Were There Really 1,500 British Wagons on the Road to Monmouth?

“On the 18th of June, the British army, now under the command of Clinton, evacuated Philadelphia for New-York. The figure they made on the road had something the air of the sublime; for their baggage, loaded horses, and carriages, formed a line not less than twelve miles in length. General Washington, whose eye, like that of the sacred Dragon, was always open and fixed upon the enemies of America, immediately crossed the Delaware after them—pushed on detached corps to obstruct their advance—gall their flanks—and fall on their rear, while he himself moved on with the body of the army.”[1]

It’s an image synonymous with the British army during the June 1778 Monmouth campaign – an enormous line of baggage wagons snaking along a scorching, sandy road in southern New Jersey, filled with what couldn’t be packed aboard the transports bound for New York upon the evacuation of Philadelphia. Lurking nearby, a detachment of Jersey militia follows along, ready to pounce on what they hope to be their next prize.

In his public after action report to Secretary of State Lord George Germain of the march across New Jersey that would eventually lead to the Battle of Monmouth on June 28, 1778, Gen. Sir Henry Clinton reported that, “under the head of baggage was comprised not only all the wheel-carriages of every department but also the bat horses, a train which, as the country admitted but of one route for carriages, extended near 12 miles.”[2]

General Knyphausen further elaborated on the number of wagons in this extensive train, in his report of July 6, 1778 to the Landgrave, informing him that, “On the 18th the 1st Division under my command, including the whole of the artillery and provision train of the army, (numbering 1,500 wagons), marched to Haddonfield, where the Commander-in-Chief with the last Division of Lt-General Earl Cornwallis also arrived towards mid-day.”[3]

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That’s a lot of wagons.

A train of that size would not only have been a ripe target for the advanced parties of the Continental army and New Jersey militia, but it also would have presented serious logistical challenges to Clinton. To pilot the wagons, the army would need to hire at least 1,500 civilian drivers willing to make the perilous trek from Philadelphia to New York. And for horsepower, depending on whether two or four horses were harnessed to each wagon, between 3,000 to 6,000 animals would be needed, which would have consumed 30 to 60 tons of hay and 14 to 27 tons of oats or cereals per day.[4]

But, more so, it would have been, by far, the largest wagon train the British had ever fielded in its three years of operating as an active wartime army in America. From its time as a besieged force cooped up in Boston, through the New York and New Jersey campaigns of 1776 and 1777, and onward to the capture and occupation of Philadelphia, the British army had great difficulty securing and maintaining adequate land transportation. By June 1778, did General Sir Henry Clinton solve a transportation problem that had plagued both Generals Thomas Gage and Sir William Howe, finding 1,500 wagons for a twelve-mile long baggage train?

The Problem of Land Transportation in the British Army in America

The British army of the eighteenth century did not have an integrated land transportation corps to haul tents, tent poles, cooking equipment, as well as provisions. Instead of purchasing, constructing, and maintaining its own fleet of wagons, the army relied on its centuries-old practice of hiring civilian transport from the population at large. Surrounded by thousands of civilians with little desire to hire their vehicles to what they saw as an occupying foe, this method was simply impossible for the army in Boston under General Gage. In June 1775, Gen. John Burgoyne observed that, “A great part of our defeats [are] owing to want of capacity in the departments of the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General,” and that great exertions would be needed “to put us in a condition to act, particularly in the great articles of magazines, of which we are totally deficient, as well as of bread-waggons, bât-horses, artillery-horses, and many other articles necessary for an army to move to a distance”[5]

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General Gage confirmed Burgoyne’s observations in a secret dispatch to Lord Dartmouth in August 1775:

I have made your Lordship acquainted with the disadvantageous situation of His Majesty’s Forces in this place, and the more it is considered the worse it is found to be. Nothing could Justify the venturing an attack upon the Rebels, considering the strength of their Posts, and their great Numbers, but the being reduced to the Necessity of Attacking or the Hopes of obtaining very signal advantages on the supposition of a certainty in forcing the Enemy in which considerable Loss must be expected, little would be gained by it, as neither Horses, Carriages, or other Articles for moving forward could be procured[6]

Shortly after taking command upon Gage’s recall, Gen. William Howe compiled several returns and estimates of equipment and provisions both on hand in Boston, and what would be needed for the upcoming campaign of 1776, to be sent to Lord Dartmouth and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury. One of these estimates was titled “Supply of Waggons for an Army of Thirty Battalions of Infantry And Two Regiments of Cavalry for the Carriage of Baggage, Bread, And Provisions with Horses in Proportion.”

