Morgan’s Victory at the Cowpens: Brilliant Tactics or Fortunate Volley?

Gen. Daniel Morgan’s defeat of Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton at the Cowpens is generally attributed to his arrangement of troops into three lines, with two lines of militia in front to wear down the advancing enemy. Morgan, however, mentioned only a single line, and he attributed his victory to a “fortunate volley.” Did Morgan not understand his own victory?

Of all the events said to have been turning points in the Revolutionary War, the Battle of the Cowpens in South Carolina on January 17, 1781, may be the most deserving of that accolade and of repeated study. Gen. Charles, Earl Cornwallis stated that it “almost broke my heart,”[1] and five days after the battle he marched after Morgan to recapture six hundred British prisoners, ending up at Yorktown. It is generally thought that Morgan’s victory was the result of an innovative tactic of arranging his troops in three lines with the weakest in front. According to this view, Tarleton’s troops had to skirmish with a first line of militia riflemen and then fight their way through a second line of militiamen before confronting the main line. The first two lines were volunteer refugees from the Carolinas and Georgia under Col. Andrew Pickens, and the main line consisted of Maryland and Delaware Continentals who were hardened survivors of the Battle of Camden on August 16, 1780, under Lt. Col. John Eager Howard, together with Virginia militiamen under Maj. Francis Triplett. Lawrence E. Babits in his meticulously researched book A Devil of a Whipping notes that deploying troops in three lines was not unusual, but that Morgan’s “genius lay in reversing the strength of his linear formations and creating progressively stronger defensive lines . . . The depth of the American lines soaked up the shock of British thrusts.”[2] The primary sources of information about the battle are not entirely clear or consistent with each other, however, so it should not be surprising that there can be a different interpretation.

How Many Lines Were There?

One aspect of the battle about which primary sources disagree is the number of lines. Pension applicant William Lorance, a skirmisher, expressed the standard view, stating that “he was in the front line in the beginning of the action and upon the first fire it fell back upon the second line which this declarant thinks was commanded by Col. Pickens.”[3] Alexander Chesney, a captain of South Carolina Loyalist volunteers at the battle, also stated that there were three lines, but his three lines do not correspond to those in traditional accounts. Chesney had the “Rifle-men as a front line and Cavalry in the rear so as to make a third line,” [4] combining the first two traditional lines into the front line and considering the cavalry of Lt. Col. William Washington in the rear to be the third line. Tarleton also did not consider the skirmishers to be a separate line. He wrote that his “light infantry were then ordered to file to the right till they became equal to the flank of the American front line,” apparently referring to the militia volunteers under Pickens as the front line. Several other participants in the battle also wrote that there were only two lines.[5] Morgan writing two days after the battle referred to only one line: “The Light Infantry commanded by Lt Colonel Howard and the Virginia Militia, under the command of Maj’r Triplette were formed on a rising Ground, and extended a Line in Front . . . Cap’ts Tate & Buchannan with the Augusta Riflemen to support the right of the Line.”[6]

The disagreement about the number of lines may result from different definitions. In eighteenth-century warfare, a line was intended to be a stationary formation of soldiers standing within arm’s length of each other opposite a similar line of the enemy. Musket and artillery fire were intended to open gaps in the enemy’s line, which, together with the flanks, were vulnerable to infantry bayonets and cavalry sabers. The object was to make the enemy’s line break and run. Thus, strictly speaking, a body of troops formed a line only if they were close together and did not intend to retreat. Tarleton and others who referred to more than one line may have been using the term “line” in a less formal sense, or they may not have had a good view of the entire battlefield.

