Quarters: The Accommodation of the British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution

Features

July 3, 2019
by Don N. Hagist Also by this Author

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Quarters: The Accommodation of the British Army and the Coming of the American Revolution by John Gilbert McCurdy (Cornell University Press, 2019)

Question: “Why did the colonists fight the British?”
Answer: “Because the British Army stayed in their houses.”

This question and answer comes from a United States government practice test for the U. S. citizenship test. Which is unfortunate, because the answer is wrong. We see this error in many places, including manuscripts that are submitted to Journal of the American Revolution. In fact, the Quartering Acts passed by the British government after the French and Indian War all expressly forbid quartering troops in private homes. One need only read the text of the Quartering Acts, which are available online, to see this. The misconception probably comes from misunderstanding one of the grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence: “For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us.”

A new book by historian John Gilbert McCurdy not only explains the true controversy over quartering in North America, but does so in a well-paced, highly readable fashion. The author delves into the history of quarters and quartering, taking a detailed but rapid journey through the challenges faced by the British government in managing the conflicting demands of the American colonies in the 1760s and 1770s. Managing the new colonies and borders established in 1763 required regular troops stationed in the colonies during peacetime, a new and expensive proposition. The first Quartering Act put the onus of supporting these troops—with both accommodations and provisions—on the colonial governments, an expense to which they objected. An expense to the colonial governments was, in effect, a tax, because the money ultimately came from the colonists themselves. Even though some of the colonies consented to build and maintain barracks, and to pay for provisions when those barracks were occupied, the law was unpopular, at least among those vehemently opposed to other British revenue policies during the era.

Rising tensions in Boston over British government policies brought quartering to the forefront in another way when troops were sent to Boston in an effort to maintain order and enforce laws. Instead of protecting the frontiers and borders, the troops were now “among us” in the eyes of Bostonians. In Great Britain, it was common practice to send troops to towns to quell riots, but only at the request of the civil government; in Massachusetts, divided sentiments and strong inclinations toward self-governance made it unlikely that civil authorities would call on soldiers, leaving the purpose of the regiments in Boston in question—at least from the perspective of the citizenry.

The author discusses the abstract concept of people’s perception of private and public spaces, and how the evolution of that concept shaped public opinion about quartering both in homes and in barracks located in towns. To his great credit, he presents this analytical view without dwelling on it for too long, and using language that is very easy to read and understand. While this aspect of the book may feel too cerebral for those who like a “just the facts” approach to history, it is not a distraction and does not interrupt the narrative flow, but instead contributes to the overall understanding of why the presence of soldiers in American cities was so contentious even though they we not quartered in private homes.

The book is a masterful telling of personal, local stories about the challenges and impacts of quartering, while maintaining a fast-paced book. We learn the different attitudes and handling of the quartering problem in each colony, along the coast and on the frontier, by the colonial governments and by the British government, from the military and the civilian perspective. Gen. Thomas Gage, often portrayed as either ineffectual or villainous, is shown in a generally favorable light as he took every measure possible to serve his government while accommodating the demands of the colonial population throughout the 1760s and early 1770s. The author’s extensive research is evident in ample end notes that cite primary sources almost exclusively. The book not only tells the story, it provides a basis for further research.

The third amendment of the United States Constitution forbids the government from quartering soldiers in private homes. The British Quartering Act of 1765, and the follow-on act of 1774, also did this. Just like taxation, colonists objected to the acts because they were Parliamentary demands for colonial governments to pay for things, without colonial representation in Parliament. It is important for American citizens not only to know their rights, but to understand why they exist. Quarters provides exactly that understanding, in a thorough and accessible manner; as such, it is indispensable reading for those interested in any aspect of the American Revolution.

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4 Comments

  • Don,

    You make a number of interesting points that are worthy of further consideration:

    1. the importance of resources such as JAR and its informed editors, to correct erroneous submissions before publication. If only the uninformed preparers of the U. S. citizenship tests made a similar effort. . . ;

    2. one cannot understand the reasons for the Rev War if they do not actually read the law in effect at the time. Many historians and commentators neglect this important starting point before launching off on a condemnation of England’s policies (thus uninformed, current day history teachers, U. S. officials, etc.);

    3. give credit to and and consider the financial impact of the Seven Years War on England and the not-unreasonable effort to have the colonies contribute to paying some portion of it. The Stamp Act was not onerous (the North Americans experienced very little taxation and led comfortable lives compared to other colonies), but a misguided attempt to invoke some measure of authority in distant colonies that had grown too comfortable in their ability to exploit time and distance from the metropolitan center to their advantage;

    4. the quandary presented by Britain’s need to protect its colonies (not just North America) following the war when it reduced the number of expensive frontier forts, reassigned the many troops manning them and placed them at strategic points, such as along the Atlantic seaboard, and where they required housing, vis-a-vis barracks. Importantly, the North Americans cannot reasonably have contended that Britain ever withheld its protection from them at any point thus allowing them to withdraw their allegiance and justify their heading off into the Revolution; it simply makes no legal sense and greatly undermines any assessment that the underpinnings of the war were legitimate;

    5. that Thomas Gage was not the tyrant that history has painted him, but was a well-intentioned overseer of British policy caught up in the requirements of conflicting colonial laws and royal directives – see my article Thomas Gage Reconidered: When Law Interfere with War: https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/08/thomas-gage-reconsidered-when-law-interferes-with-war/

    6. lastly, what was the quartering issue like in Britain’s many other colonies? Was North America singled out for special treatment in any way or was it simply part of a uniform practice? If the same, then what is the justification for the claim in the Declaration?

  • As you rightly mention the Quartering act never gave the British army permission to occupy private homes however if I understand correctly it did allow for the British army to occupy, certain unoccupied private buildings such as warehouses, with the guarantee that the owner could be compensated. I believe this is the part of the act which has been misinterpreted

  • Your last paragraph states that the “second amendment forbids he government from quartering soldiers in private homes”. That should read “the third amendment”. Thank you for a lead on a good read.

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