Signed off by Deputy Quarter Master General William Shirreff, it was estimated that one infantry battalion would require twelve wagons and forty-eight horses, with “4 horses to each waggon” to transport baggage, and an additional four wagons and sixteen horses to transport bread and provisions. Adding the wagons and horses needed for the baggage and provisions for the cavalry, general and staff officers, as well as the mounts needed for the cavalry and for infantry officers, an army of thirty infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments would require 540 wagons and 3,662 horses, 2,342 of which would be for the wagons.[7]

If the infantry chose instead to transport its baggage using bât-horses, or pack horses, it would reduce the number of wagons required to 260, but 4,738 horses would be needed, with 1,182 for the wagons.[8]

General Howe could only wish for such numbers. In reality, only 50 wagons and 474 horses were on hand in Boston as of November 27, 1775, according to a return of “Effective Horses & Waggons in the Garrison.”[9] The situation would never improve by the time of the evacuation of the city in March 1776. Due to the shortage of tonnage available to the army for its removal to Halifax, 27 of those 50 wagons and 79 of the 474 horses ended up being left behind. [10]

At the same time Howe was compiling his returns in Boston, Lord George Germain replaced Lord Dartmouth as the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Germain energetically sought to provide Howe with the equipment necessary to end the war as quickly as possible—ideally, as Germain hoped, with the single campaign that was about to unfold over the course of 1776. While unable to meet Howe’s full request of wagons and horses to complete his land carriage train (and confessing to Howe that he thought it wasn’t necessary), Germain ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to have 277 wagons and 1,117 sets of harness procured for the use of the British forces in North America, with 237 destined for the army under Howe. The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury granted a Mr. Fitzherbert the contract for constructing the wagons. By mid-April, they were complete and awaiting transport at Portsmouth, where they remained idle until the end of June. By then, Francis Rush Clark, who was appointed the superintendent of the train, arrived, along with 950 draught and cavalry remount horses, which were boarded on twenty-one specially modified horse transports. The wagons were stowed on troop transports belonging to the 2nd Division of Hessians bound for New York. Under the protective guns of the Ambuscade man of war, the convoy finally got underway on the 20th of July, 1776.[11]

Unfortunately for Howe, Mr. Clarke, the wagon train, and the horses did not arrive until the middle of October. A dreadful voyage of sixteen weeks killed over 40 percent of the horses embarked from Britain. Further complications kept the train from taking the field until just before Christmas, too late to be of any use during the New York campaign. Rather than wait, Howe was forced to hire, impress, or simply plunder land transport from the civilian population of Staten Island, Long Island, and Bergen County, New Jersey.[12]

What wagons remained with the army at the beginning of 1777 saw hard service through the snow and mud of the winter foraging operations in the Raritan River Valley of Central New Jersey. An inconvenient number of wagons, with their cargo of precious forage, were lost in actions against New Jersey militia and Continental army detachments.[13] At staggered points through the late Spring, the Quarter Master Department managed to hire approximately 276 wagons, 552 horses, and 276 civilian drivers for the British infantry regiments, Hessian Grenadier battalions, Waldeckers and Jaegers with General Cornwallis in New Jersey. But with General Howe intending for the army to embark for the Philadelphia campaign by sea, the term of service for these wagon teams would last only until June 30, 1777.[14] Seeing an opportunity to finally put his wagon train to use, Francis Rush Clark sought out Commissary General Daniel Wier, and asked if he was to join the expedition to Philadelphia. Weir said no. To add further insult to Clark’s injury, Wier told him that not only would he remain behind, but his train would stay as well, to be distributed amongst the regiments assigned to garrison duty on Staten Island and New York City.[15]

Fortunately for General Howe, the army managed to hire a sufficient number of wagons and drivers so that “that the Army might be able to move off its ground immediately upon its Debarkation.”[16] Despite another excruciating journey that killed over a third of the horses that set out from New York, by September 5, 1777, the land carriage train had secured enough wagons and serviceable horses to employ 286 waggoners.[17]

It was with this train that the British army entered capital of the rebellious colonies on September 24, 1777.

