No Brooklyn? No Brandywine? WIth this list, one wouldn’t know that the royal forces entered a nominally independent nation and quickly took over its second-largest city, then a year later took over its capital. That’s gotta hurt.

    What about the British military’s successful siege of Charleston? That seems like a bigger turning-point than the first, unsuccessful siege in 1776. What about Camden?

    Philosophically, this list seems to be based on the idea that British military success was a given so British military victories were less often “turning-points” than American ones. But between every two shifts of momentum to the Continentals, there had to be a shift back to the British, right?

    • Todd Andrlik says:

      I think Brooklyn, Brandywine, Charleston, Camden and Guilford Courthouse were all tied for No. 11.

      • tahsin says:

        But the battle of charlestown is in the list as number 4.

        • tahsin says:

          i mean charleston

          • Todd Andrlik says:

            Hi Tashin. We were discussing two different Charleston engagements. The Charleston listed at No. 4 is more commonly known as the Battle of Sullivan’s Island, June 28, 1776. The Charleston that J. L. Bell and I were referencing as another contender for this list is the 1780 Siege of Charleston. Sorry for the confusion.

    • The point about momentum shifts is well taken, but the British, in general, obtained momentum by initiating campaigns rather than by winning individual battles. We could argue, for example, that the Philadelphia campaign would’ve had the same outcome if the battle of Brandywine had never happened. This line of reasoning is also what puts Rhode Island on the list; in that case, an American victory was almost a given, but did not occur. In general, the battles on this list are the ones where the outcome was startling and unexpected given the forces involved and the side that was already on the offensive.

  • Joe Gadbois says:

    This is exciting news because my great-great-great-great grandfather Captain Clement Gosselin of the 2nd Canadian Regiment was involved in 2 out of the 10 – Quebec and Yorktown! 20% – not bad for a French-Canadian!

  • Scott Ward says:

    Curious as to why Guildford Courthouse isn’t mentioned (though I see that it was in an 11th place tie). It was pivotal to success at Yorktown and one of the bloodiest battles fought… even if the outcome is often debated. It seems to regularly be overlooked by historians…

  • These battles (or in a few cases, non-battles) were chosen because they CHANGED the course of a campaign that was already in progress – the side that had the initiative lost it because of the outcome. Battles aren’t on this list is because they didn’t CHANGE the momentum of the campaign that they were part of.

    Brooklyn (Long Island), for example, had an (arguably) predictable outcome. Momentum favored the British from the time they arrived in New York harbor with overwhelming force. Individual battles, including Long Island, were necessary to effect that goal, but given the forces involved the outcome of the campaign was reasonably predictable: the British achieved all of their geographic objectives, all the way to the Delaware River.

    The same can be said for Brandywine – the British initiated a campaign to take Philadelphia, and the campaign was successful regardless of the individual battles that occurred on the way. And the same again for the 1780 siege of Charleston – the British took the initiative by deciding to take the city, and were completely successful.

    Camden and Guilford Courthouse are tougher to classify in this way. It’s hard to say who had the initiative at Camden; an American victory may have been a game changer, but the American loss simply allowed the British to continue with a plan they’d already set in motion. Guilford Courthouse (arguably) took the offensive capability out of Cornwallis’s army, but the extent to which it singularly caused the move to Yorktown is debatable.

    Many other battles were important in many ways, but these ten (in my view) swung the initiative from one side to the other, rather than allowing one side to retain initiative.

  • George Evans says:

    When you listed Charleston, I thought you’d mean 1780 not 1776.
    I put Monmouth Court House on the list as Clinton didn’t do much out of NYC after that. Replacing Rhode Island which was pretty much a side-show.

  • What? No “Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge”? That Patriot-Scottish/Loyalist skirmish made the British abandon the southern colonies until 1780. Then, forgetting what they’d learned, again thought that Loyalist support was stronger down there than it really was.

  • Stephen Estopinal says:

    Nothing said about expelling the British from Baton Rouge, Mobile, Pensacola and securing the Mississippi River Valley?

  • John Rees says:

    Excellent way to start a good discussion of the subject. Your list is nicely reasoned, should make readers think deeply on the matter, and was destined to encourage rebuttal. Kudos.

  • Wayne Lynch says:

    I would have said Guilford instead of Cowpens. Cowpens was a wonderful victory and, like all victories, gave the Patriots a nice morale lift. However, Cornwallis didn’t really lose the initiative until after Guilford. Up to that point, the CA was on the run. Even at Cowpens, the real question after the battle was whether Morgan could get away without losing the prisoners (and perhaps his own). It was more like a biting Cornwallis in the ass while Guilford CH actually changed the initiative and sent Cornwallis to the safety of Wilmington to regroup and come up with plan B.