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Accounts by Morgan and other eyewitnesses suggest that what has been termed the “skirmish line” does not fit the strict definition. According to Morgan the skirmishers were “small Parties of Riflemen,” and Christopher Brandon stated that they were only “some 60 or 70 in number . . . stationed sixty or eighty yards in advance of the line, as ‘Sharp Shooters,’ to begin the fire.”[7] Even if each party had only two skirmishers, there would have been thirty-five or fewer of them spaced an average of more than five yards apart. Moreover, Morgan would not have expected them to remain standing with their slow-loading rifles against a bayonet charge. Remaining beyond the effective range of British muskets, and possibly concealed behind the scattered trees, they fired their rifles once, then retreated to the militiamen behind them.[8] The tactic was not unique to Cowpens: Gen. Thomas Sumter had used it at Tarleton’s first defeat in the Battle of Blackstock’s Plantation on the previous November 20 in order to bring on the battle before Tarleton was ready.[9] Of course Morgan as commander of a rifle corps at Saratoga did not need Sumter’s example to show him how to employ riflemen. The skirmishers presented Tarleton’s line with three options: stand and get shot up, retreat, or charge with bayonets before the riflemen have a chance to reload. Tarleton chose the last option, as depicted in the map, ordering his line to charge perhaps before it was completely formed.[10] Far from being deterred or worn down by the skirmishers, the whole British line “moved on with the greatest Impetuosity shouting as they advanced.”[11]

The skirmishers retreated to what is usually termed the second or militia line commanded by Pickens. Tarleton estimated that there were a thousand volunteer militiamen,[12] almost as many as his entire force (as represented by the area of units in the map). If correct, there would have been enough militiamen to form a continuous line across the battlefield, as Tarleton and others thought. Morgan reported to Greene, however, that they were concentrated in front of the flanks of the line: “The Volunteers of North Carolina, South Carolina & Georgia under the Command of the brave and valuable Colonel Pickens, were situated to guard the Flanks. Maj’r McDowell, of the N C Volunteers, was posted on the right Flank in Front of the Line 150 yards & Major Cunningham with the Georgia Volunteers on the left at the same distance in Front.”[13] Even if the militiamen had been deployed across the entire battlefield, Morgan knew they would not hold a conventional line, since they were armed with rifles and less disciplined than Tarleton’s troops. They “kept up a Fire by Regiments retreating agreable to their Orders.”[14]

Did the Militia Blunt the British Attack?

The number of militia lines is less important than whether they weakened the British attack. We have found nothing in the eyewitness accounts to suggest that they did, in spite of valiant efforts to do so. Christopher Brandon described this phase of the battle as follows:

A slight rise in the ground, prevented our seeing the enemy, until they came within eighty yards of us. With a shout they came on in a beautiful line, and a solid flame of fire burst from one end to the other. Our orders were for only one third to fire at a time, but the anxiety of the men was so great, that many of them broke ranks, and rushing forward, jumped behind trees, and commenced the fight on their own responsibility. The violent shock from the British, drove us back a hundred yards.[15]

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Thomas Anderson in the Delaware Continentals gave this account:

About sunrise they began the attack by the discharge of two pieces of cannon and three Huzzas advancing briskly on our Riflemen that was posted in front who fought well, disputing the ground that was between them and us — flying from one tree to another; at last being forced to give ground, they fell back in our rear.[16]

According to British Lt. Roderick Mackenzie, the militiamen “gave way on all quarters, and were pursued to their continentals.”[17] Loyalist Alexander Chesney wrote in his journal, “The Cavalry supported by a detachment of the 71st Regiment under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.” If the troops under Pickens were meant to exhaust the British, they evidently failed. Morgan’s use of the skirmishers and militiamen was sound but not particularly effective in blunting the shock of the British charge.[18] It could be argued that it had just the opposite effect of encouraging the British to charge with even more vigor in anticipation of an easy victory.

Morgan reported that, “When the Enemy advanced to our Line, they received a well-directed and incessant Fire, but their Numbers being superiour to ours, they gained our Flanks, which obliged us to change our Position. We retired in good Order about 50 Paces.”[19] Tarleton gave the most detailed description of this phase of his attack:

The fire on both sides was well supported and produced much slaughter: The cavalry on the right were directed to charge the enemy’s left: They executed the order with great gallantry, but were drove back by the fire of the reserve, and by a charge of Colonel Washington’s cavalry. As the contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating, Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy’s right flank, would put a victorious period to the action . . . The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy’s right flank. Upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on: The continentals and back woodsmen gave ground: the British rushed forwards: An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge.[20]