The Transportation Situation at the Evacuation of Philadelphia, June 1778

Only a day after arriving in Philadelphia to take command of the army from Howe, Gen. Sir Henry Clinton received his secret orders from the King and Lord Germain on May 9, 1778 to divide his army and evacuate the city for New York.[18] In his dispatches of May 23 and June 5, Clinton informed Germaine that due to the uncertain nature of shipping available to him, he would proceed to New York by land, using what tonnage was available to him for sending off heavy baggage and stores. As of June 5, Clinton reported, “I have embarked all the Baggage of the army in such Transports as are here, the Stores to considerable amount, & the greatest part of the valuable Merchandize necessary for the Troops which had been imported since His Majesty’s Forces took Possession of this Town.”[19] Commissary General Daniel Wier reported to the Secretary of the Treasury that the bulk of the provisions stored in Philadelphia were used to victual the transports, and Capt. Johann Ewald of the Hessian Jaegers observed that “likewise all the heavy guns and the entire artillery park, with everything belonging to it” were also embarked. [20] Whatever remained would need to be carried across New Jersey with the army by wagon.

With the baggage and “a large proportion of the Provisions we had here” on board transports, how many wagons and horses were available to Clinton for the march to New York?[21]

While there are no known returns for wagons with the army in May and June 1778, there are multiple returns for horses foraged by the army in Philadelphia leading up to the evacuation. One return, dated March 2, 1778, counted 3,288 horses with the army, with the Quarter Master General’s Department employing the most, 990, and each infantry regiment or battalion having between 15 on the low-end for the 37th Regiment, to 60 on the high, for the 1st Battalion of Light Infantry.[22] Little more than month later, 3,586 horses were being foraged by the army, with the Quarter Master General’s Department now employing 1,211 horses, the Light Infantry having 79, and the 37th finding one new horse, bringing it to 18 employed by the regiment. Using the figures from Colonel Shirreff’s 1775 estimate for horses and wagons needed for an army of thirty battalions, either of these numbers of horses, the 3,288 from March 2, or 3,586 from April 16, would have been more than enough to field at least 500 wagons. But Shirreff’s estimates were for wagons pulled by four horses. The composition of the teams hired in the Spring of 1777 show that the Quartermaster Department adapted to using two-horse teams for wagons, and so the number of horses on hand would have been well enough to field even 1,000 wagons.

But what about waggoners? Were there enough drivers for 1,000 wagons, let alone 1,500?

From victualling lists compiled between January 16 and May 28, 1778, there were, on average, about 325 waggoners employed by the army in Philadelphia—considerably fewer than what would be needed for fielding 1,000 wagons with the number of horses kept by the army, never mind the 1,500 claimed by Knyphausen.[23] Not only does it appear that there were far fewer waggoners than needed, there may even have been a shortage of wagons necessary to transport the remaining materiel.

General Clinton ordered the army to march with enough provisions for twenty days in the field, though he estimated that the march across New Jersey would take only ten days. Sixteen days’ worth of provision would be packed on the wagons, and the soldiers would carry the remainder as a four days’ issuance in their haversacks. As Commissary General Wier reported to the Treasury, the twenty days’ of provisions “was accordingly deposited on the Jersey side, to be taken as soon as the Troops should cross the Delaware, but it being afterwards thought proper that they should take only two days provisions on their Backs the Remainder . . . we were compelled to destroy. Every Arrangement having been before made, no Carriage could be afforded for it, & the Victuallers & all the other Vessels having been sent down the River the preceding Day, it was impossible to bring it away.”[24] In what would have been unthinkable to General Howe, who experienced chronic shortages of provisions, Clinton was forced to destroy “315 Bags of Bread, 80 Barrels of Pork, & two Hogsheads of Rum . . . at Coopers Ferry on the 18th Day of June 1778 to prevent them falling into the Hands of the Enemy, as they could not be carried on with the Army.”[25]