    • Jeff Mahon says:

      Very well detailed observations, Wayne. I realize that you wrote this a while ago, so I’m not sure if your opinion has changed, but there a couple reasons I’d keep Cowpens on the list. The first being that after the loss, Cornwallis, who never listened to anyone, was obsessed with getting payback. He foolishly chased Greene. If Morgan was defeated at Cowpens, it’s unlikely the chain of events leading to Yorktown would have ever happened.

      The second reason is the return of the much needed Morgan to the Continental Army, who in my opinion is one of the top five continental officers responsible for winning the war. After resigning due to non-promotion and total disrespect by Congress, (Imagine Congress commissioned Wilkinson to Brigadier General based on Gates ridiculous recommendation even though Wilkinson had done nothing) he came back and did what he always did, and more; used the terrain to his advantage, (Similar to Saratoga) aggressive battlefield tactics, (Like Quebec, Saratoga) developed an exception battle plan, (If original or not can certainly be debated) and ended up winning a much needed battle for the Continental Army.

      • Wayne Lynch says:

        Jeff, truth is I would like to find room for both Cowpens and Guilford in a top ten list. But, of course if it were up to me, the southern battles would always show up first. :)

        I am delighted that you mentioned ‘if original or not’ about Morgan’s battle plan. Not to speak badly of Morgan in any way (I am also a huge fan of his) but, just to give a bit of nod to Thomas Sumter and maybe give credit where due, I will add some info from a recent research trip in the pension files. In the application of James Clinton S2437 as transcribed by Will Graves and located at http://revwarapps.org/s2437.pdf , he talks about Sumter’s plan and its results.

        “General Sumter rode along our lines and asked if any would volunteer to bring on the attack, by making one attack and retreating back so as to draw the enemy to a different point.” Apparently Clinton volunteered and, “this succeeded as was expected” and Tarleton’s legion was drawn into a disastrous charge. “They immediately retreated” with a loss of about 20 dragoons “on the spot”

        To me, this is very similar to Cowpens and represented Sumter’s best battle. But of course, being a fan of the SC partisans, I tend to favor Sumter more than many folk do. :)

        • Jeff Mahon says:

          That’s a really great find, Wayne. Graves’s pension application provides more specifics of the internal workings in his militia company, than those of most pension applications. Granted 50 years have passed since the events described, so some forgotten information may have been gathered to fill in the gaps, but that seemed to be a common practice, and Graves does give many specifics that only he would know.

          Those militia in North Carolina were underrated. They did a heck of a lot of damage to Cornwallis and Carleton, not just in the numerous battles around the state but by more importantly blocking supply lines.

          There’s no doubt that there are similarities in strategy between Blackstock and Cowpens. It may have come more out of desperation in Sumter’s case, having to retreat before taking a defensive stand, but the actual strategy involved with the frontal attack by Tarleton, Sumter’s second line firing from behind first, and right flanking the attackers, are all similar and precede that of Cowpens. Maybe because it was with Militia and on a smaller scale it doesn’t get nearly as much attention as it should, but that’s a solid source to back up the argument.

  • Mark says:

    Cowpens destroyed the aura of invincibility around Tarleton, but it did not fatally damage Cornwallis’ army, it was Guilford Courthouse that did it.

    • wayne Lynch says:

      Mark, the aura of invincibility around Tarleton had already been taken care of 2 months earlier at Blackstock’s Plantation. Probably Sumter’s best battle. He later believed that Morgan actually got his ideas for Cowpens from Sumter’s setup at Blackstock’s where ‘poor Money’ was killed trying to lead an assault against Elijah Clark and the Georgians.

      • Mark says:

        Good point Tarleton was beaten at Blackstock, but putting it into the context of the time, he was still expected to win at Cowpens, the fact that he lost was an upset. On being told the outcome Cornwallis supposedly leaned on his sword until it snapped, although that might be anger at Tarleton’s immaturity!

  • Mark says:

    The Siege of Savannah in 1779 probably would have been fatal for the British had they lost it, they probably wouldn’t have been able to carry out the southern campaign the year later. When he heard the news of the battle, Henry Clinton wrote; “I think that this is the greatest event that has happened the whole war”.

  • Steve Baule says:

    I have to say that Clark’s Western Campaign which solidified American claims to the Old Northwest was a critical point in the war. Had Kaskaskia not been taken (no battle) or Vincennes not have been captured by Clark, Canada would reach much farther south today. The Ohio River would be the northern boundary of the midwest.

  • Sean Kelleher says:

    I would echo John Rees comments.

    I happy to see Saratoga and agree with Bunker Hill and Lexington.

    I think the Americans had little chance of winning and holding on to Quebec – but who would have ever thought they would do so well in that battle and yet lose.