“Now,” thought James P. Collins, “my hide is in the loft.”[21]

The Fortunate Volley

At this point the battle could easily have turned into a rout of the Americans, but somehow victory fell out of the jaws of defeat. The conventional explanation is that the two lines of skirmishers and militiamen had exhausted the British line, but we have seen that the skirmishers and other militiamen quickly gave way, and it seems unlikely that the British would have suddenly succumbed to fatigue when victory was so close. Morgan could offer no better explanation for his victory than that his men “formed, advanced on the Enemy & gave them a fortunate Volley which threw them into Disorder. Lt Colonel Howard observing this gave orders for the Line to charge Bayonets.”[22] Howard gave a more detailed description, but even he seemed surprised by the result of the fortunate volley of “unexpected and deadly fire”:

I soon observed, as I had but 350 men and the british about 800, that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank. To protect that flank, I ordered the company on my right [Capt. Andrew Wallace of Virginia] to change its front so as to oppose the enemy on that flank. Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them. The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order. At this moment Genl Morgan rode to me and ordered me to retreat to Washingtons horse, about 100 yards, and there form. This retreat was accidental but was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy. As soon as the word was given to halt and face about the line was perfectly formed in a moment. The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us with two field pieces, my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire. Observing that this fire occasioned some disorder in them I ordered a charge which was executed so promptly that they never recovered.[23]

Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Continentals also cited an unexpected volley:

The enemy seeing us standing in such good order halted for some time to dress their Line, which outflanked ours considerably. They then advanced on boldly, under a very heavy fire, until they got within a few yards of us, but their Line was so much longer than ours, they turned our flanks, which caused us to fall back some distance. The enemy thinking that we were broke set up a great shout, charged us with their bayonett, but in no order. We let them come within ten or fifteen yards of us, then give them a full volley, and at the same time charged them home; they not expecting any such thing, put them in such confusion that we were in amongst them with the bayonet, which caused them to give ground, and at last to take to flight.[24]

Tarleton also cited unexpected fire:

An order was dispatched to the cavalry to charge: An unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans, who came about as they were retreating, stopped the British, and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless. The part of the cavalry which had not been engaged fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line. The Americans, who before thought they had lost the action, taking advantage of the present situation, advanced upon the British troops, and augmented their astonishment. A general flight ensued.[25]

Tarleton thought he might yet escape defeat:

In this last stage of defeat Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge. The weight of such an attack might yet retrieve the day, the enemy being much broken by their late rapid advance; but all attempts to restore order, recollection, or courage, proved fruitless. Above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader, and left the field of battle. Fourteen officers and forty horsemen were, however, not unmindful of their own reputation, or the situation of their commanding officer.[26]

Maj. Thomas Young wrote that “The British broke, and throwing down their guns and cartouch boxes, made for the wagon road, and did the prettiest sort of running!”[27]

Several other reasons have been offered for Morgan’s victory. Captain Chesney cited “some dreadful bad management” and alleged that Tarleton’s cavalry “was filled up from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden” who “on seeing their own Regiment opposed to them in the rear would not proceed against it and broke.”[28] We have not been able to confirm that any of Tarleton’s British Legion cavalry were prisoners from the battle of Camden. They would presumably have been captured Maryland and Delaware Continentals, some of whom did join the British but were sent to serve in Jamaica so they would not have to fight their former comrades.[29] Tarleton had 15 of his 170 Legion cavalry killed or wounded at the Battle of Blackstock’s Plantation on the previous November 20, so about 155 of the 254 Legion cavalry officers and men at Cowpens may have been survivors of Blackstock’s.[30] The other 99 or so may have been former prisoners, if Chesney was correct, or they may have been inexperienced and inadequately trained recruits. The Legion cavalry may also have been demoralized by their defeat at Blackstock’s, while the Americans may have been encouraged by having learned that Tarleton was not invincible. Regardless, it is not clear how the Legion cavalry could be blamed for the retreat of the entire British line.