Despite Clinton and Knyphausen’s claims to an extensive and heavy baggage train, the primary source evidence from British army returns appear to show quite the opposite. Furthermore, while Captain Ewald did make a single reference to “the great number of wagons,” he gave no figure, and no other participant in the campaign made anything more than a passing mention of what would have been, as mentioned earlier, by far the largest land transport train in the service of the British army up to that point in the war.[26] Capt. John Peebles of the Grenadier Company of the 42nd Royal Highland Regiment had duty to “take care of the Baggage” on June 24, and made no other mention as to its size. Nor did Lt. William Hale of the Grenadier Company of the 45th Regiment, the anonymous officer of the Royal Artillery whose journal was published in (then) Capt. Francis Downman’s diary, nor Andrew Bell, confidential secretary to General Clinton; Capt. John André did estimate that the entire army as a whole comprised “a Column of 8 or 10 miles in length.” [27]

Captain Peebles, however, did leave one indirect clue as to the length of the baggage train. On the morning of the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778, Peebles observed that General Knyphausen’s Division, which included the “provision & Baggage train marched between 3 & 4 o’clock on the road leading to Middletown.” Peebles’ Division was next to step off, taking to the road “after 5 o’clock.” That Knyphausen’s Division, which numbered approximately 10,000 men, women, and children, was able to take the road and clear enough distance, along with the baggage train, to allow Peebles with his Grenadier Battalion under General Cornwallis to step off after only two hours indicates that the train must not have been very long.[28]

Another piece of evidence pointing towards a considerably smaller train comes from a victualling list taken in the field the day before and the morning of the battle. As noted earlier, there was, on average, about 325 waggoners attached to the British army in Philadelphia from January through May 1778 (the most being 358 in mid-January, and lowest numbering 278 in the beginning of April.) But, remarkably, on the 27th and 28th of June, only 180 waggoners were listed as being present at Freehold, and attached to the army, assigned to the British infantry regiments and four Hessian infantry regiments.[29] The baggage for the remainder of the Hessian corps not assigned waggoners, as well as the numerous Loyalist battalions and several army departments, were likely carried by bât-horses.[30] But with only 180 waggoners, how could there have been 1,500 wagons, as General Knyphausen reported?

Curiously, the Royal Artillery did not list any waggoners on the victualling list. But, on a separate line, they did count 261 “drivers.”[31] Monmouth Battlefield State Park historians and interpreters Michael Timpanaro and Victor Piderman estimate that there were forty-six pieces of field artillery travelling with the British Army during the Monmouth campaign.[32] These guns would have been pulled by anywhere from one horse in the case of a light three-pounder, to a team three horses in case of the heavier twelve-pounders. Each gun would require a driver for the horse or team, so at least forty-six drivers would have been employed in moving the artillery. The train of artillery would also have included a number of spare gun carriages and limbers, and wagons for ammunition, laboratory stores, and entrenching tools.[33] While it’s unknown how many of the wagons were employed by the train of artillery, there were at least 215 Royal Artillery drivers remaining available for the task. However many wagons were used, it appears there were no spare or empty vehicles available when the army moved off after the battle, as the anonymous artillery officer published in Downman’s diary lamented that, “we were under the necessity of leaving a great part of our wounded officers and men behind for want of sufficient wagons to bring them off.”[34]

The land carriage train that accompanied Clinton’s army across New Jersey was instead likely comprised of between 180 and 395 wagons, far from the 1,500 vehicles claimed by Knyphausen that formed a column that extended twelve miles, and placing it much more within the historical average of wagons employed by the British army in America. Accounting for the additional pack horses employed by the battalions and departments not furnished wagons, this reduced train would have covered approximately two to two and a half miles of road. Certainly large, and no doubt a frustrating obstacle to pass through while attempting to skirmish with American militia, as Captain Ewald complained.[35] But it was far from the heavy and extensive burden that Clinton reported to Lord Germaine. Combined with the 20,000 soldiers, civilian employees, women, and children, Captain André’s estimate of eight to ten miles for the length of the entire British column becomes much more plausible as the actual size of the army on the march towards Sandy Hook.

