Lafayette and the Journey to Yorktown

During the American War for Independence, 1781 proved to be a monumental year for the young nation. They would achieve an astounding victory at the Siege of Yorktown, and that would presage the end of major combat operations and the beginning of peace negotiations between the warring nations. There was one general officer on the American side who played a significant role in the operations that led to that surprising battle. Marie-Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, commander of the Continental Army forces in Virginia during the Summer of 1781, was a key agent in the events that led to the Franco-American victory at Yorktown.

In early 1781, the Lafayette was tasked by Gen. George Washington to pursue and capture a newly minted British brigadier general, Benedict Arnold, leading British troops in the state of Virginia.[1] By April of that year, before he was able to move his force from Maryland to Virginia, Lafayette received word from Washington that Maj. Gen. William Phillips of the British Army had arrived with additional forces to support Arnold.[2] Lafayette would then have to contend with a larger force than originally expected. To add to these complications, the young general was asked by the government of Maryland to remain in the state due to fears of raids by the Royal Navy.[3] In a letter to the Chevalier de La Luzerne, the French Minister to the United States, Lafayette stated that he was going south and that he was contending with significant supply issues.[4] This, and a lack of manpower, would prove to be enduring obstacles throughout the campaign. The problem of supplies was a difficulty that affected the Continental Army as a whole.[5] In a letter from Gov. Thomas Jefferson on May 31, 1781, he described to Lafayette what actions the state government was taking to supply Lafayette with militia, arms, and supplies.[6] Lafayette also struggled to gather enough horses to form an effective cavalry unit.[7] He began the campaign with a force of approximately 800 Continental Soldiers.[8]

On May 1 Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, the commander of the Southern Department (including Virginia), formally tasked Lafayette to remain in Virginia to oppose General Phillips.[9] Before the British army under Gen. Charles, Lord Cornwallis moved from North Carolina into Virginia, Lafayette maneuvered to defend Richmond and Fredericksburg against a British advance under Phillips.[10] Lafayette was initially successful in this, as he marched rapidly to block Phillips while ordering Maj. Gen. Frierich von Steuben to deploy the Virginia Militia to aid in the opposition.[11] Phillips moved his army to Petersburg, Virginia after this, and Lafayette was then tasked by Greene to prevent Cornwallis and Phillips from joining.[12] During this time, Cornwallis had marched his force from Wilmington, North Carolina, to Halifax, Virginia.[13] Before Cornwallis proceeded to Petersburg, General Phillips passed away due to an illness, leaving Cornwallis as the sole senior commander of British forces in that state.[14] Learning that Lafayette, with a force of approximately 1,000 men, was waiting for a junction with a force commanded by Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne, Cornwallis decided to begin operations immediately.[15] In a letter to Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, dated May 20, Cornwallis illustrated that even if Lafayette and Wayne were to join together, his current force was so superior in numbers that it was unlikely the Continentals could effectively oppose him.[16] Henry Lee also described how “the union of the two armies gave to the British general a force so far superior to his enemy, as to threaten the destruction of Virginia.”[17]

It was with this overwhelming force that Cornwallis began his offensive operation in Virginia in the Summer of 1781. Cornwallis planned to advance on Richmond and destroy the supplies that were stored in the area.[18] Lafayette was forced to use what Continentals he had, along with sporadic deployments of militia, to oppose these movements without the advantage of a significant cavalry force.[19] As Cornwallis advanced, Lafayette proceeded to abandon Richmond and move towards Fredericksburg to form a junction with Wayne.[20] Lafayette developed a strategy of defense, avoiding large engagements and opposing the British when able.[21] By avoiding a direct fight Lafayette kept a force present in the field that Cornwallis had to account for, and this bought the Patriots time to gather greater forces for a more substantial effort.[22] By the end of June, events appeared to turn in favor of the Continentals, with Wayne arriving and the British beginning their retreat to the coast.[23] Virginia Militia Gen. Thomas Nelson was elected as the new governor of Virginia, replacing Thomas Jefferson, and he gathered a large force of militia to aid Lafayette for a time.[24]

Advertisement

Lafayette transitioned to the offensive and prepared to strike Cornwallis as he retreated. On July 6 Lafayette committed his forces at the Battle of Green Spring.[25] He attempted to catch Cornwallis unaware as he and his army crossed the James River.[26] Rather than an enemy caught unaware, Lafayette found the British deployed for battle.[27] The young general held out until the arrival of nightfall, and his force retreated in an orderly fashion while the British chose not to pursue.[28] With the conclusion of that battle, the British continued their retreat to Portsmouth, Virginia, while the Continental forces proceeded to shadow them.[29]

While General Cornwallis was in command in Virginia, it was General Clinton who held overall command of all British forces in North America. When he received word that Cornwallis was operating in Virginia, he was less than pleased.[30] Communications were slow at that time, even with the Royal Navy maintaining control of the sea lines of communication. To further complicate matters, Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the government official tasked with conducting the war, did not give clear guidance to the commanders.[31]

With no clear guidance from Germain, the two British generals were at odds as to what operations to prioritize. General Clinton had received intelligence that the French and Americans might attack New York, and he desired additional troops from Cornwallis to establish an effective defense.[32] Thus, he ordered Cornwallis to establish a port for the Royal Navy to support the movement of troops.[33] Clinton insisted in a letter to Cornwallis on July 11 that he never intended for there to be more than short-term raids in the Chesapeake area, and that the station should only require a small force to defend it.[34] He believed that Cornwallis should have focused on securing South Carolina, rather than moving into Virginia.[35] Cornwallis maintained that to succeed in the Carolinas, he required the removal of Virginia as a source of resupply for the forces under Greene’s command.[36] With this lack of a common operating picture and a breakdown in command structure and communication, it is evident that it was a British decision to retreat and establish a post at Yorktown and Gloucester. Lafayette was not strong enough to force them to make that decision, but he did have a role to play.