Lt. Roderick Mackenzie blamed Tarleton for the defeat, citing several errors in judgment, including not allowing his infantry sufficient rest before the battle.[31] Tarleton had been ordered by Cornwallis on January 2 to “push [Morgan] to the utmost” to prevent his threatening the crucial British post at Ninety Six, which Cornwallis considered “of so much consequence, that no time is to be lost.”[32] Two days later, however, Tarleton “had undoubted proofs, that the report which occasioned the order for the light troops to march was erroneous. The secure state of Ninety Six, and the distance of General Morgan, immediately prompted Tarleton to halt the troops under his command.”[33] Tarleton then proposed to Cornwallis a new plan to “either destroy Morgan’s corps, or push it before me over Broad river” into North Carolina.[34] After a march of about eighty miles on muddy roads and across four swollen rivers, Tarleton let his men rest from about 10 p.m. until 2 a.m. on the day of the battle.[35] Morgan, who had already decided that Ninety Six was impregnable and that Tarleton was a threat, had been withdrawing northward for several days and probably would have continued into the safety of North Carolina without being pushed.[36] Tarleton could have avoided the battle entirely, but his close pursuit forced Morgan to make a stand. When Tarleton arrived at Cowpens around dawn the Americans were ready for him, formed for battle.

Tarleton did not blame himself for his defeat, but ascribed it instead “to the bravery or good conduct of the Americans; to the loose manner of forming which had always been practised by the King’s troops in America; or to some unforeseen event, which may throw terror into the most disciplined soldiers, or counteract the best-concerted designs.”[37] Our conclusion is that Tarleton was correct about the first and last reasons—bravery and good conduct by Morgan and his troops, and the unforeseen event of the fortunate volley. Morgan did understand his own victory: it was due to the fortunate volley from the line.

[1] Charles Cornwallis to Francis Rawdon, January 21, 1781, in Ian Saberton, The Cornwallis Papers (Uckfield, UK: Naval & Military Press, 2010), 3:251.

[2] Lawrence E. Babits, A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 152.

[3] William Lorance pension application, S31217, Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Applications & Rosters, revwarapps.org/.

[4] Alexander Chesney, “The Journal of Alexander Chesney, a South Carolina Loyalist in the Revolution and After,” Ohio State University Bulletin 26, No. 4 (October 30, 1921): 22.

[5] Banastre Tarleton, History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces (Dublin, 1787), 222. Maj. Samuel Hammond of South Carolina also referred to the militia as the first line, with the troops of Howard and Triplett as the second line. Samuel Hammond in Joseph Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences Chiefly of the American Revolution in the South (Charleston: Walker & James, 1851), 528; Samuel Hammond pension application, S21807, Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Applications & Rosters, revwarapps.org/. Roderick Mackenzie, a lieutenant in the 71st Regiment at the battle, in Strictures on Lt. Col. Tarleton’s History (London: R. Jameson, 1787), 97 stated that David Ramsay’s History of the American Revolution vol. 2 (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1789), 196 was correct in writing that Morgan “drew up his men in two lines.

[6] Daniel Morgan to Nathanael Greene, January 19, 1781, in Richard K. Showman et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene (PNG) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 7:153-154. Christopher Brandon, who was in Col. Thomas Brandon’s South Carolina militia brigade, also referred to the troops under Howard and Triplett as “the line.” R. J. Gage, “Revolutionary Incidents IV,” Southern and Western Magazine and Review 2, no. 6 (December 1845): 384.

[7] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154; Brandon, “Revolutionary Incidents,” 384.

[8] James P. Collins, Autobiography of a Revolutionary Soldier (Clinton LA: Feliciana Democrat, 1859), 57. Pension applications of William Lorance S31217, James McDaniel W7424, John Cunningham W6752, Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Applications & Rosters, revwarapps.org/.

[9] Joseph McJunkin, “Narrative” (Lyman C. Draper MSS, Papers 23VV153-203), transcribed by Will Graves, Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution 2, no. 11 (November 2005): 40. Pension applications of James Clinton S2437 and Jeremiah Dial, Jr. W914, Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Applications & Rosters, revwarapps.org/. Charles Starke Myddleton, “Letter concerning the Battle of Blackstock’s Plantation,” Library of Congress – George Washington Papers, transcribed by Michael Burgess.