    A very good list.

  • Jeff Mahon says:

    Based on the criteria involved, this is an excellent list, Don. One observation I have why limit the criteria to only land battles in the North American Continent? I say this because this eliminates the only major naval battle in the North American Continent, the Battle of Valcour Island.

    Many would argue that the Battle of Valcour was a critical engagement for the Continental Army in not only buying time for the following year’s campaign, but in showing that the Americans could put up a fierce and tenacious fight, something the British did not expect. More so than anything, Carleton’s caution in preparing for the battle, lead to the delay. When Arnold took his fleet up to Windmill Point, which Carleton described as “a considerable naval force”, this had an obvious effect on Carleton. At that point the Carleton felt the need for to have in his flotilla the unnecessary “Inflexible” which took an extra four weeks to transport and reassemble.

    That being said, had the British fleet gone straight down to Ticonderoga, either unopposed, or encountered the Continental fleet in open water, (Where the British would have likely destroyed the entire fleet in a matter of a couple hours) things would have likely turned out differently.

    • These are thoughtful questions, Jeff.
      I limited the criteria primarily because I wanted some kind of boundaries to limit the discussion from extending to the global aspects of the war. Events like the Siege of Gibraltar and the defense of the English Channel had major military significance; I confined the list to North American land battles to keep it simple.
      That said, I do consider the battle of Valcour Island to be within the scope of consideration, for even though it occurred on the water it was part of a land campaign. But I’m one of those dissenters who doesn’t think the battle was a major factor in the campaign. I do understand and respect the arguments of those who do think it was pivotal, but my own belief is that Carleton would have retreated for the winter even he had succeeded in reaching Ticonderoga in 1776, because he’d have gotten there too late in the season to establish the necessary lines of communication with Quebec. I could be wrong, of course; we’ll never know what would’ve happened if Arnold hadn’t given battle that day. I think, though, that the real delay was caused by Carleton having to build a fleet in order to proceed down the lake, rather than the battle that occurred in October, that prevented British success that year. In that sense it was a successful campaign for Arnold, but not (in my view) because of the battle of Valcour Island.

  • Jeff Mahon says:

    Don, thanks for providing such detailed rational behind the exclusion of this particular battle. I see your point, it can be argued both ways, and there’s no right or wrong conclusion. Like you said, “we’ll never know what would’ve happened if Arnold hadn’t given battle that day”. There are a lot of what ifs, and it’s impossible to delve into the psyche of the two main opponents at that particular time, each complicated individuals, especially under those circumstances.

    I suppose that the reason I would include the battle, which you alluded to, is more so the tactics leading up to the actual battle that cost the British the delay. Would another American Commodore have taken his flotilla so close to St Jean to “intimidate” the British? Maybe, though Arnold was well aware of Carleton’s cautious nature and that this action would likely have a greater psychological impact on an opponent like Carleton. Would another American Commodore publicly announced to his men that they would be attacking St Jean, knowing that word of those comments would reach Carleton, even though Arnold had no intention of attacking St Jean? Probably not. And finally would Carleton have had the respect for any other Commodore of the American fleet had it not been Arnold, who he was obviously familiar with from Quebec and thought of as a relentless rebel? Again, doubtful.

    With those questions in mind, I don’t believe Carlton would have waited for the construction of the “Inflexible” had Arnold not been the Commodore of the American fleet. That’s just an opinion, and though what I put out there was not part of the battle, they are the tactics and the possible mindset leading up to it.

  • Eric says:

    What about the Siege of Savannah in 1779? One of the bloodiest of the war and a major British victory.

  • Dan says:

    Since this popped back up in the most recent comments on the front page, thought I’d add my thoughts. You won’t get any hostile disbelief from me for what was or wasn’t chosen though, I promise! Despite my opinions, everyone here has certainly given convincing reasons for the battles they’re arguing for :)

    First, I would suggest King’s Mountain is in many ways overrated. If anything its importance was in demonstrating the value of constantly disparaged militia (and even more ad-hoc forces than that) when used appropriately. But Cornwallis’s position in NC was already extremely precarious (indeed moving into NC so early was ill-advised), and the defeat at King’s Mountain was hardly the only reason Cornwallis had to turn back to SC. But more importantly, the claim that it was the turning point in the southern strategy after which the British could not find the Loyalist support it needed, is overblown. The British were beginning to notice real problems with raising Loyalist support by July 1780. The high-water mark for Loyalist turnout was actually in late May and June, immediately after the fall of Charleston. This was not, however, because Loyalist strength in the South had been exaggerated. It’s because the British did not understand what it would take to turn out the Loyalists. Throughout 1779 and 1780 they believed simply showing up was all that would be necessary – the Loyalists from the entire province would rise up and march over potentially vast distances to meet the British, and run the very real risk of being intercepted by the Patriots before they ever reached the British.