This leads to the question: why? While Knyphausen’s motivation is unknown, historian R. A. Bowler and Clinton biographers William B. Willcox and Frederick Wyatt have pointed out that Clinton was known to distort or outright fabricate details in his post-war narrative.[36] Summarizing Willcox and Wyatt, Bowler wrote,

For Clinton authority was an unquestioned positive value. He sought constantly to achieve it for himself and felt intense guilt when he defied it in others. But Clinton was incapable of using his own authority effectively. . . . His ineffectiveness undoubtedly created feelings of anxiety and guilt for not living up to his role as commander. So intense at times were these feelings and so urgent was the need to assuage them that the natural caution and strong moral sense which normally made [Clinton’s] accounts of events accurate and honest were completely overcome. At these times he resorted to the common ego-defense mechanisms of projection—blaming others for failings which were largely his own- and fantasy—inventing strong action or compliance with authority where there had been none.[37]

Did the destruction of the provisions at Cooper’s Ferry haunt Clinton with a sense of guilt that led him to then exaggerate the size of the provision train? Or, since he never received any public satisfaction for his role in the disaster at Charleston in 1776, did he feel the need to inflate the accomplishment of having made it to New York without having lost a single wagon? While we may never know the answer behind Clinton’s reasoning, we can certainly acknowledge that, now, on the cusp of the 250th Anniversary, the major works that inform what we do know about Clinton are now over sixty years old. With broadened access to archival records around the world, through online catalogues and large-scale digitization efforts, there is no better time return to the archival sources and begin to reexamine not only what we know about General Sir Henry Clinton, but the Revolutionary era as a whole.

[1] Parson Weems, A History of the Life and Death, Virtues and Exploits, of General George Washington, 1st Edition (Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1800), 21.

[2] Henry Clinton to George Germain, July 5, 1778, in K. G. Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783: Colonial Office Series (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972), 15:161.

[3] “Correspondence of General von Knyphausen, 1776-Sept. 1779” Letter G, G.284, Lidgerwood Collection of Hessian Transcripts, Morristown National Historic Park, Morristown, NJ.

[4] Based upon the estimates of forage required in “Supply of Waggons for an Army of Thirty Battalions of Infantry And Two Regiments of Cavalry for the Carriage of Baggage, Bread, And Provisions with Horses in Proportion,” dated November 27, 1775, CO 5/92, Part 3, f. 349v, 350r; also, T64/108 f.6v-7r, The National Archives, Kew, UK (TNA).

[5] General John Burgoyne to General Hervey, June 14, 1775, from Edward Barrington De Fonblanque Political and Military Episodes in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century. Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesman, Dramatist (London: Macmillan and Co., 1876), 140.

[6] Thomas Gage to Lord Dartmouth (Secret), August 20, 1775, CO 5/92 Part 3 f.260, TNA.

[7] “Supply of Waggons for an Army of Thirty Battalions of Infantry And Two Regiments of Cavalry for the Carriage of Baggage, Bread, And Provisions with Horses in Proportion.” CO 5/92, Part 3, f. 349v; also, T64/108 f.6v, TNA.

[8] CO 5/92, Part 3, f. 350r; also, T64/108 f7r, TNA.

[9] CO 5/92, Part 3, f. 349v; also, T64/108 f.6v, TNA.

[10] “Return of Horses, Waggons, Trucks, Hay, Beans, Bran, &c. &c. &c. Left in Boston, 17^th March 1776,” CO 5/93, Part 2, f.172, TNA.

[11] George Germain to William Howe, January 5, 1776, in Davies, ed., Documents of the American Revolution, 12:34; John Pownall to John Robinson, January 15, 1776, CO 5/147, f.19, TNA; Treasury Minutes, February 6, 1776, WO 47/87 f.158, TNA; “Narrative of Occurrences, relative to His Majesty’s Provision Train in North America,” Francis Rush Clarke Papers (no.2338), Sol Feinstone Collection, David Collection of the American Revolution, American Philosophical Society; “A List of Horse Transports, with the Numbers of Horses Embarked on board each Ship, at Portsmouth; the number Disembarked at New York; and the number that Died on board each Ship during the passage,” CO 5/93, Part 3, f.499, TNA.

[12] “Appraisement of the Waggons & Horses, taken from the Farmers of Bergen & Staten Island, for the use of the Army in the Year 1776 by Col: Billop & Colonel Seaman, Residents there,” Francis Rush Clarke Papers (no. 2338). For Howe’s General Orders regarding the need for wagons, or the limited number of wagons available, see General Orders August 26, 28, 29, September 17, 23, 24, 27, and October 1, 1776, WO 36/5, TNA. Approximately fifty-four civilian wheeled vehicles, including wagons, sleds, and sleighs were listed as plundered from or damaged in Bergen County for year 1776, New Jersey Revolutionary War Damage Claims, Claims Against the British, Bergen County, Reel 1, New Jersey State Archives.