[10] “The line, far from complete, was led to the attack by Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton himself.” Mackenzie, Strictures, 97.

[11] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154. Tarleton, History, 223. Mackenzie, Strictures, 97. Collins, Autobiography, 57. Chesney, Journal, 22. Pension application of James Kelly S1544.

[12] See also Babits, Devil of a Whipping, 89 and note 11. Other sources suggest there were as few as 500 under Pickens.

[13] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154. Benjamin West, Sr. also stated that he “was on Flank guard duty in Colonel John Thomas’s regiment.” https://revwarapps.org/sc3384.pdf. Versions of the “Clove” and “Pigree” maps in Babits, Devil of a Whipping, 70 and 71, said to be based on Morgan’s report of the battle, also show the militia volunteers only in front of the flanks. A map on page 529 of the account by Samuel Hammond in Johnson, Traditions and Reminiscences appears to be erroneous in depicting the militiamen in a continuous line in front of the middle of the main line rather than on the flanks.

[14] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154.

[15] Brandon, “Revolutionary Incidents,” 384.

[16] Joseph Lee Boyle, “The Journal of Thomas Anderson, Delaware Regiment, Part 1, May 1780–March 1781,” Journal of the American Revolution, July 25, 2023.

https://allthingsliberty.com/2023/07/the-journal-of-thomas-anderson-delaware-regiment-part-1-may-1780-march-1781/ (accessed October 30, 2024)

[17] Mackenzie, Strictures, 98.

[18] General Greene fought the British to a draw at the battles of Guilford Courthouse on March 15, 1781, and Eutaw Springs on September 8, 1781, using a three-line deployment with militia in front that may have been inspired by what he thought was Morgan’s plan at Cowpens.

[19] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154.

[20] Tarleton, History, 216-217. Mackenzie, Strictures, 98-101, disputed much of Tarleton’s account but gave a similar description of this phase of the fighting.

[21] Collins, Autobiography, 57.

[22] Morgan to Greene, January 19, 1781, PNG 7:154.

[23] John Eager Howard to unnamed recipient, PNG 7:159-160n10.

[24] Boyle, “Thomas Anderson Journal.”

[25] Tarleton, History, 223.

[26] Ibid., 224.

[27] “Memoir of Major Thomas Young,” The Orion 3, No.3 (November 1843): 101.

[28] Chesney, Journal, 22. Chesney also accused Tarleton of behaving “bravely but imprudently.”

[29] Pension applicant David Bradley R1132 entered “the British Service under the express stipulation of not bearing arms against our countrymen in America.” The names of eleven of the seventy Maryland Continentals recorded as prisoners at the Battle of Camden, and thirty-four of the 204 recorded as missing there, are found on the Duke of Cumberland’s American Regiment, which was sent to Jamaica. “Musters of Maryland Troops, Vol. I” in Muster Rolls and Other Records of Service of Maryland Troops in the American Revolution 1775-1783 (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1900), 78-180. For additional discussion see C. Leon Harris, “Prisoners of war from the siege of Charleston and the Battle of Camden who joined the British in the Duke of Cumberland’s Regiment,” Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Applications & Rosters, revwarapps.org/b406.pdf.

[30] Tarleton, History, 177, 180, 218.

[31] Mackenzie, Strictures, 108-110.

[32] Cornwallis to Tarleton, January 2, 1781, in Tarleton, History, 244-245.

[33] Tarleton, History, 211.

[34] Tarleton, History, 246; Mackenzie, Strictures, 96-97.

[35] For maps of the movements of Tarleton and Morgan see Bill Anderson’s website “American Revolution Sites, Events, and Troop Movements by Day,” elehistory.com/amrev/SitesEventsTroopMovements.htm.

[36] Morgan to Greene, January 15, 1781, PNG 7:128.

[37] Tarleton, History, 222.