    This was the greatest contribution by the Patriots – breaking up Loyalist forces (the key to the southern strategy) before they could assist the British, while the British usually focused their attention on finding the Patriot army and defeating it when they were supposed to be raising Loyalist support. This was the case during Archibald Campbell’s march to Augusta, Augustine Prevost’s march to Charleston, and then with Cornwallis through the entirety of the southern campaign in 1780-81. (And of course each one expressed great surprise that no Loyalists showed up as promised) This was the real lesson of Moore’s Creek Bridge and why that battle was important for the lessons the British failed to learn (despite Josiah Martin pointing out that the British could not rely on the Loyalists to come meet them, and would instead need to send their own forces throughout the country assembling Loyalists). So based on their mistaken assumptions of what would be needed to raise Loyalist support, the British were already questioning the value of Loyalists – particularly Cornwallis who, if we are to believe Sir William Howe in his letter to Germain in January 1778, never had much faith in the first place in strategy that depended so much on Loyalists.

    (One way in which you could make the case for King’s Mountain is in the loss of Ferguson. He was perhaps too impetuous and careless of a commander, but he did have a particular talent for understanding what it took to raise Loyalist forces. Historians, however, have largely echoed Cornwallis’s criticisms of Ferguson, and naturally Cornwallis would not have paid much attention to this particular strength of Ferguson’s)

    Likewise, Guilford Courthouse is, I think, also somewhat overrated. The usual argument was that it was this battle that convinced Cornwallis that he could not rely on the Loyalists, and that the key to pacifying the southern colonies was to take Virginia. But again, he had largely reached this decision before Guilford Courthouse. It was clear he had already lost all faith in the value of the Loyalists, and that he likewise believed the only thing sustaining the Patriots in the southern colonies were supplies from Virginia (a questionable assumption somewhat akin to claiming the key to pacifying South Vietnam was to bomb the daylights out of North Vietnam). Cornwallis was therefore already beginning to shift his strategic thinking before Guilford from the southern strategy that depended on support from Loyalists to one of conquest of territory, something he was much more comfortable with, and interdiction of supplies. Guilford did require that he go first to Wilmington to rest, resupply and refit, but it was of less importance than generally assumed in convincing him to abandon the southern strategy and move to Virginia (the fact that Phillips had arrived in VA and Arnold was already there just helped him decide on the timing).

    On a related note, I think the reason that major British victories in the southern colonies (Savannah 1778, Briar Creek, Charleston 1780, Camden, etc) would generally not be in my top 10 of the whole war is because they really weren’t the strategic ends that were going to bring British success in the southern strategy. That strategy was based on organizing local support among the Loyalists, not just territorial conquest or even defeating the enemy’s main army. Taking Savannah and Charleston were necessary because it provided the British with a base of operations to then implement their strategy, but they were by no means sufficient for yielding British strategic success in the South. Camden, meanwhile, brought about the defeat of the Continental Army in the South, but this assumes that army had played a terribly significant role in the success of Patriot military operations in the South to that point. They really hadn’t, because the Patriot strategy was not to defeat the main British army in the field. It was to prevent the British from leveraging Loyalist support, so that the British would not be able to venture far from Savannah, Charleston, or their handful of posts in the SC backcountry without overextending themselves due to that lack of expected Loyalist support. The success or failure of British forces in the major conventional battles in the South therefore really had less impact on British strategic success than most assume. The outcome of these battles inevitably had some effect of loyalty, but much more important was the regular activity of Patriot militia (and occasionally the Continental Army) in controlling the day to day actions of the population, particularly known Loyalists. Read the letter from James Mark Prevost to Germain in the aftermath of Briar Creek in March 1779 where he expresses a great deal of surprise that such a convincing battlefield win yielded very little in terms of boosting Loyalist turnout or diminishing growing Patriot numbers.

    The major conventional battle I would rate as most important for the southern campaign, in addition to Moore’s Creek Bridge and probably Charleston 1776, was Cowpens. As someone noted, it largely destroyed the mythological status of Tarleton as the bogeyman – as he had been the most effective British tool for breaking up groups of Patriot forces before they could do the same to Loyalists. Furthermore, when Cornwallis began chasing after Greene’s army, he largely gave up trying to raise Loyalist forces. He would make one last-ditch, skeptical effort in the Hillsborough area after Greene escaped across the Dan, but Cowpens had cost the British many of their mounted troops – which they would have needed to patrol the area and bring Loyalist forces safely to the army. Naturally though, Cornwallis again blamed the lack of turnout on the perfidy of the Loyalists – something historians would echo for centuries to come.

    Anyway, there’s my 0.02

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