Though his was not the crucial force that drove Cornwallis to retreat to Yorktown, Lafayette was still an active participant in the campaign, and his actions proved vital in several ways. He played a central role in organizing and providing supplies for both his force and those under the direct command of Nathanael Greene.[37] Before he left for Virginia, he worked with Maryland civilian officials to supply his troops, including the purchase of supplies on his personal credit.[38] He proved skilled at working with political leaders in Virginia to coordinate Patriot actions, such as calling out the militia, coordinating supplies, and providing a unified strategy.[39] This was especially needed, as the previous commander in Virginia, von Steuben, had managed to anger many of the political and militia leaders.[40] The Marquis was also diligent in keeping Washington apprised of the situation in the southern colonies.[41] This resulted in Lafayette being an active voice in encouraging Washington to bring a decisive force to Virginia as early as June 3, 1781.[42]

On July 30 Washington ordered Lafayette to prepare for continued operations, including training the militia, organizing a cavalry force, and preparing supply magazines for use by a large force.[43] As Cornwallis moved towards Yorktown and Gloucester, Lafayette moved his force closer so he could keep an effective watch on the British and be aware of their intentions.[44] The major general was then tasked by Washington to act as a blocking force to ensure Cornwallis did not escape before Washington and the Comte de Rochambeau brought their combined Franco-American force to besiege Yorktown.[45] When the French fleet arrived, it was the Marquis who was the first to meet and coordinate with them.[46] And finally, during the siege, Lafayette continued to command forces in the field.[47]

In the lead-up to the Siege of Yorktown, it was the confusion and disintegration of the British chain of command that ultimately led to their defeat. They had to contend with the difficulties of communication in the eighteenth century, where letters and updates could take weeks or months to arrive. The enemy could also intercept those letters, thereby gaining intelligence while preventing the opposing force from receiving the required updates. Lafayette, though not the reason for the British retreat, did have a part to play in the campaign. He prevented Cornwallis from operating with complete impunity, and he was a vital link in coordinating and organizing the civilian and military elements to ensure that the siege was a success. Without him, the campaign might not have resulted in a British defeat, and Lafayette deserves credit for his role in one of the most important campaigns of the war.

[1] Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution: Selected Letters and Papers, vol. IV (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 66-67.

[2] Ibid., 8-9.

[3] Ibid., 15.

[4] Ibid., 22-23.

[5] Benjamin Franklin to the Marquis de Lafayette, May 14, 1781, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 35, May 1 through October 31, 1781, ed. Barbara B. Oberg (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 64-67.

[6] Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette, May 31, 1781, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 6, 21 May 1781–1 March 1784, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 50–51.

[7] Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 162-165.

[8] Ibid., 88.

[9] Ibid., 74-75.

[10] Ibid., 88-89.

[11] Ibid., 91.

[12] Ibid., 96.

[13] Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America (New York: Arno, 1968), 286-87.

[14] Ibid., 290.

[15] Ibid., 291-292.

[16] Charles Cornwallis, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis vol. 1 (London, 1859), 97-98.

[17] Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States (Washington, DC, 1932). 286.

[18] Cornwallis, Correspondence, 100-101.

[19] Lee, Memoirs of the War, 287.

[20] Ibid., 288-289.

[21] Tarleton, A History, 299.

[22] Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 298-300.

[23] Ibid., 205.

[24] Ibid., 214-215.

[25] Tarleton, A History, 353-356.

[26] Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 236-238.

[27] Tarleton, A History, 353-356.

[28] Lee, Memoirs of the War, 305.

[29] Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 268-269.

[30] Richard Middleton, “The Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy,” History 98, no. 331 (July 2013): 373.

[31] Stanley D.M. Carpenter, Southern Gambit: Cornwallis and the British March to Yorktown (University of Oklahoma Press, 2019), 8.

[32] Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis, Correspondence between His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis (New York, s.n., 1781), 6-9.

[33] Ibid., 6-9.

[34] Charles Cornwallis, An Answer to that Part of the Narrative of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B., Which Relates to the Conduct of Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis, during the Campaign in North American, in the Year 1781 (Farmington Hills: Gale ECCO, 2010), 148.

[35] Henry Clinton, Observations on Some Parts of the Answer of Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative (London: Printed for J. Debrett, 1783), 10.

[36] Cornwallis, Correspondence, 100-101.

[37] Lafayette, Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution, 51.

[38] Ibid., 46.

[39] Ibid., 148-149.

[40] Ibid., 197-200.

[41] Ibid., 130-131.

[42] Ibid., 165-166.

[43] George Washington, The Writings of George Washington. Vol. IX (1780-1782) (New York City: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1891), 321-324.

[44] Edward M. Riley, “Yorktown during the Revolution: Part II The Siege of Yorktown, 1781 (Concluded),” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 57, no. 3 (1949): 278.

[45] Washington, The Writings, 334-336.

[46] Oliver Bernier, Lafayette (Boston: New Word City, Inc., 2017): 80-81.

[47] W. Cochran Pruett, “The Siege of Yorktown,” Field Artillery, no. 4 (July 2003): 12.