[13] One of the largest losses of British wagons occurred at the Battle of Millstone, fought on January 20, 1777. See John U. Rees, ‘The Road Appeared To Be Full of Red Coats ‘: An Episode in The Forage War: The Battle of Millstone, 20 January 1777, www.scribd.com/document/123985060/The-road-appeared-to-be-full-of-red-Coats-An-Episode-in-the-Forage-War-The-Battle-of-Millstone-20-January-1777 .

[14] “Return of Horses and Waggons delivered to the following Corps by Lieutenant Colonel William Shirreff, Deputy Quarter Master General, between the 1st April and 30th June, 1777, being 91 Days,” The Journal of the House of Commons, October 31, 1780-October 10, 1782, Volume 38, 1104-1106.

[15] “Narrative of Francis Rush Clark,” Francis Rush Clarke Papers (no. 2338).

[16] Proceedings of a Board of General Officers of the British Army at New York, 1781,” Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1916, vol. XLIX (New York: Printed for the Society, 1916), 228.

[17] Thomas J. McGuire, The Philadelphia Campaign (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2006), 136; “Return of the Number of Men Women & Children Victualled the 5th September 1777 at the Head of Elk,” Correspondence from Daniel Weir [sic] to T. Robinson, Vol. I (1777), Series III, Box 60, Ferdinand J. Dreer autograph collection (Collection 175), The Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

[18] General Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germaine, May 10, 1778, CO 5/96 f.6, TNA.

[19] Clinton to Germaine, May 5, 1778, CO 5/236 f.115, TNA.

[20] Daniel Wier to John Robinson, June 15, 1778, T64/114, pg 63, TNA; Johann Ewald, Dairy of the American War: A Hessian Journal, trans. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 130.

[21] T64/114, 63, TNA.

[22] “Return of Horses Foraged at Philadelphia 2nd March 1778,” T64/114, 31, TNA.

[23] “Abstract of the Number of Men, Women, Children, & Waggoners victualled from the Commissary Generals Stores in Philadelphia,” T64/114, pgs. 8, 27-30, 38-39, 56, TNA.

[24] Clinton to Germain, June 13, 1778, Co5/236, f.115; Daniel Wier to John Robinson, July 23, 1778, T64/114, 67, TNA.

[25] Daniel Wier to John Robinson, July 23, 1778, T64/114, 67, TNA.

[26] Ewald, Dairy, 136.

[27] John Peebles, John Peebles’ American War: The Diary of a Scottish Grenadier, 1776-1782, ed. Ira B. Gruber (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998), 192; W.H. Wilkin, Some British Soldiers in America (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1914), 257-265; Francis Downman, The Services of Lieut.-Col. Francis Downman, R.A. in France, North America, and the West Indies, Between the Years 1758 and 1784 (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1898) 64-69; Andrew Bell, ; Journal of John André. HM 626, The Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, f.83r.

[28] Peebles, John Peebles’ American War, 193; Order of Battle, Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone, Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth Campaign, and the Politics of Battle (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 463-468.

[29] “Return of the Number of Men Wagoners Women & Children victualled at Monmouth the 27th & 28th June 1778 inclusive,” Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, Box 36, Volume 5.

[30] Bât-horses are specifically mentioned in several of General Clinton’s Orders of the Day during the march across New Jersey.

[31] Samuel Johnson defined “driver” as “one who drives beasts” or “one who drives a carriage.” Samuel Johnson Dictionary of the England Language (London: W. Strahan, 1755).

[32] Michael Timpanaro and Victor Piderman, “Artillery Supported by Infantry: The Royal Artillery at the Battle of Monmouth Courthouse,” New Jersey Studies, Volume 7, No. 1 (2021), 162.

[33] John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery (London: John Millan, 1768), 179-190; see “Train of Artillery” under the definition of “Artillery”, George Smith, An Universal Military Dictionary (London: J. Millan, 1779).

[34] Downman, The Services of Lieut.-Col. Francis Downman, 68.

[35] Ewald, Dairy, 136.

[36] R.A. Bowler, “Sir Henry Clinton and Army Profiteering: A Neglected Aspect of the Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1974): 111-122; Frederick Wyatt and William B. Willcox. “Sir Henry Clinton: A Psychological Exploration in History,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1959): 4-26.

[37] Bowler, “Sir Henry Clinton and Army Profiteering,” 116.